Football Mythbusters: Breaking Down "The Wildcat"

(Photo by Doug Benc/Getty Images)

MYTH: “A year from now the Wildcat will be fading away, almost gone, another toy gone to the gimmick gravesite.” (Pete Prisco, June 9, 2009)

FACT: The opposite is true.  Though the Wildcat formation lost some of its effectiveness last year when teams started run-blitzing it, it will come back stronger and be used by more teams this year.

Just to clarify, I am referring to the Wildcat formation as run by the Miami Dolphins, not just any direct snap play. 

For example, in Super Bowl XLIII, Willie Parker ran to the right on a direct snap where Roethlisberger was out wide to the left and there were three players on the right (I don’t remember if it was three WRs, or one TE and two WRs. I can’t find a video of this play anywhere to verify it either).

It was obvious before the play even started that Parker was running to the right: There’s no way a team would make their QB block during the Super Bowl, because if he had gotten hurt, it would have been disastrous.

Parker ran around for a few seconds, but was tackled for no gain. This play was destined to fail due to the obviousness of where Parker was running, and it completely lacked the versatility and creativity of the Wildcat. 

However, Madden and Michaels referred to it as the Wildcat during the game, and columnists afterward started saying that play was proof that defenses had finally figured out how to stop the Wildcat. 

That couldn’t be farther from the truth.

This picture shows the Wildcat formation as employed by the Miami Dolphins last year.

They had a receiver out wide to the left, RB Ricky Williams in the left slot, RB Ronnie Brown in the shotgun, and QB Chad Pennington out wide to the right.

Basically, there are three main options for the RB taking the snap: Hand the ball off, keep it and run with it, or pass. Before the play, the slot RB motions towards the right.

When the ball is snapped, the RB in the shotgun hands the ball off as the slot RB crosses in front of him. The slot RB runs around on the sweep to the right, and the shotgun RB runs up the middle as if he has the ball.

On the other hand, the shotgun RB could keep the ball and run up the middle, but first he has to pretend to hand the ball off to the slot RB, who runs around to the right as if he has the ball.

This helps freeze the defense: Since both the shotgun RB and the slot RB run as if they have the ball, the defense isn't sure who really has it.

There's also the third option of the shotgun RB throwing the ball. This is where Miami's Wildcat offense will improve significantly this year.

The reason that Miami put a RB in the shotgun was because they didn't have a fast QB. Eventually, Ronnie Brown’s inability to throw as well as a QB led to teams such as Baltimore run-blitzing and slowing down the Wildcat.

Now that they have a speedy QB in Pat White, if defenses run-blitz to stop the Wildcat, the Dolphins will be able to make them pay through the air.  Defenses will have to be conscious of this, leaving more running room in order to defend against the pass.

If your QB is a fast guy, such as Pat White or Vince Young (who often ran this formation in college), then you have the advantage of not having to line your QB out wide and risking injury to him.

You're currently logged into Facebook

Do you want to share your Bleacher Report activity on Facebook?