Arsenal Christmas Schedule: Solving the Full-Back Problem

The Arsenal-City match was just the first of a gruesome Christmas schedule.  Here's how it looks.

Date	Place	Team
Dec. 21	A	Villa
Dec. 26	H	Wolves
Dec. 31	H	QPR
Jan. 02	A	Fulham

After the disappointing loss at City, Arsenal need to resume their winning streak in order to consolidate their position on the table. Already, Liverpool have tied them on points, therefore any slip could prove costly.

I have said elsewhere that Arsenal may not be able to advance beyond sixth or seventh position after these series of matches. I said this in consideration of other teams, relative to Arsenal vis-à-vis the ease or difficulty of each team's schedule.

Arsenal's current position at fifth on the table is a rung or two better than my projection. Should Arsenal maintain this position after this demanding schedule, they'd be in a strong position to challenge for a top-four finish.

It is therefore incumbent on the team to win at Villa, for while a draw might not seem costly, it could have an undesirable effect both on the team's psychology and on its chances at finishing in the top four. So in all honesty, it's win or bust.

But the big challenge for Arsenal is the team's current problem with injury. At present, there are no experienced full-backs available. Johan Djourou, a center-back, who has recently been used as a makeshift right-back, limped off the field injured in the City match.

So he joins Bacary Sagna (broken leg), Carl Jenkinson (stress fracture), Kieran Gibbs (stomach) and Andre Santos (ankle) on the sideline.

Djourou's injury has been acknowledge by Arsene Wenger, the Arsenal manager, as a big factor in the loss to City.

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Djourou's injury may have cost Arsenal the match against Manchester City

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Djourou's inability to continue meant Arsenal's entire back four had to be reshuffled, with Laurent Koscielny shifting from a center-back position to play in the right-back position. It was a breach in this position that led to the City goal.

When Arsenal played Everton a week ago, lack of full-backs limited their attacking thrust. This, of course, is a huge tactical drawback. Therefore, it is a problem Arsenal have to confront as they tackle this difficult series of matches.

What can they do to limit the effect of this drawback both on the team and the results of the coming matches?

I examine the question in the following slides.

Eliminate the Full-Backs 1: The Case of Barcelona

Progressive football requires constant modulation and adaptation. This is why, at the moment, Barcelona are ahead of everyone else; it is also the reason why Jose Mourinho, as brilliant as he is, has been unable to find an answer to the Catalans.

Take a look at this formation; Barcelona often used it last season. The big red triangle represents the structural pyramid, which every coach or informed pundit is aware of. The interesting thing here is that Barcelona's is deployed differently and very strategically.

So where is the tip? It is surprisingly occupied by Dani Alves. In other words—and as many know—Dani Alves is not a conventional full-back. As a matter of fact, Barcelona are most effective when he doesn't function as such. This is also the reason why Dani Alves is often mediocre in the Brazil colors but excellent in Barcelona's.

The simple secret is that Barcelona have found an effective way to use him. And here is the key word for our purpose—effective.

The only match that I have seen in which Barcelona have been excellent all around is their recent match against Santos in the FIFA Club World Cup final. Their passing and control of the rhythm and the tempo of this match was simply excellent.

But many who have watched Barcelona this season have noticed the lack of their accustomed fluidity. This is not unconnected to the fact that Pep Guardiola has seldom, if at all, played the same lineup in contiguous matches this season. He has continued the formational tinkering he began during preseason. And now in hindsight, we can appreciate why.

Barcelona overcame Real Madrid in the just concluded Clásico by outmaneuvering them tactically. In an apparent concern for the 4-3-3 formation that Mourinho had said he would use in the match, Guardiola opted for a back four, which he abandoned ten minutes into the match because Barcelona struggled to cope with Madrid.

But more importantly, they could not play near any of their accustomed fluidity. When they reverted to a three-man defense, they gradually took control of the match. Alves was free to fall into his normal groove. Recall that some of the most threatening balls into the Madrid area were supplied by Alves. One of them, of course, resulted into a goal.

So what is my point here?

It is simply this: A team does not have to play with full-backs. And in our situation where we don't have any, what can be done is a simple structural reshuffling. I say simple because it is simple. 

Now, a few of you may be alarmed by the prospect, but you need not be because a pre-planned reshuffling is better than a spur-of-the-moment re-ordering of the back line as happened in the City match.

Let me say a few words on the Barcelona formation. The majority of it is culled from my earlier article on the Olympiakos match, which I believe many of you missed.

The diagram shows Barcelona's distribution in the entire space of the pitch. Here is what I wrote in that past article. I have changed the first sentence slightly.

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Whenever Barcelona line up to play out from the back, Eric Abidal takes up the position shown in the diagram, high at the extreme left of the pitch, while Dani Alves moves—counter-intuitively—up the pitch toward the halfway line.

David Villa rides high to the opposite end of the pitch on the left. This completes the weird diamond.

The yellow arrows show the strategic movement the players make from their default positions into the exposed spaces.

The black lines show how Barcelona make their incessant triangles. The blue circle shows Messi's roaming space; the solid gold arrow, his devastating diagonal run that often results in goals. David Villa is the trump card for the patient passing build-up, which is the hallmark of Barcelona. 

The passing is psychologically employed to tire out the opponent's defense and make them lose concentration, at which time David Villa springs the trap that beats the offside trap.

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Dani Alves is not a conventional right-back

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What is interesting for our purpose is how this team plays with three defenders at the back, yet is still able to dominate its opponents. So it is possible to play with three at the back, and it isn't a difficult adjustment to make.

Wigan employed three defenders in their Chelsea match, and I had never seen them play with three at the back before. A week before, Spurs had changed from a four-man defense to a three-man defense in the second half of their Stoke match, and it was only after this change that they took control of the match.

Here's my question, then, to any Gooner who might think a shift to three defenders for Arsenal is dangerous. How is it that Wigan and Spurs can do so, but we can't? It seems to me that any "can't" is either an indication of unwarranted fear or of susceptibility to the fear of change that afflicts everyone from time to time.

To eliminate the current problem of full-backs is simple: Don't play them!  You don't really need them.

I elaborate on this in the following slide. 

Eliminate the Full-Backs 2: The Conventional Need of the Full-Backs, 4-4-2

Full-backs are the most potent specie in a 4-4-2 to 4-4-2 duel because, as you can see from the diagram, they're the ones left unaccounted for in an attacking situation, when the rest of the players cancel each other out. They alone, theoretically, have the freedom to maraud forward in an attacking situation.

This may explain why Brazilian full-backs are very dangerous, since they have a natural knack to maraud forward. When 4-4-2 came to prominence and became a dominant formation in modern football, the usefulness of full-backs as attacking threats quickly became apparent.

The most useful contribution of full-backs in the 4-4-2 formation is the attacking firepower they provide. Though this is not limited to 4-4-2.

The above, therefore, may explain why Andre Santos, in his first few matches for Arsenal, looked dangerous going forward but very mediocre when defending because when properly understood, the function of full-backs primarily is not defending, despite their default positioning in this role.

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Santos displays the attacking instinct natural to a Brazilian full-back.

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This also may have a lot to do with Arsenal's attacking lethargy in the Everton match since the natural overlapping runs, which the likes of Santos, Kieran Gibbs, Carl Jenkinson and Bacary Sagna normally provide the team, was lacking in this match.

In modern football, since full-backs primarily are not defenders in the technical sense of the word, it makes no sense to play footballers in that position who lack the attacking instinct of real full-backs.

So how do you handle the marauding full-backs of the opposition if you don't play full-backs of your own? Let's continue to the next slide.

Eliminate the Full-Backs 3: Countering the Full-Backs

The 4-3-3 formation was invented to counter the threat of the marauding full-backs. In the 4-3-3 formation, the two wide attackers—traditional wingers—curb the attacking instinct of the full-backs.

It's always interesting to watch Theo Walcott duel Ashley Cole whenever Arsenal play Chelsea. In the last two meetings between the two teams, Walcott has had the better of Cole. The wingers force the full-backs of a sister 4-3-3 or of a 4-4-2 to sit back and defend.

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Wide forwards, such as Theo Walcott, curb the attacking instinct of full-backs, such as Ashley Cole

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Here is what it means tactically: It hands the advantage to the 4-3-3 formation when played against the 4-4-2 formation. This is why many attack-minded coaches, including Wenger, switched from the 4-4-2 formation to 4-3-3. 

There are two major advantages. First, the 4-3-3 full-backs have more freedom to maraud forward than their counterpart in the 4-4-2 system.

Notice, for example, that if the wingers of the opposing 4-4-2 attempt to counter them, they leave the two holding midfielders of the 4-3-3 unmarked. If the two center-forwards decide to make up for this shortcoming, they leave the two center-backs of the 4-3-3 free to join the attack.

Second, the 4-3-3 has more bodies in the midfield when attacking. To counter this, the 4-4-2 can withdraw its forward two to help in defense, but this frees up the center-backs of the 4-3-3, meaning the 4-3-3 can retain possession and recommence the attack.

What is important for us here, though, is the countering effect of the wingers on the opposing full-backs. As it touches the current subject therefore, it means that so long as Arsenal play the normal forward three, it can account for the threat of the full-backs.

Eliminate the Full-Backs 4: The Roaming Defender and Fluidity of the 3-1-2-1-3

A careful study of the 3-1-2-1-3 formation reveals its versatility. First of all, the only difference between it and the normal 4-3-3 (4-2-1-3) that Arsenal play is the extra personality in the hole between the back three and the two holding midfielders.

In attack, things remain the same, and the forward three retain their normal function in an attacking situation. The two forwards in the flanks can moreover track back to help in the defense, combining with the midfielders to form a five-man line.

The roaming defender falls back with the back three to form a four-man defense line. Where and how he falls back can be sorted out during practice, the yellow arrows provide some suggestions.

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Emmanuel Frimpong could play in the roaming role.

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Essentially then, this formation modulates to a 4-5-1 formation in a defensive situation. In their default 4-2-1-3 (or 4-2-1-2-1) formation, Arsenal often modulates to a 4-5-1 formation in their more defensively-minded games, such as their match against Marseille in France. So using this proposed formation is nothing novel.

Now back to its versatility, you'd notice, if you study the diagram carefully, that it can handle the formations in current use.

The big defensive advantage it provides is that the roaming defender (libero) can destroy any false nine or creative midfielder in the mold of David Silva, Sergio Aguero, Rafael van der Vaart or Wayne Rooney.

During attack, he can be the tempo setter, but he can also enable the team to modulate however it wants: 3-2-2 2-1, 3-1-3-3, or 3-1-2-3-1, etc.

I ask again. If Wigan can quickly adapt this formation against a team of Chelsea's caliber, why do we think Arsenal can't?

Again, since Arsenal don't have full-backs due to injury, why persist in converting center-backs into an unnatural position when the need for full-backs can be eliminated (for now) altogether? 

A back three means that Arsenal's three solid center-backs can be played in their more natural position, albeit a little more spaced.

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Arsenal have three solid center-backs, such as Thomas Vermaelen, who could form a solid three-man defense.

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I may elaborate on this issue in another article.

Your comments are highly solicited and coveted.