Are Real Madrid Taking a Risk by Restructuring the Club's Youth Academy?
It's a debate that's rarely been far from the surface, perpetually simmering like a Bulgarian stew. In football's biggest rivalry, Real Madrid versus Barcelona, it's a sub-plot, a secondary war on a sort of moral front, that's almost as fierce as the main event if not as public.
It's La Fabrica versus La Masia: a battle of reputation and standing between the respective canteras or youth academies of these footballing behemoths. One that dramatically shapes the wider perception of contrast between these clubs' ideologies.
Last month, however, this subsidiary fight bubbled to a boil, capturing centre stage in the rivalry, each side taking aim at the other's supposed failings in youth development.
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On Aug. 21 in Madrid, Marca ran the headline, "The Sunset of La Masia" across its cover, arguing Barcelona's revered production line was slowing. Little more than a week later, Sport in Catalonia seized upon an opportunity to respond, proclaiming "Rafa Benitez abandons Real Madrid youth players."
Putting aside Barcelona and La Masia, what prompted the latter headline was Madrid's starting XI against Real Betis at the Bernabeu on Aug. 29.
Featuring Keylor Navas, Danilo, Raphael Varane, Sergio Ramos, Marcelo, Luka Modric, Toni Kroos, James Rodriguez, Gareth Bale, Cristiano Ronaldo and Karim Benzema, Real's starting lineup was without a single youth product, and contained just one Spaniard—the first time that's happened in 50 years.
Admittedly, four Spaniards were present on the bench that evening, three of them youth products, but it was an occurrence that took one's mind back to one of the under-the-radar events of the summer: the restructuring of Real Madrid's academy.
In this case, "restructuring" is a polite way of saying compressing. Last September, club president Florentino Perez announced his intention to overhaul the structure of La Fabrica, describing his goal, per AS, "to reduce the number of teams in the Cantera. We studied that Castilla and Madrid C should merge and we want to reduce the 'Juveniles' teams to one." His belief was that such action would "optimise" the academy.
Essentially, the plan was to remove the C team, Juvenil B and Juvenil C, the sort of thing that a business with an affection for hip terms would call streamlining. To date, the Juvenil teams have remained in place (for now), but in July the C team was officially disbanded and now represents a part of history. "Adios to 40 players," said AS afterward, pointing at a likely mass exodus.
By early August, Marca's departure list had passed 30 (though, admittedly the tally included loan moves). Among them: Jack Harper to Brighton, Sergio Molina to Stoke, Alberto Lozano to Rayo Vallecano, Agoney Gonzalez to Borussia Dortmund, Djakaridja Traore to Olot, Gonzalo Merchan to Moscardo, David Oliveros to Girona, Oriol Ayala to Palamos, David Tejero to Fuenlabrada, Marcos Legaz to Deportivo La Coruna and Rai to Valencia.
That's just a selection demonstrating how far and wide some of the cantera's products have gone; there are more, and others are yet to find new homes.
But what does all this mean?
The theory behind Perez's scrapping of the C team—which could be followed by the removal of two of the three Juvenil sides in the near future—is to cultivate an environment in which only the best exist. By culling the numbers, internal competition is driven north, playing opportunities are suddenly coveted rather than readily available.
In turn (again in theory), each team is made stronger without the need for resources to be stretched, the very finest available in each age group coming together to form a smaller number of deeper, more talented squads.
For Real Madrid Castilla, the B team, that might translate into a capacity to push for promotion back into the Segunda Division, the Spanish second tier which is vastly superior to the regional third of the Segunda Division B in which Castilla currently compete.
But there are problems in all of this; this initiative isn't without risk.
Over the coming week, the name Raul will be thrown about consistently. Real Madrid's all-time leading goalscorer with 323 strikes in a glittering, 741-game career at the Bernabeu, Raul is set to be overtaken by Ronaldo, who's now just two goals behind the Spaniard.
Raul once played in Real Madrid C.
As did Iker Casillas.
As did Guti.
Others to do so include Alvaro Arbeloa, Diego Lopez, Esteban Granero, Mista, Javier Portillo, Juan Mata and Jose Callejon. And in what is now staggeringly symbolic, Raul, the most iconic of all, found his way to Real Madrid C from Atletico Madrid, when former president Jesus Gil cut down Atleti's academy. "[This] won't affect the production of more Rauls," said Perez of his plans for the C team last September.
Can he be sure of that?
The major issue with removing the C team from the club's structure is the immense gap it leaves between Juvenil A and Castilla.
Instead of having a stepping-stone between the two, players are now confronted with a pathway that jumps from Under-18s to professional senior football, from the Division de Honor to possibly the Segunda. That's fine for some, but it won't work for just as many.
Footballers, like players in any sport, develop at different rates. We've all played with or against that man-child in under-age sport, that kid who's already got 14 abs, rippling biceps and hair on his chest while you're still going through your awkward pubescent days listening to Linkin Park.
In that same age group, we've also played with that kid who's so small, so scrawny, you think he'll be going to Show and Tell on Monday or driven home from training in a booster seat.
The former, at the time, is a monster, indomitable; the latter just gets dominated. Yet, genetics, timing of growth phases and accumulation of maturity are hardly uniform—how often do you see the more physically developed kid flame out when his peers eventually catch up to him in stature? How often do you see the kid at the other end of the spectrum shine once he eventually gains a little size?
It's the same with technical ability, composure and game awareness: The progression of such attributes isn't linear or predictable, instead gathered by players at different junctures in their formative years. One player might have the lot at 16; another might need until he's 20.
Remember, the ones who come through first aren't always the best.
Thus, this is the issue Real Madrid's academy faces by cutting out the halfway point, the C team, between Juvenil A and Castilla.
Suddenly, the club has a situation in which talented youngsters will inevitably slip through the cracks, the immense gap in the pathway meaning only those who've developed quickly, both physically and psychologically, will be capable of making the jump. The late bloomers, the smaller bodies, those who need time to mature: They're likely to fall out of the system.
Some wouldn't have made it anyway, but some might have, perhaps just needing a succession of smaller steps in front of them rather than one big one.
But does any of this actually matter in the bigger picture? Even if Perez's "optimisation" proves unsuccessful, do Real Madrid really need to be developing their own vast pool of talent for the success of the senior team?
In the short term, probably not. With an annual revenue figure now in excess of €600 million (£437.4 million), the Bernabeu-based outfit under Perez appears content pursuing its stars via the transfer market, the club's financial clout allowing it to eclipse most of the continent.
In 2013, Gareth Bale was the example of that. In 2014, it was James Rodriguez. This summer, Real were able to fork out a fortune on Danilo and Mateo Kovacic simply to strengthen the supporting cast. Few have such a luxury.
But what if the football landscape were to change?
Back in 2008, as the game went on a hunt for greater competitive balance, FIFA was in favour of the "six-plus-five rule."
Though ultimately never introduced, the proposed rule was to limit the number of foreign players in an XI to just five, which would have forced clubs to focus more intently on homegrown players—who, by FIFA's definition, had to be eligible for the national team in that particular country. The European Commission opposed the proposal on the grounds it was discriminatory.
Seven years on, though, competitive balance in the game is just as scarce, if not more so. The gap between the "haves" and "have nots" is growing ever wider, a tiny collection of super clubs emerging to dominate Europe like never before.
"Bayern, Barca and Real have occupied 15 of the past 24 [Champions League] semifinal places going back to 2010," wrote ESPN FC's Miguel Delaney this week. "It's a domination that is unprecedented in European Cup history going back to 1955. There has never been such a lack of diversity, but that's because there has never been such a difference in cash." Inevitably, there are those looking for solutions.
When FA chairman Greg Dyke announced in March his plans to increase the homegrown player quota in English squads from eight to 12, he was strongly supported by UEFA president Michel Platini. "This is a position we defend," said Platini. "We're not only talking about England, we're talking all of Europe."
In July, Platini expanded on his position in an interview with World Soccer Magazine:
"What will be important in the future is to limit the possibility to have the best players in one or two teams. That is important for competition. If everybody is in one team, this is not so good, and [with] the Bosman rule, it was difficult at the beginning, but people know that now.
I totally support the agenda saying that we need more home-grown players, because it is not possible to fight on nationality. However, we have meetings in September with Mr [Jean-Claude] Junker and the European Commission to work on this.
It cannot be possible that the best teams should have all the best players, or competition itself is finished. At the moment, you have big clubs with a lot of money who can have everybody. We have to think about football in all of Europe – not only in two or three clubs.
"
Whereas FIFA's definition of a homegrown player was one eligible for the national team, UEFA considers a player homegrown if he's spent at least three seasons between the ages of 15 and 21 trained by a club in that national association, regardless of nationality. For example, Cesc Fabregas, who's Spanish but was groomed at Arsenal, is considered homegrown in England.
Certainly, any action to change homegrown player quotas is still some distance from fruition, and may not happen at all. But still, UEFA's long-term objective appears clear: To some extent prevent Europe's super clubs from stockpiling established global talent, and force a more inward approach based on domestic player development.
At Real Madrid, that could possibly mean the club's senior squad would have to take on a different complexion to the one it has now.
Under tighter homegrown player regulations, Madrid might not be able to round up Ronaldo and Bale and Rodriguez and Benzema and Kroos and Modric and Danilo and Marcelo and Varane and Kovacic and Casemiro and Pepe and Navas. A few might need to be shed; the club would possibly need more Daniel Carvajals, Jeses, Lucas Vazquezs or Nachos in the mix.
We're talking a considerable way down the line here, of course, but if such action is in the minds of the game's governing bodies, at the very least vague ideas on how to react should be in the minds of the clubs: How might it affect our transfer market strategy? What mechanisms would need to be in place in order to cope successfully? What would be the necessary objectives for our own production line of talent?
Real Madrid might view such a situation as one that simply requires a transfer focus that's closer to home. Isco, developed at Valencia, would be considered homegrown. Ramos, developed at Sevilla, would be too.
Such players might become more prominent targets than those overseas. But remember, if a homegrown player quota was enforced, prising domestically developed players from rival Spanish clubs would be more difficult than it is now; the premium placed upon them would possibly see clubs reluctant to sell.
Thus, it all comes back to one's own academy: Can a club produce its own—talent bred to its own ethos and philosophy that can seamlessly fit into the first XI?
Right now, it's not a necessity. But in the coming years it might be, meaning Real Madrid have taken a risk in dissolving one of the components, the steps, in its own production line.
Under a new, compressed structure, talent could easily slip through the system.
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