GM Decision Huge For Mariners

Larry Stone had a great column in the Seattle Times about the Mariners’ current search for a new general manager.

Stone uses the men responsible for building the rosters for each team in current ALCS matchup as an example of how the new breed of general managers in the industry has transformed the position.

Theo Epstein and Andrew Friedman, as mentioned within the article, are each sharp, young baseball minds who fit into the Ivy League GM mold. (Granted, Friedman attended Tulane.) It is hard to deny with their success, despite their youth, and Stone writes that the M’s should keep this in mind during the upcoming search.

Stone:

As the Mariners strive to fill their GM position, they can't avoid paying heed to the dramatic changes the job has undergone.

No longer is the prevailing prototype that of the cigar-chomping baseball lifer who uses his gut instincts to formulate a roster — though Pat Gillick, who has guided the Phillies into the National League Championship Series at age 71 (minus the cigar), is proof that the GM job is not the total province of the fuzzy-cheeked.

…Indeed, the "Moneyball" argument that raged just five years ago with the publication of Michael Lewis' landmark examination of the Oakland A's and their trendsetting GM, Beane, has already become passé.

No longer is it a question of "stats vs. scouts." No organization would dare operate without at least dabbling in sabermetric analysis and trying at some level to exploit market inefficiencies that were the A's lifeblood.

"I would be surprised if any organization doesn't do both," said Dombrowski, referring to the statistics versus scouts dichotomy. "Now it's a matter of how you emphasize one versus the other."

In all honesty, no matter who they choose, things cannot possibly get any worse in Seattle. In fact, it would be difficult to choose a baseball operations leader who could possibly prove to be any more incompetent than Bill Bavasi, whose disastrous run as GM came to its ultimate end when he was fired earlier this season.

From the Carlos Silva debacle to Jarrod Washburn to Richie Sexson, and many more blunders, Bavasi turned a blind eye to advanced statistical analysis and a wave of progressive baseball analysts who criticized most of his moves (at the time they were made). His close-minded approach produced a set of results—including a near 100-loss season in 2008, all for over $100-million—that speak for themselves.

Epstein and Friedman, on the other hand, have shown that they are open to all useful information if it will help their club win baseball games. They could care less about the source, and are more concerned with using the right tools to generate strong results.

In particular, Friedman—a 27-year-old former Bear Stearns employee—values information of all sorts. Whether it is quantitative analysis or more traditional measures of evaluating talent, he is a general fan of intelligent information that can help him make the best decision in the end.

Clearly, that seems to be an effective approach. While Friedman has had a strong right-hand man in Gerry Hunsicker, his ability to find value is, in part, a result of his open-m

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