Ozzie Guillen's Late-Game Strategies Fail White Sox: Can Ozzie Ball Win Games?

The Cleveland Indians took the rubber match of their three-game series with the Chicago White Sox on Thursday, winning 5-3 in 11 innings.

In the game, Sox manager Ozzie Guillen sent Andruw Jones out for his first start in a Chicago uniform, penciling him in as the center fielder and moving regular center fielder Alex Rios to left.

But while that move worked out fine (Jones reached base twice and stole second base off Jamey Wright in the sixth inning), others of Guillen's decisions should draw vigorous criticism.

In the seventh inning, trailing by one run, Guillen elected to have second baseman Gordon Beckham bunt over designated hitter Juan Pierre, who had drawn a walk. Pierre, the White Sox's prime base-stealing threat and one of the American League's fastest players, got no opportunity to steal second before Beckham (one of the team's three best hitters, by any measure) sacrificed himself.

Although that was almost certainly the wrong choice, Guillen will draw little fire for it, because right fielder Carlos Quentin bashed a go-ahead home run that made his manager seem like a genius.

In the ninth inning with the game tied, the White Sox were not so lucky.

Pierre got on base to lead-off the inning again—and again, Beckham was asked to lay down a bunt. Cleveland manager Manny Acta responded by calling for an intentional walk of Quentin, and when first baseman Paul Konerko and Jones struck out, the inning was suddenly over.

Beckham had struck out with the bases loaded in the fifth inning, but that does not excuse Guillen's managerial gaffe.

If anything, the adversity experienced by the team's young star should have led Guillen to reinforce his confidence in Beckham.

Instead, he twice engaged in a questionable strategy for even the worst hitters, and one that certainly cost the White Sox scoring opportunities given the quality of Beckham's forfeited batting skills.

Worse, the move shows a gross negligence of Guillen's considerable and versatile offensive assets.

Pierre should have been looking for opportunities to steal a base in an extremely high-leverage situation, rather than jogging from first to second as the play occurred behind him.

Guillen insisted all spring that he was eager to make use of his team's speed when employing one-run strategies. Stripping Pierre of the chance to swipe a high-leverage base entirely undercuts that assertion.

"Ozzie Ball," as Guillen's affection for one-run strategies has become known on Chicago's South Side, has its merits.

But when Guillen willingly gives up outs without need or takes the bat out of the hands of his best hitters, those merits evaporate, even on bitterly cold April nights in Chicago.