MU Finance plc’s bond prospectus?
I think the answer to both is c.
If a U.S. court is asked the same questions and agrees with me, then things could potentially get very expensive for the Glazer family.
Such is the norm with modern debt and equity issues in our—and particularly America's— litigious culture.
The risk factors cover a huge range of potential pitfalls—from player injuries, to the nature of English insolvency law, to the terrorist attacks I mentioned above.
The reason that the list is so long—other than the fact that football is inherently a risky business—is that if any substantial risks are not disclosed and then come to pass, the issuer can be sued by people who bought the bonds.
In U.S. courts, not only can investors sue for the amount invested, but also for punitive damages in cases in which business risks were not adequately disclosed.
Such punitive damages can be several multiples of the original amount invested.
Although things have calmed down since the wave of post-dot.com bubble litigation and the aftermath of the credit crunch in 2008, U.S. investors in bonds and equities frequently turn to the courts when they believe a company that has sold them securities has not shared all the relevant information it has with them.
Red Football, of course, chose to sell bonds in the U.S. to “qualified institutional buyers” under the 1933 Securities Act, making the identification of risks very important.
The bond prospectus not only lists numerous risk factors, it also makes the following statement:
“The risks and uncertainties we describe below [in the risk factors section] are not the only ones we face. Additional risks and uncertainties of which we are not aware or that we currently believe are immaterial may also adversely affect our business, financial condition or results of operations.” (Page 28 of pdf version)
This raises the question of whether the risk of action by supporters was considered “immaterial” and was therefore deliberately not mentioned—or whether Red Football’s management was aware of it.
Years of ticket price rises, the lack of transfer activity last summer, and news that total debt had passed the £700m mark had already increased supporters’ concerns by the end of 2009.
The publication of the prospectus was always going to anger supporters, as it revealed for the first time all the cash extracted from the club by the Glazers and their intention to take much, much more in the future.
When he heard the answer, he didn’t like it.
As the saying goes, I’m no lawyer, but I have seen hundreds of securities offering documents over the years—and I have a fair idea what constitutes a material risk and what doesn’t for United’s “business, financial condition, or results of operations."
If I were a bondholder, and in the next few months supporters groups call a boycott with a significant number of season ticket and executive ticket holders taking part, I’d have a lot of questions to ask about why the risk of such an event was not disclosed— and why even the existence of opposition to the owners was not disclosed.
But before I asked those questions, I’d call my lawyers—and I’d make sure they were in America.