Heroes and Goats: Notes on Game Four of the 2009 World Series

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Johnny Damon and Alex Rodriguez provided the heroics for the Yankees in their 8-5 win Sunday night in Game Four of the 2009 World Series, but when there are heroes in the game of baseball, there also must be goats.

Unlike other sports, baseball is mostly a zero sum game.

If a pitcher gets a really big (or final) out, then the hitter didn't "come through in the clutch." If a hitter gets the big hit, such as Pedro Feliz hitting a game tying home run in the bottom of the eighth, then the goat is the pitcher who served up the gopher ball. In the latter case, that would be Joba Chamberlain. 

Chamberlain gave up the tying homer when he perpetuated one of pitching’s cardinal sins, missing your location. On that fateful pitch to Feliz, catcher Jorge Posada called for a fastball low and away. Chamberlain threw the ball up and over the plate, missing his location by a good two feet.

Joba got away with the same pitch two batters earlier, when he struck out Jayson Werth leading off the inning, but Feliz should be credited with looking at the pitch sequence to Werth, and adjusting to the 3-2 offering from Chamberlain.

Much has been made of Damon's great at bat, but Lidge picked the wrong spot to be heavy with the fastball. One batter earlier, Lidge struck out Derek Jeter on a 3-2 slider, and Lidge's slider seemed to be back to its 2008 form, as it was biting ferociously towards the ground every time he threw it.

Both Hideki Matsui leading off the inning, and Jeter were both retired on terrific sliders.

Why then did Lidge primarily throw fastballs to Damon after getting ahead in the count? If he had confidence in throwing a slider to Jeter 3-2, why not Damon, too? Especially after Damon fouled off three straight fastballs. And if you are going to throw another fastball, the only place an outside fastball should be located is low. After seeing so many pitches that at bat, anything up and away is like a batting practice pitch.

But that wasn't even Lidge's biggest gaffe. After Damon reached first base, he immediately stole second, and then stole third about two seconds later. But Damon took advantage of Lidge "watching the game from the field," a bonehead non-play.

For example, in the eighth inning when Robinson Cano popped a single down the left field line, Phillies pitcher Ryan Madson was covering third base, because both short stop Jimmy Rollins, and third baseman Pedro Feliz, were trying to catch the ball, as third base was vacated.

I teach my players that if you are standing around watching the game, you are doing something wrong. Pitchers, especially, need to move all over to back up bases on throws, or covering bases when they are vacated. I have pulled players off the field in the middle of the game, because they did not move defense. And it wasn’t because the other team benefited from that lapse.

Lidge needed to be at third base as soon as Damon tried to steal second.

That play was only possible as the Phillies had the Teixeira shift on, moving three infielders to the right base side of second base, with the third baseman covering the short stop position. Feliz was more towards second base because of Damon's threat to steal.

What I never understood about the left handed shift (and why don't they ever shift for pull conscious right handed hitters?), was why do they move the short stop over to the right side and leave the third baseman on the left side? The short stop usually has more range, and is a better athlete. With only one fielder on the third base side with more ground to cover, wouldn’t you want your best range fielder to cover more ground?

In employing the shift, a team should move their third baseman over to the right side and leave their short stop in his own position. That means only one fielder is out of position rather than two guys.

ROBINSON CANO

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