Pricey Prospects: The Pittsburgh Pirates' Predilection

(Photo by Jim McIsaac/Getty Images)

Here's something that the Pittsburgh Pirates' management don't seem to understand about prospects; they are much like fighter pilots.

If you take each year of major league baseball as the equivalent of one combat mission, the attrition statistics are strikingly similar.

About one in five won't make it past the first year/mission; barely more than half last beyond the fifth one. The ones that make it to double digits unhurt are dubbed "aces," and become legends in their own time. 

Given these facts, established players used to be valued much higher compared to prospects than they currently are. The old rule of thumb was that an established player was worth two "advanced" prospects(players with some major league playing time that hadn't established themselves) of equivalent quality.

An advanced prospect was worth about two "raw" prospects(players who didn't have major league playing time). So an established player might also be worth four raw prospects of equivalent caliber. That's because even elite raw prospects sometimes don't make it to the "start" line(their first major league game).

Players might also be traded at different ratios, across different ability levels. For instance, a single average, established player might have been traded for an elite prospect, but that's rare.

In 2005, the Dodgers' General manager, Paul DePodesta, was derided for trading an above-average outfielder, Shawn Green, for four, perhaps above-average prospects, that produced only one serviceable, but inferior, player.

The player was Dionner Navarro, who would not make his mark until 2008, long after he had left the Dodgers. Such are the hazards of trading experienced players for prospects. 

All that had changed by 2008, teams like the Pirates that wanted prospects had trouble trading for them even using elite established players. For instance, in 2008, the Pirates offered elite outfielder, Jason Bay, to the Tampa Bay Rays for something like elite advanced prospect, Jeff Niemann, and raw prospects Reid Brignac and Wade Davis.

But the Rays were reluctant to part with even two out of these three, let alone all of them. A decade ago, a deal like this would have been a no-brainer.

So the Pirates were pleased to get four players for the elite Bay from two different teams in the Manny Ramirez brouhaha. But it would be generous to describe them, Bryan Morris, Craig Hansen, Andy LaRoche, and Brandon Moss as elite(raw) prospects, even though they once were.

That's because the last three had major league playing time that belied their "elite" label. LaRoche and Moss were at best above average, not elite, advanced prospects, which meant that the Pirates didn't get enough for Bay, even with the pitchers thrown in.

In fact, Craig Hansen was recently kicked off the 40-man roster, meaning that trading for him was a waste.

On the other hand, when the Pirates traded an elite established player, Brian Giles, in 2003, they got elite advanced prospects Bay and Oliver Perez. Bay replaced Giles, and Perez, who had lost his luster by 2006, was traded to the New York Mets along with Roberto Hernandez for Xavier Nady.

This meant that the Pirates ultimately got Bay and Nady for Giles. That was a good deal, but only years after the fact.

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