We've Done the Math, and the Pirates' Moves Come Up Short

"Experiment" doesn't really describe what the Pirates are trying to do fiscally. "Revolution" may be more like it; if it succeeds, it will be deemed "revolutionary" and probably "highly disruptive." If it fails, it will have been "doomed from the start."

In a sense, what the Pirates are now doing reminds me of the farmer who bragged to his neighbor that he had weaned his horse off hay and was feeding him a diet of only sawdust.

In advocating better treatment of veterans Freddy Sanchez and Jack Wilson, I've been using calculations of player value (from FanGraphs and other sources), which in turn reflect what teams have been paying free agents for wins over replacement value in the free market.

For instance, based on what other veterans are making, A-Rod's estimated six wins over replacement is worth over $4 million per, or somewhere over $25 million in total; at $28 million he is overpaid, but not egregiously.

But these figures are different from the $1.6 million it takes to generate one extra win mentioned in my previous piece. That's because the $1.6 million reflects ALL players' salaries, controlled and uncontrolled, divided by the number of wins; Andrew McCutcheon's $400,000 salary for five extra wins pulls down that average.

So given the $1.6 million figure, the $5 million and $4 million offers to Sanchez and Wilson respectively make economic sense.

Sanchez is worth about three wins over replacement in a normal year. Multiplying that by $1.6 million and adding the $400,000 minimum wage gives $5.2 million, on which $5 million represents rounding (down).

Wilson is worth about two wins over replacement. Multiplying this by $1.6 million and adding the $400,000 wage gives about $3.6 million, and round that (up) to $4 million.

In essence, there is a two-tiered market for talent, of controlled and uncontrolled wages. The Pirates were trying to push their remaining free agents down into "controlled" territory.

But paying them based mainly on the controlled market is kind of unfair to Sanchez and Wilson: Having toiled for six years apiece at controlled wages, they now deserve to taste something of free agent wages, if not here, then elsewhere.

Besides their functions as leaders and role models, veterans should be kept around to encourage the rookies, as examples of what they can aspire to.

Someone ought to be able to retire with a "gold watch," and that someone ought to be Jack Wilson—and if he needs Freddy Sanchez (a transplant) to keep him company, so be it.

Without a handful of loyalists who actually prefer playing in Pittsburgh to create an "esprit de corps," you risk getting a bunch of "mercenaries" who are "doing time" in the city before moving on to greener pastures elsewhere.

Take it from yours truly, who is now a New Yorker. Among ball players, Pedro Alvarez is a case in point; he held out for top dollar before signing.

And how would Charlie Morton (pictured) feel (and play) once he figures out (or learns from this piece) that Nate McLouth was traded for him largely to save money?

Is he likely to be proud that "I can do the same (three-win) job for less," or is he more likely to think, "the Pirates will throw ME over in three to four years?" This is not an example you want to set.

We need a situation where Jason Bay will play for the Pirates at $12 million a year (when he's worth $15 million on the open market), Freddy Sanchez will play for $10 million a year (when he's worth at least $12 million), and Jack Wilson will play for $8 million (which is what he is worth as a player, not counting what he's worth as a "citizen," on the field, and off the field as a civic leader).

Those are top-notch leaders that almost any rookie would be proud to be on a team with.

If management can sign them for $10 million, $8 million, and $6 million respectively, which could have been their initial offers, all the more power to them.

But they need to find out what "Pittsburgh discount" the most loyal veterans will accept in exchange for, say, a lower cost of living, local celebrity, and the prospect of not being uprooted.

I don't count Xavier Nady or Adam LaRoche among them. Nor would I include Aramis Ramirez or the other Jasons, Schmidt and Kendall, in this group.

That would cost another $24-$30 million over the $30 million budgeted for next year, which would still put the Pirates neck-and-neck in payroll with the Washington Nationals, of all teams, and clearly above only the San Diego Padres and Florida Marlins.

Without the balance that Bay, Sanchez, and Wilson would have brought, the Pirates may find themselves in the position of the above-mentioned farmer, who said to the neighbor, "The next step was to move the horse to an all-water diet starting this Monday."

Sensing a rat, the neighbor asked, "And what happened?" The farmer answered, "Well, the horse died on Sunday."