Pittsburgh Pirates' Predisposition for Pitchers: Draft and Trade Choices

Around 1970, the Pittsburgh Pirates also had the Major League's most offensively productive outfield in Willie Stargell, Mattie Alou, and Roberto Clemente as they did early in 2008.

But they wouldn't have made it to the World Series in 1971 without good, if less celebrated, starting pitchers.

These included Steve Blass, Dock Ellis, and two Bobs: Moose and Johnson, plus Bruce Kison. With Al Oliver ready to take his place, the Pirates also traded center fielder Mattie Alou for veteran pitcher Nelson Briles.

With that kind of heritage, the Pirates' draft and trade moves over the past decade or so, have focused on pitching. But success has been mixed, at best.

The Pirates have had particularly bad luck drafting pitchers. Brian Bullington and Brad Lincoln in 2002 and 2006 were poor choices. San Francisco (who chose after us both times) drafted Matt Cain and Tim Lincecum in those years.

John Van Benschoten from 2001 worked out badly, but that was a banner year for position players (like Mark Teixeira, taken before the Pirates got to the draft), rather than pitchers. Fellow writer Andrew Mease makes the useful suggestion that Van Benschoten could have been a good first baseman, rather than pitcher.

In 2003, the Pirates' enjoyed their greatest success in drafting pitchers: Paul Maholm. There were no clearly better choices even with hindsight, and Maholm represented "average expectations" for a first round draft choice.

On the other hand, in 2004, when the Pirates drafted catcher Neil Walker, they overlooked an abundance of good pitching talent; Jared Weaver, Phil Hughes, and Taylor Tankesley.

But in the 2005 Draft, the Pirates did better by getting position players Andy McCutcheon and Steve Pearce, plus Brent Lillibridge, who was traded for reliever Tyler Yates.

In 2007, the Pirates made a mistake "settling" for reliever Daniel Moskos over harder to draft Matt Wieters.

But it was trading that stood to make or break the Pirates.

Ironically, the trade that might have put them on the road to recovery early in the 17-year loss cycle was the trade of (relief) pitcher Ricardo Rincon to the Cleveland Indians in 1997 for Brian Giles.

Giles became a six win (over replacement) slugger that would have brought almost any team other than the Pirates over .500.

Brian Giles was re-traded for Jason Bay, his successor, and Oliver Perez. Bay all but filled Giles' shoes, running neck and neck with Willie Stargell for the third best left fielder in Pirates' history, behind Giles and Ralph Kiner.

Perez was in turn flipped for Xavier Nady, who in turn fetched the equivalent of one starting pitcher and two prospects, one of which being Jose Tabata.

Another trade that worked well was that of Jeff Suppan and two other pitchers to the Boston Red Sox for second baseman Freddy Sanchez and Mike Gonzalez (the latter was re-traded for Adam LaRoche). With Bay and Nate McLouth gone, these two men contribute what passes for power on the Pirates' team.

On the other hand, perhaps the worst trade of the past decade was that of (starting) pitching prospect Chris Young for reliever Matt Herges. Herges was let go three months after he failed to work out, and petered out elsewhere.

Meanwhile, Young's development paralleled Ian Snell's, including the two pitchers' "break-outs" in 2007, (although Young's subsequent "regression" came one year behind Snell's).

In 2007, Post-Gazette writer Brian O'Neill analyzed the one-two punches of several clubs' top two pitchers, and concluded that only San Diego's Peavy-Young team were then clearly better than Snell-Gorzelanny.

If the Pirates had kept Young, they would have had unquestionably the best "top three" in Snell, Young, and Gorzelanny. Imagine a Pirates' rotation where Maholm and Duke were the fourth and fifth starters.

Admittedly, this was a worst-case result, but the principle remains: starters should not be traded for relievers. If Matt's last name were Capps, the deal would have been merely bad, instead of awful.

Starting pitchers are more valuable than relievers for a reason. They can pitch more innings, which is to say, they have greater staying power. Relievers, by definition, are prone to crashing. Matt Herges was just an extreme case of this.

On the other hand, trading reliever Damasco Marte (along with Nady) for the equivalent of one starter last year was a good idea. Marte later proved disappointing to the Yankees.

So if you have a starter, and need a reliever, just make your starter a reliever (as the Pirates have recently done with Jeff Karstens).

On the other hand, only rarely can a reliever be turned into a starter: the Yankees' Joba Chamberlain is the exception that "proves" the rule.

Another terrible trade was that of Aramis Ramirez and Kenny Lofton for three players, including Jose Hernandez and Matt Bruback, who shortly had to be dumped, and "a player to be named later" (Bobby Hill), an afterthought that never amounted to much.

This meant that management wasn't trading very hard. Ramirez had to be traded, because unlike Bay, he made it clear he didn't want to stay.

But even in today's constrained market for prospects, Ramirez alone would be worth at least three good prospects (e.g., the equivalent of Charlie Morton, Jeff Locke, and Gorkys Hernandez). He might have been worth more in 2003.

And Lofton should have been retained in the deal, or traded for others.

As for the recent trade of Nate McLouth, which I've "rethought," Charlie Morton is beginning to look like a middle, not back, of the rotation starter. Straight up, McLouth for Morton would still be a down-trade, but the two raw prospects make up for it.

If either Gorkys Hernandez steps into Andrew McCutheon's former shoes as an adequate backup, or Jeff Locke can pitch in the majors, it would have been a good deal. And it's expecting a lot, but if they both work out, it would have been a great trade.

Similarly, last year's trade of Nady for the one starter would be a down-trade on a standalone basis, but the two prospects offered adequate compensation. If just McCutcheon works out, the deal is even. If Tabata is as good as Nady (never mind better), the two pitchers represent clear profit.

I have been against trading Bay since day one (and joined Bleacher Report last August to register this fact). That is based on 1. His playing ability, 2. His leadership and 3. His citizenship, off the field as well as on.

Every team worth its salt needs one $10-million plus "foundation player" to coalesce around (And if Bay hadn't been traded, the "fall-out" regarding McLouth probably wouldn't have been nearly as bad.)

I'm not sure what to make of the last two trades (with Washington), having liked Burnett for Hanrahan on "sabermetric" grounds, and disliked Morgan for Milledge. But Pirates' management apparently tied the two together.

Is it possible that Morgan for Milledge was a "loss leader" to make the other trade work? And does this make sense?

I'm still scratching my head on this one.