Why Jason Garrett's Inadequacies Show Dallas Cowboys Will Not Win Long-Term

WARNING: If you are a staunch supporter of Jason Garrett and refuse to recognize his shortcomings, please bypass this article.

If you think this title is harsh, I can assure you it does not come close to representing the inadequacies displayed by Garrett in tonight’s overtime loss to the Arizona Cardinals. Garrett coached scared and downright moronically. His lack of courage and disregard for statistics is mind-boggling. For those unaware of all of Garrett’s blunders, let’s recap (sequentially).

Blunder No. 1—4th-and-1 Field Goal Attempt

On the second drive of the game, Garrett called a pass play on 3rd-and-1 at the Cardinals’ 35-yard line. DCT readers know I am all about passing, but I do advocate running the ball frequently in a few situations, including short-yardage and inside the red zone. Offenses pass the ball far too often with one yard to go for a first down.

Of course, this alone is not a major mistake from Garrett, as you cannot run the ball on every short-yardage play for fear of becoming predictable (although Garrett apparently has no qualms regarding offensive predictability).  

Nonetheless, the Cowboys lined up to go for it on 4th-and-1, and Garrett once again called a pass—this in spite of a running game which, up until that point, had been very successful.

But wait, the Cowboys called a timeout prior to the fourth-down attempt, negating the play. So what play would Garrett call when given another shot? A run or a pass? Neither.

 Instead, the coach decided to kick a 53-yard field goal that ended up being no good. Let me mention that the fact that Dan Bailey missed the field goal has absolutely no bearing on the stupidity of Garrett’s decision.  

The choice from Garrett to kick a field goal at the opponent’s 35-yard line on a 4th-and-less-than-a-yard was a joke and the incorrect move, even if we assume Bailey was to make the field goal. In that range, stats show the Cowboys would have been smart to go for it up until 4th-and-11.

Those who will inevitably argue that “it was too early to go for it” and “you take the points” are both missing the point and mistaken in their understanding of statistics. Actually, in such a “normal” game situation (tie game in the first quarter), you can bet the statistics are as accurate as ever, meaning the notion of it being “too early” to attempt a play on fourth down is sickening.  

Much like how it is never too early to attempt a two-point conversion (an idea I havediscussed here ad nauseam), a team can only inhibit its chances of winning when displaying such sophomoric thinking.  

Here is what I wrote about two-point conversions–an argument which can be easily extended to fourth down attempts:

"

You’ll often hear announcers say it’s “too early to go for two.” But what does that even mean?  How is it ever “too early?” The decision to go for a two-point conversion should be based on a variety of factors, including the score, a coach’s confidence in his two-point play, and so on. Actually, if the probability of Team X converting on a two-point attempt is 50.1 percent, they should almost always go for two. The expected points of 1.002 is greater than that of an extra point (which can obviously only be as high as 1, even with 100 percent accuracy).

"

Even worse than Garrett’s decision to kick a field goal (maybe) is the fact that he changed it following a timeout. Prior to the timeout, the Cowboys had a 4th-and-1 at the Cardinals’ 35-yard line.  

After the timeout, the Cowboys had a 4th-and-1 at the Cardinals’ 35-yard line. What changed? In terms of the game situation, absolutely nothing.

Thus, it appears Garrett’s decision-making is completely random. Is that what we want from a head coach–utter randomness in decision-making? Is the fate of the entire organization to rest on the shoulders of a man whose choices are no better than flipping a coin?  

Sorry, Jason, but NFL coaching isn’t about blindly making choices with any sort of rhyme or reason.

Of course, one thing did change between those two fourth down plays. . .the Cowboys “failed” on the first 4th-and-1 attempt (it ultimately did not count, obviously). So if Garrett’s decisions are not random, they must be based on the offense’s effectiveness on a single play.

The Cowboys didn’t convert on the first play, so how could they possibly convert on the subsequent one, right?

Hmm. . .could it be that, prior to any given play, an offense has a certain chance of obtaining a first down?

And could it be that previous failures are not so heavily-correlated to future plays that they can alter those percentages in such a way that it “makes up” for an offense who is justified in attempting a play up until 4th-and-11 (and more, seeing as how those numbers are based on league averages and Dallas undoubtedly has an above-average offense) trying a 53-yard field goal instead of going for it on 4th-and-1?

In my opinion, we are left to believe one of three things about Garrett:

• He is a coach whose understanding of statistics is so rudimentary that he cannot see why it is almost never a poor time to attempt a 4th-and-1 play at the opponent’s 35-yard line.

• He is a coach who understands the statistics but forgoes their use to “save face,” i.e. lacks both courage and loyalty on such a vast scale that he is willing to allow potential failures (of which many more will occur if this sort of idiocy continues) to be placed at the feet of his players, simply so he does not need to shoulder the blame for losses.

• He is a coach whose decisions are arbitrary.

Either way, he’s not the sort of head coach I thought was the case, and he’s certainly not of the caliber needed to win a Super Bowl.

Blunder No. 2—4th-and-1 punt

With four minutes left in the contest, the Cowboys punted the football on a 4th-and-half-yard at Arizona’s 44-yard line. You can consult the chart above to see why this was a horrendous choice.

Again, the old-school, conservative “run-the-football-and-punt-just-so-we-can-mask-our-deficiencies-and-delay-losing-as-long-as-possible” types are sure to come out of the woodwork here, arguing that a failure to convert for a first down results in a dramatic drop in win probability.

Yeah, no sh*t. Getting stuffed on fourth down plays lowers your chances of winning football games. But NFL coaches shouldn’t be in the business of simply extending football games to delay losses. 

That idea is pre-historic and again lacks a basic understanding of statistics. Would you rather attempt a “risky” fourth down play right now, knowing it gives you a 60 percent chance of winning, or punt and extend the game as long as possible, knowing that, although you will “stay in the game” longer, your overall chances of winning drop to 50 percent?

Unfortunately for the Cowboys, Garrett lacks the courage to make what appear to be risky decisions that would eventually help his team win more football games.

Blunder No. 3—Late-Game Clock Management

After last week’s win, I wrote the following:

"

When down three points or less late in games, Garrett gets ultra conservative once the offense crosses the opponent’s 30-yard line. It is like he thinks a field goal is a sure thing (despite Dan Bailey’s success, it isn’t), and this is particularly detrimental when down just three points and a field goal only ties. Stay with the normal offense and try to score a touchdown when down three, and at least run somewhat unpredictable plays if down by one or two. It worked out yesterday, but eventually it will come back to bite Dallas.

"

Guess what? "Eventually” is now. Tony Romo completed a pass for a first down, leading the offense to the Cardinals’ 31-yard line. There were 23 seconds left on the clock at the time of completion, but it was still running.  

Simple decision here. . .use one your two remaining timeouts. Even if you want to drain the clock down to later kick a field goal, you still have another timeout left to accomplish that.

Instead, the offense moved clumsily down the field, allowing the clock to drain to seven seconds before snapping and spiking the football. Now, Romo is certainly to blame here.  

The notion of a quarterback thinking it is smart to forgo using one of two remaining timeouts in that situation is ridiculous. Anyone think Tom Brady isn’t immediately calling a timeout there?

Nonetheless, Garrett is still capable of calling a timeout, too. Instead, he looked like a lost puppy dog, hanging his offense out to dry. It is Garrett’s job to manage the clock and protect his players. He performed neither one tonight. He displayed a complete lack of tenacity, bravery and loyalty to his team. Garrett showed that, in terms of being an NFL coach, he has no backbone.

Of course, maybe he just wanted to save timeouts so he could ice his own kicker.

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