2015 UEFA European Under-21 Championship: Top 10 Biggest Tactical Faux Pas
The European Under-21 Championship finished on Tuesday, with Sweden beating Portugal on penalties in Prague to claim the right to lift the trophy.
Here at B/R, we're in full on reflective mode, and we end the week with a look back on the tactical faux pas that riddled the tournament. All eight of the competing managers made mistakes over the course of their short stays in the Czech Republic, and we've collated the biggest errors in a storyboard-esque fashion.
Did we miss one? Add it to the comments below and start the conversation!
1. Moritz Leitner, Philipp Hofmann and Germany's Opening-Game Conundrum
1 of 10
Germany's opener against Serbia—a team crippled by injuries and withdrawals of key players, in addition to the Under-20 World Cup hoovering up some of the prime talent—should have been a walkover. But the Serbs flew out of the blocks, and Filip Djuricic scored a lovely goal inside 10 minutes, leaving Die Deutsche plenty of work to do to recover.
It was here that Horst Hrubesch's first big mistake became clear: his appalling organisation of his first XI to feature in the competition. The 4-2-3-1 formation was fine, but the lumbering Philipp Hofmann provided nothing up front and the midfield configuration left plenty of unwanted questions.
For example: What exactly was Moritz Leitner's role? Once Joshua Kimmich was introduced to hold, allowing Emre Can to flood forward, Germany were far more tactically stable—even despite seeing Christian Gunter sent off. Even when Hofmann came off, they finished in a 4-4-1 with Max Meyer up front, not Kevin Volland. Why?
2. No Leonardo Bittencourt? Are You Serious?
2 of 10
Leonardo Bittencourt is one of those players; the sort that can turn a match in your favour, so long as you give him the keys to the lock.
Well, not only was Bittencourt not given the keys, they were also placed on the highest, most unreachable shelf. Just 144 minutes across four games, per WhoScored.com, is a despicable total for such a talent.
Horst Hrubesch's defensive tendencies led him to play Nico Schulz—a left-back!—on the wing on two occasions, while his loyalty to Amin Younes blinded him on at some points.
The truth is, Bittencourt showed great promise in his outings and outperformed Max Meyer by a distance; the red card Leo received in the semi-final against Portugal was, by and large, a product of frustration and urgency to get things going for his own side.
He was criminally underused.
3. Italy's Shambolic XI in Game One
3 of 10
Luigi Di Biagio's Italy could only finish third in Group B despite beating England and holding Portugal to a 0-0 draw. The reason? An opening loss to Sweden, which saw the Azzurrini split from inside to out in the most embarrassing of circumstances.
Let's forget, for a moment, that Italy took the lead in the first half after Alexander Milosevic hacked out at Andrea Belotti on the run. The Swedish defender was red-carded, Domenico Berardi converted the penalty, and the Azzurrini held a 1-0 lead against 10 far inferior men.
The XI LDB picked for that game was atrocious, acknowledged by the man himself in his severe correcting for the second game. Let's run through the errors:
- A right-footed full-back (Stefano Sabelli) at left-back. Why?
- Matteo Bianchetti instead of Alessio Romagnoli in defence. Why?
- Federico Viviani over Danilo Cataldi, Marco Benassi or even Lorenzo Crisetig. Why?
The following game against Portugal saw sweeping changes made, and from there Italy looked a threat. They took England apart once the midfield had been fixed, and they held Portugal scoreless thanks to a Romagnoli-Daniele Rugani foundation at the back.
Italy messed up the first match on the pitch, and the players must take some blame for that (especially Stefano Sturaro), but Di Biagio set them on a collision course to begin with by picking a poor XI, and it's the Sweden game that eliminated them from semi-final contention.
4. Liam Moore over Calum Chambers
4 of 10
There are two faults here: First, the removal of Eric Dier from the preliminary England squad (and thus the preference of four centre-backs ahead of him), and second, the decision-making involved with regard to replacing the concussed John Stones for the first two group games.
Stones, England's linchpin at centre-back, was a big loss, but was Liam Moore the best option to replace him? The Leicester City man has a bright future ahead of him but endured an iffy 2015—losing his spot in the Foxes' XI due to injury, then struggling to impact out on loan at Championship side Brentford—and wasn't the right selection here.
Either Dier, a far superior option, retained from the original squad, or Calum Chambers, who has tasted UEFA Champions League action with Arsenal, would have been better bets. England cannot hope to progress in a tournament such as this by fielding a Moore-Ben Gibson partnership at the back—two Championship players from 2015.
5. Jess Thorup's Centre-Forward Selections
5 of 10
Denmark were a team with real potential in this tournament but disappointed; they had key players in all the right places to succeed, but manager Jess Thorup failed to string it together.
It's probably fair to say the Danes were eliminated because of a lack of cutting edge up front, so we call into question either the personnel or the selections from the manager. On paper they look stacked—Viktor Fischer, Yussuf Poulsen, Uffe Bech and even Nicolai Brock-Madsen are all strong options at this level—but Thorup was unable to get any of his deployments right.
In the first game Denmark were undoubtedly saved by Pione Sisto's cameo, bailing out a meek Fischer who looked uncomfortable playing as a centre-forward (he's typically a winger). Against Germany the lumbering Brock-Madsen was deployed, closing down Die Deutsche's centre-backs in possession in what seemed like slow-motion, and Bech's rather ineffectual role against Sweden in the semi-final (despite the fortuitous goal) meant they were unable to capitalise on their dominance in possession.
In none of the four games did Denmark look capable of truly taking over, because they couldn't score the goals to assert dominance. Thorup picked the wrong man for the job three times out of four.
6. The Use, or Misuse, of Pierre-Emile Hojbjerg
6 of 10
Denmark's issues were not reduced to the central striker's role; they had other problems haunting their side too.
It's acceptable to temper the disappointment of Pierre-Emile Hojbjerg's performances in the Czech Republic this summer due to fatigue after a long season and a pivotal role in the senior side's Euro 2016 qualifying victory just before this tournament started.
But in truth, he never really stood a chance of impressing, as it felt like he was misused by Jess Thorup. The role Hojbjerg ended up with was a truly reductive one, undefined, and he kept dropping too deep to collect the ball and push forward.
At no point did we see him at his barnstorming best, trundling forward and letting loose from range, and the random, ever-changing midfield configuration Thorup saddled Denmark with was a big factor in that.
The manager stunted his own best player.
7. Gareth Southgate's XI for England's Pivotal Game vs. Italy
7 of 10
After watching England play good football but struggle to break teams down in the first two matches, losing narrowly to Portugal before squeezing past Sweden, Gareth Southgate had enough evidence to construct the ideal midfield to tackle Italy.
He failed.
Where many had expected the roaming Ruben Loftus-Cheek to be deployed, giving the midfield a little oomph when it badly needed it, Southgate fielded Jake Forster-Caskey, of Brighton, alongside the disappointing Nathaniel Chalobah.
Forster-Caskey was the seventh central midfielder England had used in just three games, suggesting a blindfolded, pinata-hitting approach to selection, and once again Southgate failed to land a blow.
8. Germany's Semi-Final Midfield Selection
8 of 10
After the initial Moritz Leitner-Emre Can faux pas, Horst Hrubesch fixed his mistake and played the latter alongside Joshua Kimmich, bringing balance to Germany's midfield.
For the semi-final against Portugal he retained the two but changed from 4-2-3-1 to a more deep-lying 4-3-3, asking Can to push into unfamiliar territory and play as the midfield's foremost creator—not his game. In doing so, Hrubesch dropped Max Meyer—an underperformer, fair enough—for Johannes Geis, who he proceeded to shoehorn into the midfield in a role somewhere between what Can and Kimmich had already been doing.
The result? A 5-0 win for Portugal. It wasn't based solely on the midfield malfunction, but let's not kid ourselves into believing it was anything other than a pivotal factor.
9. Removing Sergio Oliveira in the Final
9 of 10William Carvalho and Bernardo Silva were the two shining stars of this tournament, but their midfield partner Sergio Oliveira was the rough-diamond find.
His box-to-box ability and leadership skills were a soothing comfort for Portugal in the middle of the park, and his performances have launched him into Julen Lopetegui's thoughts for the upcoming FC Porto season. Having spent two years on loan to Pacos de Ferreira, even the Portuguese public were largely unacquainted with his talents until last month.
Oliveira was the best player on the park in the final against Sweden...until Rui Jorge withdrew him for Toze in just the the 54th minute. The captain was moving freely and allowing Portugal to dominate on the left thanks to his intuitive, slick passing and freeing of runners, and Os Seleccao looked significantly worse without him.
Toze proceeded to shoot from distance every chance he got, yielding zero goals and ruining the flow.
10. The Rest of Rui Jorge's Substitutions in the Final
10 of 10
Rui Jorge deserves a lot of credit for what he's done with this Portugal setup, eschewing the chains of the 4-3-3 formation and moving toward a more suitable 4-4-2 diamond. He made his nation tough to guess and impossible to dominate, and the performances were a sight to behold.
But his substitutions in the final were a key factor in Portugal surrendering control of the match, and while we've already discussed Sergio Oliveira's odd withdrawal—a move so pivotal it deserved its own section—we must draw the spotlight over Jorge's other substitutions later in the game, too.
Porto fans were outraged to see Goncalo Paciencia come on so late, but perhaps the bigger question is how Portugal finished the game with exciting talents Rafa Silva and Carlos Mane—two severely underused outlets—on the bench despite searching for a goal.
Of the players who came on, Paciencia couldn't impact, Toze simply shot from distance at every available moment and Iuri Medeiros was no less erratic than Ivan Cavaleiro—a man caught offside five times in the first half alone.
Jorge's poor substitutions cost his nation dearly.
.jpg?w=600 "Offseason Moves for Every Team 👉")
.png?w=600 "New NBA Mock Draft 📝")
