Big Regrets NBA Teams Will Have from 2024 Offseason
NBA front offices don't just collectively roll out of bed and form offseason plans on July 1.
Instead, they spend every second of the preceding year (maybe even longer) fixated on what they'll do when the flurry of roster-remaking transactions starts. They leverage their scouting and analytical resources, game out scenarios and search for every inch of negotiating leverage.
And sometimes they still get the offseason wrong.
Here, we'll run through a handful of regrets from the 2024 offseason. These will all be speculative cases, as we haven't yet seen a second of action on which to judge the moves these front offices made (or didn't make).
In other words, these are the situations where—at the moment—the offseason decisions just don't quite make sense and might come back to bite the teams involved.
Let's start second-guessing the experts, shall we?
The Clippers Pinching Pennies on Paul George
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The LA Clippers framed their decision to let Paul George walk as a pragmatic one...but was it?
In an official release after George signed with the Philadelphia 76ers for four years and $212 million, L.A. said of James Harden and George: "We wanted to retain them on contracts that would allow us, under the constraints of the new CBA, to continue building the team" later adding that losing George afforded them "greater flexibility under the new CBA."
Sure, the Clips ducked the second apron after the 34-year-old took the Sixers' offer. But they could have done the same by keeping him and declining to re-sign Harden or figuring out how to cut costs elsewhere.
Considering George got $212 million on the open market and was pursued in trade by the Golden State Warriors, who would have also given him the four-year max, it's clear he would have retained significant trade value on a new deal.
Harden, meanwhile, had no known suitors and somehow landed a two-year, $70 million contract to return to L.A. anyway.
Keeping George could have afforded the Clippers more flexibility, not less. If things went sideways in 2024-25, they could have flipped him for the assets—picks and more manageable contracts—all teams seek when they deal stars. In contrast, nobody's going to give up anything of value for Harden.
One could argue the Clippers had no shot to contend with George on the roster, so why pay so much to keep him? But their chances of contention would have been better with him than without.
And if you still have Leonard and Harden on the team, what are you even doing if not going for it, long odds and all?
The Denver Nuggets Losing Kentavious Caldwell-Pope
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The Denver Nuggets' failure to retain Kentavious Caldwell-Pope was even more egregious than the Clips' with George.
All the same asset-preservation angles apply (Denver clearly could have retained and then dealt KCP for positive value down the line), except the Nuggets didn't have to shell out nine figures to keep their man.
Caldwell-Pope took a three-year deal worth $66 million from the Orlando Magic, a number the Nuggets, who had full Bird rights, could have beaten by paying anything up to the max.
Another difference between the George and KCP situations: Denver is a recent champ that still resides in the contenders' inner circle, led by a multi-time MVP in his prime. Even marginal talent losses are a huge deal in the Nuggets' position.
Maybe there's an argument that Nikola Jokić is great enough to render KCP's replacements—Christian Braun, Peyton Watson and the rest—just as impactful as the guy whose minutes they'll absorb. But the Nuggets had years of proof that the five-man unit of Jokić, Jamal Murray, KCP, Michael Porter Jr. and Aaron Gordon was basically the league's undisputed best.
Why tinker with that over money?
Lastly, it's not like spending a few months in the second apron locks a team into that status forever. Denver could have kept KCP at market rates and gotten a good chunk of another season to see if Braun or anyone else actually deserved to take his job on merit.
If any of the Nuggets' young players popped, it would have been easy to trade Caldwell-Pope, save money, recoup assets and wind up in a better position than they're in right now.
Early Extensions for Wagner, Barnes and Mobley
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It's possible the Orlando Magic, Toronto Raptors and Cleveland Cavaliers will wind up perfectly happy with their decisions to offer maximum-salary extensions to 2021 draftees Franz Wagner, Scottie Barnes and Evan Mobley, respectively.
All three have star upside (with Wagner probably the iffiest on that front), and all are young enough to get significantly better by the time their matching $224 million extensions kick in.
This is more of a potential leaguewide regret.
Tyrese Maxey held off on his own extension last offseason as part of a concerted effort to create maximum cap space for the Philadelphia 76ers. His cap hold was lower than for Wagner, Barnes and Mobley, which meant the flexibility gains were greater.
However, executives all over the league still should have used Maxey to set a new precedent: We don't offer max deals until we have to.
Had the Magic, Raptors and Clippers not offered extensions, Wagner, Barnes and Mobley would have entered the 2025 offseason as restricted free agents. Their teams could have given them the same deals then that they just got or exercised matching rights on any offer sheets they signed elsewhere.
It's like organizations just forget they still have maximum leverage if they wait a year to re-up with their rookie-scale players.
The Magic, Cavs and Raptors just reinforced the unnecessary trend of maxing out quality prospects at the earliest opportunity.
Considering how freaked out every team is about the aprons and spending restrictions of the new CBA, wouldn't it have been good business to make a habit of getting an extra year's worth of information before committing huge cash to a young player?
The Lakers' Failure to Land a 3rd Star
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It's clear the Los Angeles Lakers didn't have any safe options when it came to trading for a solid third star this offseason. Considering their situation, it would have made sense to go after riskier ones.
Yes, even Zach LaVine.
Why? Because these are desperate times for the Lakers. LeBron James will be 40 in December, but he's still a superhuman leader of men if his Olympic performance is any guide. Anthony Davis is in his late prime at 31 and returned to All-NBA status last season for the first time since 2019-20.
It's "go" time for this franchise. Now or never. One last ride.
Normally, you could have argued that the Lakers were wise to hold off. That they might find more opportunities at the trade deadline when names we haven't heard yet inevitably enter the rumor mill.
But Los Angeles' current roster is almost totally unchanged from the one that needed a combined 147 games from James and Davis last season (not happening again, by the way) to finish eighth in the West. Why would anyone expect them, if unchanged, to be good enough at the 2025 deadline to justify a big swing at that point?
Making a high-risk deal over the summer would have given the Lakers a chance to fight it out in a toughening West with more weapons from the jump. There would have been no guarantee of success, but L.A. was in a position where a little recklessness might have been necessary.
The roster needed an offseason jolt in the form of a star acquisition, but it never got one.
The Wizards Passing On Reed Sheppard
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When you make proclamations about the quality of a team's draft picks, time is your friend. The closer to the draft you fire off your take, the more likely you are to look stupid. Say nothing for a few years, let things play out and then you can avoid that fate.
Spouting off before anyone in a particular draft class has even played a second in the league is the apex of hubris, a blinking neon sign that shouts: "I'm making a knee-jerk statement with almost no real information!"
Do not do this. It won't end well.
OK, here goes anyway: The Washington Wizards should have taken Reed Sheppard over Alex Sarr.
The Atlanta Hawks get a pass, even if everyone at the top of a draft should take the best player available. They dealt Dejounte Murray away and committed to making it work with Trae Young for another year. Sheppard would have been a bit of a positional duplicate for them.
But the Wizards? They were a blank slate with an opportunity to take Sheppard, an advanced-stats darling who looked like he might have the most valuable skill in the league: an ability to create shots for himself and others.
His showing in the Las Vegas Summer League, which included 20.0 points, 5.3 assists, 4.8 rebounds, 2.7 steals and 1.3 blocks per game, indicated he was even better than advertised.
A slick handle, the ability to get to his spots on the floor, an advanced floater game, disruptive defense—it was all there. Sheppard was awesome without even showcasing his signature skill, three-point shooting. He was a mere 5-of-18 from deep after canning 52.1 percent of his treys at Kentucky.
Sarr, meanwhile, shot 9-of-47 from the field (including one ghastly 0-of-15 effort) and looked miles away from making an impact on either end.
It's laughably early in both players' careers. And again, this is foolish to say. But Sheppard should have been the pick.
Stats courtesy of NBA.com, Basketball Reference and Cleaning the Glass. Salary info via Spotrac.
Grant Hughes covers the NBA for Bleacher Report. Follow him on Twitter (@gt_hughes), and subscribe to the Hardwood Knocks podcast, where he appears with Bleacher Report's Dan Favale.
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