The Problem with Philadelphia Flyers GM Paul Homgren

Paul Holmgren is not a popular man in Philadelphia right now.

His trade of fan favorite Simon Gagne, formerly the longest tenured player on the roster, was roundly criticized by fans and analysts alike for the pathetic "value" Holmgren received in return.  

So how did Holmgren find himself in this situation? How could a GM fresh off building an Eastern Conference Championship roster make such an egregious error?

It must stated that Paul Holmgren, despite the hyperbole circulating on blogs and message boards over the past week, is not an idiot. His overall track record seems to indicate an intelligent, competent GM with the ability to pull off the occasional heist.

His 2007 trade deadline deal of Peter Forsberg eventually netted the Flyers Kimmo Timonen, Scott Hartnell, Scottie Upshall, and Ryan Parent, all of whom have played roles in the Flyers' late '00s resurgence.

His acquisitions of Braydon Coburn (for Alexei Zhitnik) and Ville Leino (for Ole-Kristian Tollefsen and a fifth round pick) proved to be outright steals.

His 2007 signing of future captain Mike Richards not only locked up a franchise player for the following 12 seasons at a reasonable price, but it was also one of the first deals following the lockout to show the rest of the league the merits of signing players to ultra long-term deals in order to lessen their overall cap hits.  

Even his 2009 trade for Chris Pronger, while criticized by some at the time as an overpay, showed a keen awareness of the needs of his current roster and a capability of acquiring the "missing piece" necessary to make a run at the title.

But if Holmgren is generally a good GM, what happened in the 2010 offseason?

On Wednesday, June 30, Delco Times sportswriter Anthony SanFilippo wrote a blog article giving some insight into the Flyers' goals leading into the first day of free agency, with information coming from numerous sources in the Flyers front office. His analysis of their plan? Sign a few defensemen, sign a few forwards, get another goalie.

Notice there is no "trade away a top forward to get back under the cap" in that description.

Now that the Flyers offseason is likely close to complete, a question comes to mind: Was there ever actually a plan?

The likely answer: Yes. But the problem with the "plan" was that GM Holmgren did not do sufficient research prior to the start of the offseason to realize the consequences of his goals.

Let's try to piece together what Holmgren's actual goals were.

Goal No. 1 was to improve the defense, but in a very specific way. Holmgren kicked off his plan by trading for the rights to Dan Hamhuis, a very solid defenseman who was looking for a contract in the $4-5 million range.

After being unable to come to an agreement with Hamhuis, he dealt a second round pick to Tampa Bay for Andrej Meszaros, a 24-year-old defenseman with a $4 million cap hit.

All along, it seems, Holmgren was allotting about $4 million to spend on a No. 4/No. 5 defenseman, a plan that became obvious when fellow No. 4/No. 5 D-man Braydon Coburn was re-signed shortly after the Meszaros acquisition to a two-year, $6.4 million deal. Holmgren wanted to improve the defense and was willing to spend big money to do so.

In addition, he wanted a better No. 6 defenseman, preferably at a low cost. The signing of Sean O'Donnell to a one-year, $1 million deal achieved this.

Goal No. 2 was to sign a fighter, specifically former Ranger Jody Shelley, who tormented the Flyers during the final two games of the regular season.  

The three-year, $3.3 million contract was an obvious overpay, hinting that the Flyers had set their sights on Shelley long in advance and wanted to be certain he would join the roster.

Goal No. 3 is a bit tougher to figure out, but it seems as though the plan was to acquire either a goalie or a forward in the price range of about $2 million.  

Holmgren traded for the rights to Evgeni Nabokov and Marty Turco, and apparently both turned down offers in that range. It is possible that the Flyers also kicked the tires on Dan Ellis and Chris Mason, but could not come to terms.

Holmgren responded to those rejections by signing Nikolai Zherdev, a talented but flaky forward, to a one-year, $2 million deal in an apparent attempt to improve forward depth.

Achieving these three goals, in a vacuum, would succeed in improving the Flyers in 2010-11. Except for one thing.

Holmgren apparently forgot to do the math.

These planned additions would give the Flyers an estimated $10.3 million in additional cap hit. The problem?

Assuming the signings of RFAs Daniel Carcillo and Darroll Powe, the Flyers only had about $8 million in cap space.

This is where Gagne gets dealt for peanuts.

The problem was not so much that Gagne was dealt. For the players and fans alike, it was painful to watch, but he did have only one year left on his contract and has become injury prone. If the Flyers want to keep Jeff Carter, Claude Giroux, and James van Riemsdyk long-term, Gagne was likely going to leave in 2011.

The problem was when he was dealt.

It's already been established that Holmgren had three offseason goals. If he succeeded in achieving these goals, the Flyers would be over the cap limit, and a player would have to be moved at some point.

But the job of a GM is to maximize the value of his players.

Trading Simon Gagne while the Flyers were over the salary cap limit gave Holmgren no leverage whatsoever in trade talks.

Teams knew he had to be dealt. So they offered nothing of value.

Had Holmgren recognized on June 30 that his plan would inevitably make the Flyers go over the cap, he should have dealt Gagne then, when he had leverage. He could have received, at the very least, a solid prospect and a higher draft choice, rather than a No. 6 defenseman with a bad contract (Matt Walker) and a fourth round pick.

But this failure goes back to Holmgren's biggest problem as a GM.

Sometimes, he simply does not do enough research.

The 2010 mismanagement of the cap and subsequent Gagne trade is not the first time this has happened.

The first example was the extension given to Chris Pronger.

Pronger was signed to a deal that pays him through the age of 42. The yearly salaries are frontloaded, so Pronger will get the most money when he is the most effective. The deal was made under Holmgren's assumption that if Pronger were to retire at age 40, his salary would come off the books.

However, Holmgren apparently did not read the CBA, which states that if a player is over 35 years of age, his full cap hit counts even if he retires. The Flyers disagreed with the interpretation, but they will likely have to live with it.  

As a result, a 42-year-old Chris Pronger, either retired or a shell of his former self, will still cost the Flyers about $5 million worth of cap space.

Another example of Holmgren's lack of research was the extension given to Michael Leighton.

Leighton was signed to a two-year, $3.1 million deal the day before free agency started. Holmgren apparently was sold on Michael Leighton as a legitimate goalie and did not want to risk losing him.

However, he did not take into account the likely lack of a market for goaltending during the 2010 offseason.

With few teams searching for starting goalies, prices went way down. More established goaltenders such as Dan Ellis ($1.5 million cap hit) and Martin Biron ($875K cap hit) went for less on the open market than the Flyers paid Leighton.  

Had Holmgren let Leighton test the market, he probably could have eventually signed the goalie for less, or, in a worst-case scenario, picked up Ellis for the same price (or Biron for a cheaper price) as Leighton.

If Holmgren had spent the time to count the number of teams actually searching for a goalie in free agency, he could have anticipated the market and saved cash.

But he didn't.

So Flyers fans are left in a frustrating spot.  

They have a GM who is apparently a solid judge of talent and generally a good trader.

They also have a GM who often does not put in the necessary legwork, which can result in embarrassing failures.

This tug of war between "Good Holmgren" and "Bad Holmgren" will likely continue throughout his tenure as general manager.  

The question for owner Ed Snider over the coming years will be simple. Do the successes of "Good Holmgren" outweigh the failings of "Bad Holmgren"?

The rest of the NHL will find out soon enough.