Ashes 2013: Australia's Attitude Shifts

If Australia had really wanted to win the third Test and stand a chance of regaining the Ashes, they would have played it differently.

Michael Clarke was never going to enforce the follow-on so why did he take so much time out of the game by batting on for so long in the first innings?

Why was Nathan Lyon, who was leaking runs but posing a wicket-taking threat, only bowling so sporadically?

Why did Australia bat all day on day four, despite the poor weather forecast?

Why did Australia score at 5 runs per over, not 6 or 7? Why did Australia not declare their second innings earlier?

The promotion of David Warner was a half-hearted attempt to force the issue. If Australia really wanted to be aggressive, then the IPL-playing, limited-overs basher Shane Watson should have opened alongside Warner in the second innings, not the man with eight Big Bash caps, Chris Rogers. 

Perhaps Steven Smith displayed the innocent naivety of inexperience as he pushed hard for two runs and was run out, whilst his captain Clarke jogged one so casually he may as well have been sipping a cup of tea on his way. 

In his day two press conference, Clarke was questioned as to whether Australia would "force the pace of this game" and he responded candidly.

"

I think we have to keep doing what we’ve been doing. I don’t think it’s the kind of wicket you can force too hard. I think you’ve got to build up pressure, the bowlers are going to have to be exceptionally consistent like they were this afternoon. It’s the type of wicket that’s going to take a lot of time to bowl England out, but I think our bowlers have got the discipline.

"

These did not appear to be the words of a man prepared to put everything on the line for victory. Clarke was cautious, circumspect and restrained. When asked about what changed for Australia’s batsmen in the Test, he responded that winning the toss on a flat pitch was a good start.

Clarke knew that winning this Test was always going to be difficult and his tactics reflected that. 

Making some considered estimates, you can presume that Australia were planning on declaring with a lead of about 350, giving themselves ten overs or so at England on the evening of day four and the whole day on day five to take ten English wickets.

But, of course, such a plan relied on the rain holding off—it didn’t and, considering the forecast, it wasn’t going to. 

"Being prepared to lose in order to win" was the buzz phrase as pundits postulated the merits of an early Australian declaration on the afternoon of day four, but it never came. 

Australia played the entirety of the first four days in a manner which at first prevented defeat, whilst minimising (albeit not totally relinquishing), their chances of victory—something that, considering the situation of the series, was surprising. However, it demonstrated perspective and realism. 

Regaining or retaining the urn remains romantically and colloquially important for both Australia and England. However, although a drawn series retains the urn for England, it is inputted into the ICC Rankings not as an English victory, but a drawn series.

Moreover, in the midst of 10 consecutive Ashes Tests, the concept of momentum is undeniably important.

Australia risking defeat in order to preserve a slim chance of regaining the urn would endanger their hopes of both drawing the series and potentially extending their losing streak to seven matches—something Clarke in particular would be keen to avoid. 

Too often in recent times Australia have made panicked and rushed decisions, both in selection and on the field.

Although their selection at Old Trafford again smacked of confusion and their batting order in the second innings was non-committal, their hesitancy to pursue victory with gay abandon was commendable and encouraging. It was the decision of a more sensible Australia, a forward thinking, long-term planning Australia.

Having already relinquished the urn and with seven Tests against England still to come, it's paramount that they maintain such a mindset. 

If Australia really wanted to win the third Test and stand a chance of regaining the Ashes they would have played it differently.

 

Michael Clarke was never going to enforce the follow-on so why did he take so much time out of the game by batting on for so long in the first innings? Why was Nathan Lyon, who was leaking runs but posing a wicket taking threat bowled so spasmodically? Why did Australia bat all day on day four despite the poor weather forecast? Why did Australia score at 5 runs per over, not 6 or 7? Why did Australia not declare their second innings earlier?

 

The promotion of David Warner was a half-hearted attempt to force the issue. If Australia really wanted to be aggressive then the IPL-playing, limited-overs basher Shane Watson should’ve opened along side Warner in the second innings; not the man with eight Big Bash caps, Chris Rogers. 

 

Perhaps Steven Smith displayed the innocent naivety of inexperience as he pushed hard for two runs and was run out, whilst his captain Clarke jogged one so casually he may as well have been sipping a cup of tea on his way. 

 

In his day two press conference Clarke was questioned as to whether Australia would “force the pace of this game” and he responded candidly, “I think we have to keep doing what we’ve been doing. I don’t think it’s the kind of wicket you can force too hard I think you’ve got to build up pressure, the bowlers are going to have to be exceptionally consistent like they were this afternoon. It’s the type of wicket that’s going to take a lot of time to bowl England out, but I think our bowlers have got the discipline.”

 

These did not appear to be the words of a man who was prepared to put everything on the line for victory. He was cautious, circumspect and restrained. When asked about what changed for Australia’s batsmen in the Test he responded that winning the toss on a flat pitch was a good start. Clarke knew that winning this Test was always going to be difficult and his tactics reflected that. 

 

Making some considered estimates you can presume that Australia were planning on declaring with a lead of about 350, giving themselves ten overs or so at England on the evening of day four and the whole day on day five to take ten English wickets. But of course such a plan relied on the rain holding off - it didn’t and considering the forecast it wasn’t going to. 

 

“Being prepared to lose in order to win” was the buzz phrase as pundits postulated the merits of an early Australian declaration on the afternoon of day four, but it never came. 

 

Australia played the entirety of the first four days in a manner which at first prevented defeat, whilst minimising albeit not totally relinquishing, their chances of victory, something that considering the situation of the series was surprising. However, it demonstrated perspective and realism. 

 

Regaining or retaining the urn remains romantically and colloquially important for both Australia and England, however, although a drawn series retains the urn for England it is inputted into the ICC Rankings not as an English victory, but a drawn series.

 

Moreover, in the midst of ten consecutive Ashes Tests the concept of momentum is undeniably important. Australia risking defeat in order to preserve a slim chance of regaining the urn would endanger their hopes of both drawing the series as well as potentially extending their losing streak to seven matches, something Clarke in particular would be keen to avoid. 

 

Too often in recent times Australia have made panicked and rushed decisions, both in selection and on the field. Whilst their selection at Old Trafford again smacked of confusion and their batting order in the second innings was non-committal, their hesitancy to pursue victory with gay abandon was commendable.

 

Andy Flower’s England have demonstrated the long-term merits of circumspection and calculation and during the third Test, Australia mirrored this attitude. For the health of their results and progress, long may it continue.