Bleacher Report - Articles by Andy Shaw

My Classic Italian GP: 2004

Andy Shaw — Sun, 06 Sep 2009 05:14:22 -0400

Of all the circuits on the F1 calendar, Monza is not one of my favourites. Its high-speed straights punctuated by dreary chicanes provide little challenge to the drivers, and its layout in these days of "dirty air" barely lends itself at all to overtaking.

Thus the challenge of picking a "classic" Italian Grand Prix was more difficult than usual. I could have gone for 2008, where Sebastian Vettel picked up an epic maiden win for Toro Rosso in the wet, or 1997, where a five-car battle was won by the quick pit work of McLaren and David Coulthard.

But in the end I have chosen 2004's race, not because it made particularly scintillating watching at the time, but because it told us an awful lot about the state of F1 at the time, and in particular about Jenson Button.

At the previous race at Spa in Belgium, Kimi Raikkonen had won his first race of the season for McLaren. But the rest of the year had been all about the dominance of Ferrari, and in particular Michael Schumacher, who in finishing second behind Raikkonen had wrapped up his seventh world championship.

So with no world titles to fight for, the rest of the field resigned itself to fighting for the scraps in the final four races of 2004. Ferrari's dominance throughout the year had been such that Schumacher had won all but two of the races—Raikkonen's victory in Spa accounting for one, and Jarno Trulli winning in Monaco for Renault after Schumacher had crashed with Juan Pablo Montoya's Williams.

On paper, then, Ferrari were unbeatable, but there was definitely an awareness that if normal service was disrupted by some outside turn of events, then the fight to be "best of the rest" would quickly turn into an opportunity to win, as had happened with Trulli at Monte Carlo.

And therefore, when rain began to fall on Sunday morning, it looked as though the race would not be as straightforward as had previously seemed.

The second Ferrari of Rubens Barrichello had qualified on pole at Monza, with a lighter-fuelled Montoya alongside. Schumacher was third. But with the track wet, then rapidly drying in the build-up to the race, the layout of the grid would be insignificant in relation to the crucial tyre choices made by the teams.

Should the drivers start on dry tyres or intermediates? The majority of the drivers opted for the former, but Minardi, Sauber, McLaren and Ferrari decided to split their drivers, running one on dry tyres and one on intermediates.

David Coulthard changed his mind about his intermediate rubber on the parade lap and pitted before the start, but Barrichello, Felipe Massa and Gianmaria Bruni were all still on intermediates when the lights went out.

Immediately Barrichello shot into the lead, while most of the others struggled to get up to speed on their dry tyres. Schumacher tagged Button at the first corner and spun, while Oliver Panis rammed his Toyota into the Williams of Antonio Pizzonia. The Frenchman was out on the spot, but Pizzonia and Schumacher were able to continue, albeit at the back of the field.

At the end of the first lap Barrichello was an incredible 6.9 seconds ahead of Fernando Alonso, who had started fourth in his Renault, and Montoya. Kimi Raikkonen was in the hunt as well, as was Massa who took full advantage of his extra grip to make up several places. Bruni was doing well as well, rising from nineteenth on the grid to tenth place.

But almost as soon as the intermediate runners had shown their clear advantage, that gain began to drop away as the track dried rapidly. By the fifth lap Alonso had caught and passed Barrichello, at which point the Brazilian pitted for dry rubber and fuel.

Alonso was himself fuelled light and pitted on lap 11, handing the lead to Jenson Button's BAR-Honda. Raikkonen retired a couple of laps later with engine failure, and after the first round of pit stops had all panned out, Button found himself still in front. Finally it looked as though the man from Somerset would break his F1 victory duck. It was Jenson's race to lose—which he did.

Button—by his own admission—had underestimated the speed of the Ferraris. Barrichello was out of sync with the rest of the field on strategy, and was using his dominant Ferrari to full effect. Schumacher, too, was doing a sterling job of fighting through the field, though he should have been too far back to make any real impression on Button's commanding lead.

For whatever reason, however, Button had settled into a rhythm that was not fast enough to fully hold off the charging Italian cars. By the time he realised that his precious first victory was under threat, it was too late and the damage had already been done.

The Briton ceded his lead to Barrichello at his final stop, and when the Brazilian pitted himself he remained ahead of Button. Adding insult to injury, Schumacher caught and passed the BAR on the same lap, putting the Ferraris first and second.

That was how they finished, then, with Barrichello leading home Schumacher for his first win of 2004, the eighth of his career. Button was third, while his BAR teammate Takuma Sato finished fourth to help BAR to second place in the Constructors' championship. Rivals Renault did not score, Alonso spinning out on lap 41 and Trulli, in his last race for the French team, coming home tenth.

Montoya's early challenge faded to put him fifth, a story all too common with Williams that year. Coulthard salvaged sixth from his early strategy switch, ahead of Pizzonia, who had done extremely well to climb from the back of the field. The final point went to Giancarlo Fisichella, who had driven a solid race in his Sauber.

The only other incident of note was the fate of Bruni, who had fallen back from his early charge to tail-end obscurity, then been caught in a fire in the pit lane. Nobody was hurt in the blaze, but the Italian had inhaled fumes from the fire extinguishers and was retired from the race as a precaution.

In 2004 Jenson Button already had his fair share of detractors, and the race at Monza only gave them more ammunition as he conspired to throw away a race that should easily have been his. He did not give enough in mid-race to hold off the Ferraris, and what should have been a remarkable result for the Briton instead became another podium finish, of which there were many that year.

Five years on, we approach the Italian Grand Prix with questions once again hanging over Button's will to win and world championship credentials. In Italy in 2004 the race seemed to be his from an early stage, but he failed to perform when it mattered and ended up losing the race. He will be eager to ensure that his 2009 world championship challenge is not a similar story.

Oh No, Renault: Race-Fixing Rumours Surround F1 Team

Andy Shaw — Sun, 30 Aug 2009 11:50:17 -0400

When Nelson Piquet was sacked by Renault's Formula One team last month, many predicted that it would not be the end of the story, a bitter saga that had rumbled on almost since the Brazilian arrived in F1 at the beginning of 2008.

Immediately it was evident that Piquet was not on the pace of his teammate, double world champion Fernando Alonso, and rumours were rife as early as April that his seat could be in danger. In the end it took until July of this year for Piquet to finally be dropped, after ten races in which he had scored not a single point.

Piquet's retention for 2009 was a surprise to some, after a year in which he had almost consistently failed to impress. He lucked into a podium at the German Grand Prix, but other than that had little to show for what was a disappointing season for the French team as a whole.

Come the Singapore Grand Prix, however, all that changed. Alonso looked set for an excellent grid position until a mechanical failure in qualifying confined him to 15th on the grid.

On a street circuit such as Singapore, with limited overtaking opportunity, it was perhaps expected that Renault would fill Alonso's car to the brim with fuel, in the hope that a long pit strategy would gain him a few positions. Instead, technical director Pat Symonds tried something radical—fuelling Alonso light for a three-stop strategy, in the hope that his nimbler car could make up places on track rather than in the pits.

After the first 12 laps of F1's inaugural night race, it looked as though the strategy had failed. Alonso had made up a few places on the first lap, but was set to lose them all as he approached the pit lane.

Two laps after Alonso stopped, however, teammate Piquet spun and crashed into the wall, bringing out the safety car. The instant closure of the pit lane meant that everyone had to circulate slowly for a few laps before being allowed to refuel, and brought Alonso right into contention as he rose to the head of the field.

In the end the Spaniard won the Singapore Grand Prix, ahead of Nico Rosberg and Lewis Hamilton. Some questions were asked about the convenient timing of Piquet's crash, but most credible sources were willing to give Renault the benefit of the doubt. As the eminent F1 journalist Joe Saward said, it was hardly a stretch of the imagination to conclude that Piquet had made a genuine error, such was his reputation.

Piquet bounced back from his disappointing—though ultimately fortunate—Singapore exit to score fourth place in the next race in Japan, Alonso winning again, this time without the help of the safety car. And despite lacklustre showings in the last two races of the season—not making it beyond the first lap in his home race in Brazil—Piquet was retained for 2009.

However, this year was far from a fairytale for Piquet and he fell out of favour at Renault. After his exit from the team he began almost immediately to criticise his handling by top Renault figures, describing team principal Flavio Briatore as his "executioner."

Now, during the broadcast of the Belgian Grand Prix at Spa, Brazilian TV network Globo reported that evidence had come to light suggesting that Piquet was ordered by Renault to crash in Singapore, thus helping Alonso to win the race. It is not hard to imagine where this evidence has come from.

Already reports have surfaced that the FIA may investigate the allegations, and if they are found to be grounded in reality the punishment for Renault could be extremely severe.

It is almost certain that Renault would be hauled over the coals in violation of Article 151(c) of the International Sporting Code, which concerns the bringing of motorsport into disrepute. McLaren were found guilty of violating this rule in 2007, and received a record $100 million fine as well as exclusion from the Constructors' Championship of that year.

Renault's future participation in F1 has been in doubt for several years, and rumours earlier this season suggested that the manufacturer was looking to sell the team to Briatore himself. A very public beating at the hands of the FIA would all but seal this decision for the French outfit.

At present it is difficult to know what action the FIA would take. Altering the results of a 2008 race so long after the event would be extremely problematic—Nico Rosberg might take his first victory, but it would be far from an ideal one.

Furthermore it is arguable that Piquet's accident triggered almost the entire field to pit under the safety car, and under this high-pressure environment the mistake was made at Ferrari that caused Felipe Massa to leave his pit box with his fuel hose still attached. The points lost by Massa that evening would prove to cost him the world championship. The situation, therefore, is much more complicated than a simple case of Renault unfairly gaining an advantage—lots of other people were affected by their alleged race-fixing, too.

Even simply declaring the results null and void, if such a thing is possible, would dramatically alter the shape of the 2008 world championship and award the title to Massa, Hamilton losing the six points he gained for third in that race.

In all probability, however, such drastic measures will not be taken, and an alternative solution will be found. Nonetheless, if these allegations are proven to be true, Renault face a very uncomfortable end to the season.

My Classic Belgian GP: 1998

Andy Shaw — Tue, 25 Aug 2009 06:03:24 -0400

Regular B/R readers might have heard me allude to the fact that I am, these days, primarily a Renault fan. It was not always thus.

Back when I began watching F1, in the late-1990s, it was the Jordan team that was my favorite. It certainly helped that, in 1998, my first F1 hero Damon Hill moved to the team, but even before then I had admired Eddie Jordan and his gaggle of young talents, which included Rubens Barrichello, Ralf Schumacher, and Giancarlo Fisichella.

So, when it comes to picking my classic Belgian Grand Prix, there is only one possible contender: 1998.

Coming into the Grand Prix, the world championship race was being fought to the bitter end, primarily between McLaren's Mika Hakkinen and the Ferrari of Michael Schumacher. Hakkinen was seven points clear of his German rival with four races to go.

Hakkinen duly qualified on pole alongside teammate David Coulthard, with Hill a surprising third. Jordan had endured a tough season so far, neither car having scored for the first eight rounds of the season, and Hill having been without points until the German Grand Prix two races previously.

It had been raining for hours when the race started, Hill immediately making a poor start and dropping down the field. Hakkinen led around the first corner, and Jacques Villeneuve made an excellent getaway in his Williams to take second from sixth on the grid. He was even challenging the McLaren for the lead as they approached Eau Rouge, though this turn of events was overshadowed by what happened next.

Unsighted by the spray generated by the cars ahead of him, Coulthard lost control of his McLaren and spun right, hitting the concrete wall and bouncing back across the track. This caused all hell to break loose behind him, with impact following impact and wheels bouncing down the hill towards Eau Rouge.

In the end, thirteen cars were damaged in the wreck, and the race—unsurprisingly—red-flagged. Despite the apparent severity of the collisions, everyone thankfully escaped unharmed, save for Barrichello who reportedly hurt his knee while clambering out of the cockpit.

It took nearly an hour for the race to be restarted, and when it was four cars failed to line up on the grid, teams only having one spare car. This time Hill made a superb getaway to lead into the first corner.

Hakkinen was less fortunate, being tipped into a spin by Michael Schumacher. The stationary Finn was then collected by Johnny Herbert in his Sauber, who had been involved in the original collision and thus failed to complete a racing lap at either start.

The same was true of Alexander Wurz, who came together with Coulthard halfway through the first lap and had to retire his Benetton. The Scot, however, rejoined at the back of the pack, an event that would have a significant impact on the outcome of the race.

The race was neutralized behind the safety car as Hakkinen's car was removed from the track, and when it restarted, Schumacher was quick to take the lead away from Hill.

Showing the same level of wet-weather skill and finesse that had given him victory in similar conditions twelve months earlier, Schumacher proceeded to pull away while teammate Eddie Irvine held station in third, until the Irishman fell off the track and damaged his front wing. Villeneuve, who had also been in contention for a podium placing, spun out after the first round of pit stops.

Schumacher was over half a minute ahead of Hill by lap 25, when he came up to lap David Coulthard. However, in what should have been a simple passing move, the German misjudged the position of the McLaren and ran into the back of it, ripping off his front suspension and ending his race.

Coulthard's rear wing had also been lost in the impact, though both drivers were able to recover to the pits. Schumacher was under no illusions as to who he felt was responsible for the collision—immediately after he exited his car, he stormed to the McLaren garage and angrily accused the Scotsman of trying to kill him.

Coulthard would, in 2003, accept that his decision to back off on the racing line may have contributed to the collision, but Schumacher was not without his share of the blame. Indeed, the race stewards dismissed a complaint by the German as being baseless.

Whatever the cause of the coming together, it left Hill with a commanding lead. His advantage was further secured almost immediately, as Irvine spun out of the race. However, a collision between Fisichella and Shinji Nakano—remarkably similar to the one that had just occurred between Schumacher and Coulthard—brought out the safety car, eroding Hill's lead.

In the final stages of the race, Hill's Jordan teammate Ralf Schumacher was running second, with the Sauber of Jean Alesi third, largely through attrition than through any superior skill. Schumacher, however, was lapping much quicker than Hill and wanted the opportunity to pass, in order to secure his first Grand Prix victory.

Hill, however, argued over the radio that in attempting to overtake, Ralf—who had gained something of a reputation in his first season and a half of F1 for crashing regularly—could easily take out both Jordans and leave the team with nothing. Eddie Jordan concurred, ordering Ralf to hold station in second.

Thus Hill won the Belgian Grand Prix, his 22nd and last race victory, leaving a disappointed Ralf second. The sight of Eddie Jordan, skipping down the pit lane in celebration of his team's first win and one-two finish, was one that would remain in the minds of fans for many years.

With neither Hakkinen nor Michael Schumacher finishing the race, the championship battle was put on hold for a race, allowing Hill and Jordan to have their moment of glory in a season otherwise dominated by Ferrari and McLaren. Jordan's popularity up and down the pit lane made this an exceptionally well-received result, though a dejected Michael Schumacher undoubtedly felt that this race had been taken from him.

Nonetheless, on a miserable, wet day in the Ardennes, the sun shone on Eddie Jordan and his team, paving the way for the much more successful year that was to come.

The Title No One Wants: Jenson Button's Comedy Of Errors

Andy Shaw — Sun, 23 Aug 2009 16:24:05 -0400

After the Turkish Grand Prix in June, it looked as though Jenson Button had the F1 world championship in the bag. Six wins in the opening seven races of the season gave Button the most dominant start to a year by any driver since 2006. And Button's 26-point lead in the title race looked unassailable.

Since then, however, the British driver has not set foot on the podium, scoring just 11 points in the last four races. Meanwhile, the three drivers behind him in the standings have closed in on his lead, Mark Webber having turned a 33.5-point deficit into one of 20.5 points.

In part, Button's change of fortunes—which could plausibly see him lose the title that seemed so assured just two and a half months ago—can be explained by a lack of competitiveness in his Brawn GP car, which has ceased to be the quickest car on the grid following the upturn in fortunes of Red Bull Racing.

However, it is also undeniable that errors have begun to creep into the Englishman's previously flawless driving style, and now that the car is less competitive, he is beginning to suffer at the hands of his teammate Rubens Barrichello.

Barrichello won today's European Grand Prix in emphatic fashion, putting in a string of excellent laps to leapfrog the McLaren of Lewis Hamilton at the final round of pit stops. Meanwhile, Button languished in seventh, a late charge against Fernando Alonso's Renault coming to nothing.

In March, I published an analysis of the Australian Grand Prix, focusing specifically on the fortunes of the Brawn cars. There Button finished first ahead of Barrichello, but in reality the Brazilian was fortunate to finish second after a late collision took out two cars in front of him. The main thrust of the analysis was that Button's near-perfect drive stood in sharp contrast to Barrichello's error-strewn performance, the difference in the quality of their race craft being reflected in the result.

Now it's late August, and the tables have turned. It was Barrichello who today turned in the stellar drive, while Button made the mistakes that cost him the chance to make the most of his car's pace.

Squeezed towards the barriers by Sebastian Vettel at the start, Button lost several places at the first corner as he lifted off to avoid embedding his Brawn in the scenery. Fending off a challenge from Mark Webber a few corners later, he cut across a chicane, leaving the irate Australian complaining to his team.

Then Button attempted an audacious overtake on Alonso. We have seen such passes in the early laps of previous races transforming the afternoon for Button, but today any such transformation was purely negative. Outbraking himself, the British driver lost out to the Spaniard and almost collected Webber on his way back onto the track.

Button was then instructed by his team to yield to the Red Bull driver, mindful of the penalties that had been handed out in the past to drivers who had cut corners. That left a frustrated world championship leader stuck behind his nearest rival for much of the rest of the race, with Button only managing to get past in the final round of pit stops.

All of this left Button a distant seventh, over half a minute behind his teammate, having shown none of the skill and class that highlighted the first seven races of the season.

While Button benefits from his principal title rivals—Webber, Vettel and, to some extent, Barrichello—taking points off one another, the damage inflicted on his season has been far worse than a reduction of eight points in his championship lead suggests.

In Britain, he started seventh and never really shone, inheriting sixth place at the flag. A low-fuel run in Germany saw him third in qualifying, though he fell back to fifth in the race—and even that result was in part down to an orchestrated swap between the two Brawn drivers near the finish. Hungary and Europe have been similar torrid affairs, with a pair of seventh-place finishes as all Button has to show for his efforts.

In the past, Button has been criticised for failing to get the most out of cars that are less than perfect—he simply cannot, it seems, drive around set-up issues in his car in the way that many good and great drivers can. As Brawn struggle for momentum relative to Red Bull, this could be the reason for his sudden drop in performance.

But the difference between himself and Barrichello in today's Grand Prix shows that it is not all about the car. If Jenson Button wants to win this year's world championship, he needs to cut the errors and begin driving like a champion.

My Classic European GP: Nurburgring, 2007

Andy Shaw — Mon, 17 Aug 2009 05:40:33 -0400

Welcome to the first part of the "My Classic GP" series. The aim of this set of articles is to outline a classic example of each Grand Prix left on the calendar, from my own experience of watching F1 since about 1997.

The races I choose may not always be the most spectacular, but each is memorable to me in some particular way. To begin, therefore, My Classic European Grand Prix is the race that took place at the Nurburgring, in 2007.

Lewis Hamilton came into the race, the 10th of 17 that year, with a 12-point lead in the world championship over McLaren teammate Fernando Alonso. However, Kimi Raikkonen had won the previous two races in France and Britain, and Ferrari were confident that the Nurburgring would suit the characteristics of their car better than that of the McLaren.

In qualifying Ferrari duly delivered, with Raikkonen qualifying on pole ahead of Alonso and the Finn's teammate Felipe Massa. Hamilton was down in 10th place, a wheel failure putting him into the barriers in the third part of qualifying.

As the race began on Sunday, rain threatened. The Ferraris took the lead into the first corner, Massa barging Alonso down to third. Hamilton made a spectacular start to move up into sixth by Turn One.

However, carnage ensued as Robert Kubica clipped his BMW teammate Nick Heidfeld in the second corner, forcing Hamilton to dive off the track to avoid collecting the German cars. When he regained the road, it became apparent that he had suffered a puncture.

At around the same time, rain began to fall on part of the track; when the field reached the wet segment of the lap several drivers fell off the road. As the rain spread to other parts of the track it became apparent that this would not be a light shower; the teams made the decision to bring in their cars at the end of the first lap, changing to wet-weather tyres.

Race leader Raikkonen, however, made a mistake at the slippery pit entrance, missing the pit lane entirely and forcing him to complete another lap on dry tyres. Massa and Alonso, therefore, led the field into the pit lane, followed by most of the other drivers. A few stayed out, though this gamble would fail to pay off for them.

One team who had gambled correctly were Spyker; Markus Winkelhock, starting his first (and to date only) Grand Prix, had been called into the pits at the end of the formation lap by technical director Mike Gascoyne. Winkelhock was changed to wet tyres, giving him a huge advantage as the rest of the field struggled around the slippery first lap.

After a lap and a half Winkelhock had caught and passed Raikkonen, who slid off the road at the hairpin. By the end of the second lap he was leading Massa and Alonso by 19 seconds.

In fourth place was Jenson Button, who took advantage of the confusion and a well-timed tyre stop to rise up the field in his underpowered Honda. But on the first corner of the third lap, he aquaplaned off into the gravel.

He was not the only one; Adrian Sutil hit the barrier in roughly the same place a few moments later. The pair were then joined by Nico Rosberg, Scott Speed and Vitantonio Liuzzi, the latter almost collecting the safety car—which had been scrambled in the meantime—as he spun off the road.

Conditions at the first corner were clearly treacherous, with what has been described as a "river" flowing across the circuit.

Also finding himself buried in the gravel trap was Lewis Hamilton, while Anthony Davidson spun his Super Aguri but managed to stay out of the gravel, coming to a halt on the tarmac run-off instead. Davidson was able to keep the car going, but Hamilton could not extricate his car from the gravel.

The British rookie had, however, managed to keep his engine running, so as Winkelhock came around to pick up the safety car at the end of his third lap—having extended his lead in that time to 33 seconds—Hamilton signalled for the trackside marshals to help his car back onto the track.

Unbelievably, the marshals complied, making use of a crane to lift the McLaren out of the gravel and place it back on the circuit. Never before or since in the history of Grand Prix racing has this happened; in fact, in response to Hamilton's remarkable escape, the practice was banned at the end of the season.

Hamilton was now a lap down, but still in the race, as the clerk of the course adjudged that conditions at the first corner were too dangerous and the race should be stopped. The red flags came out a few moments later and the cars gathered on the grid for the restart.

After about 15 minutes the race was restarted behind the safety car. Unusually the silver Mercedes stayed out for longer than the single lap dictated by the regulations in these circumstances. Even more unusually, Hamilton was allowed to overtake all the other cars and therefore regain the lap he had lost in the gravel.

While the 2007 regulations did allow for lapped cars to unlap themselves behind the safety car, it was only supposed to be permitted if the cars were lined up out of sequence. Since Hamilton was already at the back of the field, he should not have been permitted to reclaim his lap.

Whatever vendetta the authorities of motor racing were alleged to have against Hamilton the following year, it is clear that in 2007 nothing of the kind existed; indeed, the McLaren driver appeared to be positively favoured by the race stewards that day in Germany.

Nonetheless, the race proper restarted after a few laps, with Winkelhock quickly losing his lead as Massa and Alonso battled at the front. Kimi Raikkonen picked his way through the field to claim third shortly after, and was beginning to challenge the leaders on the now-dry track, but he was forced out of the race with a mechanical failure.

That left the battle for the win to be fought between Massa and Alonso, with the Brazilian holding the advantage. As predicted, the Ferrari was faster than the McLaren in dry conditions at the Nurburgring, and it looked as though the reigning world champion would have to settle for second.

However, with eight laps to go the rain fell again, and Alonso began to reel in the Ferrari. Less comfortable in the wet than its rival, the Italian car could not seem to lap as quickly as the McLaren.

Alonso passed Massa with a wheel-banging move on lap 56, going on to win ahead of an evidently irate Brazilian. The pair were joined on the podium by Mark Webber, who had driven a canny race from sixth on the grid to hold off the Williams of Alexander Wurz for third in the end.

Alonso's victory, his third of the season, brought him within two points of the championship lead, while Hamilton finished ninth and out of the points, tyre gambles failing to pay off as he tried in vain to pick his way through the field.

For me the 2007 European Grand Prix was the most memorable race to be held under that banner; Alonso's win in dramatic style showcasing his wet-weather skill and the joy of winning for a McLaren team where the relationship had not yet deteriorated.

Lewis Hamilton, too, showed himself not be infallible with the mistakes he made during the race, but with a little help from the authorities elevated himself into a reasonable finishing position.

And Alonso's unexpected win breathed new life into the world championship, providing a decent race in a season where the excitement on the track was few and far between. Given the bitter taste left by much of 2007, with political wranglings off the track overshadowing the racing, it's nice to be able to look back on at least one race with fond memories.

The Logical Choice: Why Fernando Alonso Is Ferrari Bound

Andy Shaw — Fri, 14 Aug 2009 12:08:46 -0400

Formula One's silly season seems to get earlier every year, but now we are firmly into the period where next season's contracts are being finalised and deals being announced. As in 2007 and 2008, the big story of 2009 concerns the destination of double world champion Fernando Alonso.

Since his move to McLaren turned sour in the latter stages of 2007, Alonso has been linked with a move to Ferrari. The Italian team has been coy about the prospect of recruiting the Spaniard so far, but the word in the paddock is that he is now contracted to race for them in 2010 or 2011.

This makes sense because while Ferrari is Formula One's oldest, most prestigious and most successful team, Fernando Alonso is currently F1's best driver.

This may seem like an ambitious statement to make, but it is entirely borne out by the facts.

Alonso has proven time and again that he is, given the correct machinery, a driver capable of winning races and championships. Winning the world title in 2006 was a sublime achievement, given that he was scrapping for glory with the most successful driver in the sport's history.

Furthermore, Michael Schumacher's Ferrari that year was a superior machine to Alonso's Renault, the progress of the French team hampered mid-season by the banning of its unique "mass damper" concept; with Ferrari's Bridgestone tyres clearly better suited to most tracks than Renault's Michelins, only a slow start to the year from the Scuderia gave Alonso the momentum he needed to take the title.

He has also shown that he is capable of mixing it at the front in sub-optimal machinery, too: 2008 saw Fernando win twice in a Renault that finished the year only fourth overall, some 55 points behind third-placed BMW.

No other driver currently in the sport has such a complete pedigree; his closest rival in terms of ability has to be Lewis Hamilton, but the Englishman has yet to dial out the occasional errors that mar his otherwise stellar performances.

The marriage of F1's best driver to its best team, then, is something that seems inevitable.

Throwing a spanner in the works at present is Kimi Raikkonen, the Finnish driver who, a few years ago, briefly rivalled Alonso for the mantle of F1's greatest driver, post-Schumacher.

Raikkonen was chosen as Schumacher's heir apparent by Ferrari, a promising but largely unhappy spell at McLaren having given the Finn two near misses but no world championships.

That was to change in 2007, Raikkonen duly winning the world title as his old team descended into controversy and farce; first the crimes of Spygate destabilising McLaren, followed by a bitter dispute over apparent favouritism showed to Hamilton over Alonso.

But Raikkonen's critics, among them the ever-fickle tifosi, had been unimpressed by his start to the season and would be given more ammunition in 2008, when an uncharacteristically inconsistent mid-season saw him take a back seat to teammate Felipe Massa.

This year the balance has been redressed slightly, though Massa was unquestionably still the better of the two before his horrific accident in Hungary threw the rest of his season into doubt.

Raikkonen has a contract to drive for Ferrari in 2010; the validity of that contract, however, is based on performance clauses. It is unknown whether the Finnish driver has successfully fulfilled those clauses, but given that it is now about the time of year that contractual options expire, we should be hearing fairly soon whether he will be continuing to drive for Ferrari next year.

A logical place for this announcement is the Italian Grand Prix in September; here Ferrari have traditionally announced their line-up for the following year, and by then the extent of Massa's injury may be better known, with a view to knowing whether he will participate in a full season in 2010.

Complicating the matter somewhat is the fact that Ferrari are known to have secured a lucrative sponsorship deal with Spanish bank Santander; top officials at the bank have previously expressed that they would not be interested in sponsoring Ferrari without Alonso.

Sources within the F1 world currently indicate that Ferrari are trying to reach a settlement with Raikkonen, so that he can retire from the sport at the end of the year and focus on rallying, which has been an interest of his for some time.

Whatever happens, the evidence at the moment all seems to be pointing in one direction: Fernando Alonso, whether you like it or not, will soon be a Ferrari driver.

An Uphill Struggle: Can BMW Follow the Brawn Model?

Andy Shaw — Sun, 02 Aug 2009 13:36:47 -0400

As BMW Sauber's workforce reel in their parent company's shock withdrawal from Formula One, questions have inevitably been asked about whether the team can undergo the same transition that came upon Brawn GP after Honda pulled out of the sport.

Unencumbered by the controlling, unwelcome interference in Honda's F1 team from a Japanese boardroom—filled with suited businessmen with no experience or expertise in the top level of motorsport—Ross Brawn was able to transform his team from struggling backmarkers into dominant title hopefuls.

Throughout their short tenure in F1 Honda clearly had potential—building on the groundwork laid by British American Racing, they produced a race-winning car in their first season—but all too often that was squandered.

Their 2007 and 2008 efforts epitomised the proverbial committee-designed horse, a shining example of corporate mismanagement overshadowing the efforts of talented people, producing the inevitable woeful results.

But with the suits gone and the team free to go about its business, the leap in performance was instantaneous, the potential immediately fulfilled.

Such could be said to be the case with BMW Sauber. For years and years, Peter Sauber's team were midfield contenders, excellent facilities and a strong team hindered by a lack of budget and their seeming inability to produce a decent chassis.

When Williams refused BMW's help in designing their cars, the Bavarian manufacturer jumped ship, and found a willing collaborator in Sauber.

BMW's corporate attitude to Formula One was worlds away from that of Honda. While Honda's head office constantly intervened in the team's affairs, replacing key technical staff seemingly at the drop of the hat, BMW left their team very much to its own devices, in the capable hands of the long-time chief of their F1 programme, Mario Theissen.

Yet still the corporate overtones of BMW's effort shone through, with their emphasis on performance targets and clean-cut image, based on typical Swiss-German efficiency. From 2006 to 2008, they duly met all their targets, Robert Kubica delivering the team's maiden victory in the last Canadian Grand Prix.

Then, in 2009, a poor approach to the new regulations hit the team hard. An ineffective KERS unit, combined with a sudden lack of aerodynamic efficiency, saw the team plunge down the championship tables.

Kubica came within an ace of a podium in Melbourne and Nick Heidfeld delivered a somewhat fortuitous second place at Sepang, but the team has hardly troubled the scorers since. So, for performance reasons alone, the decision by the German company to quit F1 is not entirely surprising.

However, the prospects of BMW donating its lavish facilities and a generous stipend to some enterprising buyer, in the manner of Brawn GP, are slim.

Peter Sauber is the most obvious choice to take control of the team—he retains a small shareholding—but he has already said that he has no interest in taking on the job of team principal again.

In fact, perhaps the only reason Sauber still has a stake in the outfit is because of complex Swiss laws regarding the operation of foreign businesses on their turf, and it is because of this that he will likely hold onto his shares regardless of who buys the team.

Aside from Sauber, it has been suggested that one of the failed applicants to the 2010 F1 championship could buy out the team instead. However, with the priority of BMW—as it was for Honda during their face-saving operation of early 2009—being to save jobs at the team's Hinwil base, they are unlikely to consider any offer that comes from a team with an established HQ outside of Switzerland.

Furthermore, any replacement for BMW would be subject to the same entry criteria as any other potential entrant for 2010. This is due to a World Motor Sport Council ruling of 2002, after the "Phoenix F1" team rose, aptly, from the ashes of Prost's terminated operation and attempted to enter the Malaysian Grand Prix.

At that time, the council ruled that F1 entries cannot be bought and sold. Therefore it seems unlikely that entrants such as Prodrive, who were rejected an F1 berth the last time they applied, would be allowed to buy out BMW and race without the FIA re-considering their application, probably with the same outcome as the previous occasion.

On the face of it, therefore, the prospects for BMW Sauber look fairly bleak. But FOTA, who have committed themselves to saving the team, will not let it disappear without a fight.

Just as they lobbied various parties to buy Honda after the Japanese manufacturer cut and ran in 2008, they will be central to securing a deal for the future of this team as well.

Whatever happens to BMW, they will most likely start next season without their star driver. Robert Kubica has reportedly had a number of offers for 2010 seats, but will have one eye on Ferrari in the unlikely event that Felipe Massa is unable to return there.

In any case, he is unlikely to be willing to extend his contract with his current team—he will feel that last year's decision to switch their development focus to 2009 midseason potentially cost him the world championship.

The survival of BMW Sauber will depend on a number of things, including finding a buyer for the team and producing the funds necessary for them to keep racing. But even if they do keep going, it's unlikely to be the same fairy story as it was for Brawn.

The Best Policy: Why Brawn Should Be Honest With Rubens Barrichello

Andy Shaw — Sun, 19 Jul 2009 09:19:21 -0400

From his demeanour immediately after most of his races these days, before the Brawn spin machine has been put into action, it's evident that Rubens Barrichello isn't exactly a happy man.

The reasons for this, on the face of it, are not exactly clear. He has been rescued from the doldrums of a declining F1 career, and the threat of being without a drive this season, by one of the most remarkable new entrants to F1 for a very long time.

With the fastest car in the field for the first part of 2009, Barrichello has had the best chance of his career so far to take that coveted world championship, emulating his fellow Brazilian, hero and friend Ayrton Senna.

But that is about all that we can say about Barrichello's season so far—a chance at glory that, for whatever reason, has not been taken. Instead the initiative has been handed to his teammate Jenson Button, a driver who Barrichello comfortably outperformed in the bleak years of 2007 and 2008, but who is now running away with the drivers' championship.

After the German Grand Prix, Barrichello had finished ahead of Button in just one race all season—ironically, Button's home race at Silverstone. His qualifying record is a little better, but when grid positions aren't converted into strong finishes it counts for little.

Barrichello's frustration with the team was evident after the Spanish Grand Prix, where he felt that a sub-optimal pit strategy had allowed Button to beat him, despite the Brazilian taking the lead into the first corner of the race.

In Germany, the story was even worse: Barrichello again qualified on the front row and beat pole-sitter Mark Webber down into the first corner. Webber received a drive-through penalty for a questionable shove on Barrichello on the first lap.

Nobody overtook Barrichello on the track that day, but he still ended up sixth, behind even Button, who had been held up by Heikki Kovalainen for the first stint of the race, which had cost him about 15 seconds.

Clearly the German Grand Prix was a strategic disaster for Brawn, a team led by a man whose credentials for making strategic calls are impeccable. The Bahrain Grand Prix, for example, where Button won from seemingly nowhere, demonstrates just how astute the team can be in making the right decisions.

Yet for Barrichello something went wrong. A problem with a fuel rig cost Barrichello a few seconds, but it was the fundamental unworkability of a three-stop strategy that meant the difference between a potential podium and a lowly sixth. To be sure, the Red Bulls were too strong for the Brazilian to have won the race, but he could still have managed third if his race had been better managed.

Barrichello's first stop brought him out right behind Felipe Massa, whose extremely wide Ferrari proceeded to wipe out any advantage the Brawn car had previously enjoyed. Combined with the aforementioned fuel rig issue, this cost Barrichello any chance of the podium and brought him out fifth, line astern with his teammate.

Then Brawn made the audacious decision to orchestrate a swap between their two cars. Barrichello pitted a lap earlier than Button, giving the British driver the chance to eke out a slender lead over his teammate.

Barrichello's stop was half a second shorter than Button's, implying that he could have gone at least two or three laps longer. Furthermore, at the final stops Brawn put Button on super-soft tyres, but gave medium rubber to Barrichello, removing any chance of the Brazilian reclaiming fifth place with a quick out lap.

At the time of their final stops Button was clearly being held up by Barrichello, but the pair were already too far behind fourth-placed Nico Rosberg for either of them to have stood a chance of claiming an extra point. There was, therefore, no reason for the drivers to swap positions unless the team is already favouring Button—something they have denied.

There is certainly an argument for the team putting all of their resources behind Button in an attempt to wrap up his world championship as early as possible, especially now that Barrichello is 24 points behind. But Barrichello insisted after Germany, despite his anger with the team, that they were not yet favouring Button.

Unfortunately for Rubens, it appears that they are. Furthermore, treating your most experienced driver as a number two and not telling him about it is hardly a way to engender good relations.

For all that he has given the team, Rubens is owed an explanation by Brawn. If they have chosen to favour Button in pursuit of the drivers' championship, so be it—but they owe it to Barrichello to be honest with him and explain that this is the case.

Rubens is afforded little sympathy by many F1 fans, particularly in Britain—those who are literally jumping for joy at Jenson Button's sudden success are rarely receptive to any idea that his championship charge is being helped enormously by his number two, a useful but unwitting rear-gunner like any number of comic-book sidekicks. According to them, Barrichello's frustrations are all of his own making.

But the evidence against this idea is damning and continues to grow. Brawn have almost certainly decided to back Button—now they need to tell Barrichello about it.

New Faces: Ten Drivers Who Deserve an F1 Break

Andy Shaw — Wed, 01 Jul 2009 07:07:05 -0400

Three new teams are set to appear on the F1 grid in 2010, and with a number of current Formula One drivers nearing the end of their careers, there are more opportunities for aspiring young superstars to get onto the grid than there have been for a long time. In addition to this, the rise of several prominent junior formulae such as GP2, the Renault World Series and this year's new Formula Two championship means that there are plenty of places where Formula One wannabes can demonstrate their talent and, potentially, catch the eye of a team principal or two. This article highlights ten of the most deserving drivers who could be poised for a break into Formula One in 2010. In order to be eligible for the list, drivers must not have raced in F1 before, though they could have tested an F1 car at some stage—therefore Giorgio Pantano, for example, is excluded, though he probably wouldn't have made the top ten anyway.

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Back to the Future: Why F1 Will Survive a FOTA Exodus

Andy Shaw — Tue, 16 Jun 2009 11:21:23 -0400

With progress in talks between the FIA and FOTA stalling, and the two parties appearing increasingly at loggerheads over the governance of F1 and the 2010 regulations, the threat of a split between the two series is growing by the day.

History tells us that such a division would be hugely damaging for all parties. In biology it generally holds true that for any given environment, only one species can occupy a particular niche—that is, a role within that environment—at any one time. If two species try to occupy the same niche, one or the other will eventually go extinct.

Such appears to be the case with motorsports, too.

When the IRL split from CART in 1996, what resulted was an attempt by both parties to attract the same audience to two series that produced essentially the same racing product; it was no surprise, therefore, that something had to give, though despite the IRL essentially "winning" in the end it is nowhere near as strong as CART was before 1996.

Felipe Massa and Mark Webber, both prominent drivers in the world of F1, have already lent tentative support to the concept of a FOTA-led split from F1, and even world champion Lewis Hamilton has said that he would have no problem with following McLaren out of F1 if that was the route the Mercedes-backed team chose to take.

Clearly these drivers believe, along with the rest of those within FOTA who are calling for a split, that in the event of FOTA's championship and the FIA competing for dominion of the same niche, the FOTA teams would win out.

FOTA have a lot on their side. Ferrari, the most prestigious and historic of F1's teams, are the ringleaders of the organisation, and quite probably the reason that FOTA has managed to cause such a stir in an era where earlier manufacturer-led breakaway threats (such as the Grand Prix Manufacturers' Association) have never previously achieved anything.

FOTA also appear to have a semi-cohesive game plan for how to acquire a solid commercial foundation in the event of a breakaway.

It has been suggested several times in recent weeks that FOTA could use the structure of A1GP, an initially popular series whose profile has dwindled even in the face of considerable support from Ferrari themselves, in order to get their own series started.

A1GP has television deals in place and contracts with popular circuits such as Zandvoort in the Netherlands and Brands Hatch in the UK. By utilising these commercial deals, a FOTA-backed series could take shape in a matter of months—in time for the start of F1's 2010 season.

There is also the possibility of using the framework of another series to make FOTA's vision a reality. Renault's Flavio Briatore recently announced the formation of GP3, a series intended to run a rung below his popular GP2 series.

But, apart from its existence, no other details have been announced. Could "GP3" simply be a placeholder to set the wheels in motion for FOTA's own, considerably higher-profile ambitions?

And finally, one fact in FOTA's favour is that the FIA have no power to stop them. Under European competition law, the FIA is unable to refuse to sanction a rival series to F1, unless it is due to safety concerns—a point which Max Mosley has already conceded on several occasions.

So, a FOTA series could conceivably take shape and become a modest success in a short amount of time. With prestigious teams, famous drivers and the competitors themselves running the show, it could gather momentum and even usurp Formula One as the pinnacle of motorsport.

And then again, maybe it won't. As the FIA alluded to in a statement released earlier today, the differences between themselves and FOTA lie in a disparate set of philosophies of what the sport is about.

In recent years, the major thrust of FIA rulemaking has been about limiting the freedom of F1's engineers to innovate. Whether for safety, competition or cost-saving reasons, restrictions on what teams can and cannot include in their cars have reached crippling levels.

The consequence of all of this is that the focus of design and engineering in F1 has switched: Aerodynamic efficiency is now more important than the generation of mechanical grip; until the ECU was standardised for 2008, devising clever electronic driver aids was a workaround for the banning of mechanical equivalents.

As many fans and pundits pointed out in this time, the rules introduced seemingly arbitrarily by the FIA achieved neither of the federation's stated aims, firstly of improving safety by reducing speeds and secondly of reducing the cost of competing in F1 to a sustainable level.

The ingenuity demonstrated by F1's technical departments in finding ways to make the cars ever quicker far outstripped the pace of the FIA in banning the more outlandish innovations. And by radically shifting the goalposts of research and development year on year, the FIA did more to increase costs than it ever did to reduce them.

What the rules for 2010 represent more than anything is a change in the approach of the FIA. They have recognised, years after many of the rest of us, that they cannot cut speeds or costs by restricting the freedom of F1 teams to innovate.

The FIA are now intent on reducing the cost of competing in a far more explicit manner, by actually capping budgets and insisting that teams operate to within a certain fixed level of expenditure.

The flip side of this arrangement is that it paves the way for many of the technical restrictions on F1 cars to be relaxed; the FIA have already gone some way towards achieving this by announcing a raft of changes to the technical regulations in the wake of the budget cap.

Moveable aerodynamic devices may be permitted on F1 cars for the first time in more than 40 years; rev limits on the engines may be removed; I have even heard that four-wheel drive F1 cars may be allowed in exchange for a cost cap.

By introducing these technical freedoms the FIA will begin to reverse the changes it has made to the sport in the last twenty years, many of which have been poorly received. By reducing the reliance on stringent technical regulations, F1 goes back to what it is meant to be about—an engineering challenge.

In their stance against the FIA, FOTA appear to have missed this bigger picture. They are worried about how a budget cap will remove their right to spend their way to the front of the grid.

In the glory days, before F1 was stifled by over-regulation, there was no need for a budget cap: But then, there was next to no interest from car manufacturers, who have since destabilised the sport by spending literally billions of dollars in pursuit of a slight competitive advantage.

In these times of global economic hardship, we are seeing that even those who led the spending spree are no longer able to compete—Honda have already withdrawn and the news for Renault and Toyota is not good.

One long-time motorsports fan, whom I respect greatly, said recently, "I would rather a sport that rewards the clever, as opposed to the most well funded." I couldn't agree more with this statement, and it is for this reason that I support the FIA's approach to reducing costs if the technical regulations are freed up along with them.

If the FIA's plan for 2010 goes ahead, with or without the FOTA members, it will be much closer to the "pure" sport of Formula One than anything FOTA can produce. The FIA will have F1 in something close to its original form; an arena for some of the cleverest minds in the motoring world to show just how fast they can make an open-wheeled racer go.

And what will FOTA have, even if they do secure a decent television deal and some sponsorship money? An unregulated, directionless monster, the perfect mechanism for spending themselves into oblivion.

As with any dispute of this kind, there are rights and wrongs on both sides. The FIA's approach to pushing through its vision has been short-sighted and damaging; by not involving FOTA in any preparatory stage, they were certain to anger the team bosses who feel that they are owed the right to a say in the governance of F1.

And there is a case for saying that Max Mosley is not the right man to lead F1 into its new era, that he is a relic from a past that the FIA would do well to distance itself from.

There are even those who suggest that Mosley is seeking a legacy other than that bestowed so inelegantly upon him by the News of the World, and that so far as he is concerned what happens to F1 after him is immaterial.

I prefer to think less cynically, and to assume that the federation besides Mosley—for it is far from a one-man show—has an interest in safeguarding the future of Formula One. It will suffer if FOTA leave, but it will not be eradicated.

For progress to be made in this dispute there need to be concessions on both sides. A new Concorde Agreement needs to be signed, removing the ability of the FIA to make rules without first consulting the Formula One Commission, a long-forgotten body that has not met in years despite its supposed authority in matters of F1 legislation.

The teams need to accept the right of other outfits to enter F1, and their responsibility to ensure that they are able to do so by not requiring massive levels of spending for any team that wishes to become competitive.

But most importantly, everyone needs to understand that the FIA's plan for the future of F1 is fundamentally sound, and that a true engineering challenge would restore the spectacle of the sport and strengthen its fundamental principles. But that cannot be done without shedding some of the expense that has crippled the sport in recent years.

The Calm Before The Storm: What June 12 Will Bring For Formula One

Andy Shaw — Thu, 11 Jun 2009 13:25:50 -0400

The Formula One world anxiously awaits the FIA's announcement this Friday, June 12, as the full scale of the FIA-FOTA row, that has threatened in recent weeks to tear the sport apart, will be realised.

That day is when the FIA will finally reveal which of the many applicants for the 2010 season will be accepted, and permitted to participate in next year's world championship. Many new entrants have put their names forward in the hope of securing a grid spot, but the entries of the eight FOTA teams are conditional, meaning that they will not be valid unless the FIA agrees to the demands attached to their entry forms.

Those demands include the scrapping of the FIA's controversial 2010 regulations and the signing of a new Concorde Agreement, which will lay out in writing the principles of F1's governance and prevent the FIA from riding roughshod over the teams, as FOTA feel has been done in recent years.

The FIA argues that such concessions will jeopardise the plans of new teams, whose entries hinge on the fact that radically revised 2010 regulations, including a £40m budget cap, will apply next season.

If the FIA chooses to stand firm and effectively reject FOTA's conditional entries, the way could be paved for a disaster of epic proportions. F1's commercial boss Bernie Ecclestone has already threatened to sue Ferrari, who he claims are committed to F1 until 2012, should they fail to make the grid next season.

Ferrari and Renault have recently reiterated their intention to leave F1 if their demands are not met, and talk of a breakaway series has continued, but this option seems decidedly unrealistic in a world crippled by economic crisis, and where Ecclestone himself controls the most lucrative of the television and advertising markets that form the life-blood of a global racing series.

The FIA, too, cannot really afford to lose big-named teams, as they know that Ecclestone can walk with them and use his financial clout to establish a really workable rival series. But neither party wants this option—a look at the extremely damaging IRL/CART split in the USA in 1996 demonstrates how dangerous such a division could be for the long-term future of the sport.

Both sides have postured and continued posturing right up until the crucial June 12 "red letter day." But serious consideration of the issues at hand clearly demonstrates that this is not war—if anything, it is more akin to a highly complex and baffling game of poker. He who—to switch metaphors for a moment—blinks first will ultimately lose out, but neither can afford to keep staring for too long.

Plenty is up for grabs in the coming months in Formula One. The way the sport is governed, formerly through the auspices of a quasi-independent Formula One Commission and now seemingly on the whims of Max Mosley and the FIA, is one thing that the teams have been seeking to change.

The distribution of revenues is another.

Currently the teams receive half of the profits generated by the commercial rights holder, CVC Capital Partners: Relatively speaking, however, the profit margins are slim, with the majority of revenues going towards servicing the massive loans taken out by CVC to buy the rights in the first place.

Even Mosley's job is not safe: Up for election in October, if the President wishes to continue in his role as head of the federation he will need to assert his authority over world motorsport, and quelling a few noisy, blustering F1 teams is a perfect way to do this. No credible opponent to Mosley has yet emerged, but some within and outside Paris believe it is only a matter of time.

Both sides desperately need to be seen to "win" in order to satisfy their own motives; FOTA want security in their sport and a vision for the future that more completely corresponds to the aspirations of their paymasters, for the most part large car companies. The FIA, quite simply, wants to retain their authority as the arbiters of global motorsport.

For neither side to suffer a massive hit requires compromise, and it is for this reason that compromise is the most likely outcome of this week's meetings, and what will be announced on Friday will be a position far removed from the disparate pontifications of both Mosley and the teams.

But neither side will want to be seen to be backing down, either, which is why these concessions will be hammered out behind closed doors, and it is only on Friday that we will begin to see how this crisis has been resolved. Nobody here can afford to lose; nobody can go it alone; cooperation will be the way forward, and the astute businessmen and legendary negotiators of both the FIA and FOTA are surely smart enough to realise this.

So June 12 will not bring forth a storm, but more of a gentle breeze, the winds of change not blowing strong enough to upturn any well-established structures or upset any of the saga's key players.

Only time will tell what direction Formula One will take in the future, but it is not unduly optimistic to suggest that all parties are going to see sense in the end.

Full House: When Would the F1 Grid Be Maxed Out?

Andy Shaw — Sun, 17 May 2009 06:54:11 -0400

The FIA World Motor Sport Council recently announced that the maximum number of entrants for a Grand Prix would be raised to 26 from its previous figure of 24, in order to accommodate a flood of new entries anticipated for the 2010 World Championship.

The fact that such a maximum figure exists has been irrelevant for several years now, as the last time the grid was full was back in 1995, but with entry numbers set to rise for next season in the wake of the FIA's massive cost-cutting scheme, it could become a burning question once again.

Ignoring, for the moment, the artificial limits imposed on the number of entries by the F1 Sporting Regulations, what is the theoretical maximum number of cars that could enter a Grand Prix?

The answer to this question is held in Appendix O of the International Sporting Code, which applies to all FIA-mandated motorsport events. Except for Formula One, the maximum number of cars permitted to start an international race is derived from the following formula:

N = 0.36 x L x W x T x G

N represents the number of cars, whereas the numbers L, W, T and G are coefficients determined respectively by the length of the circuit, the minimum width of the circuit, the duration of the race and the type of car competing in the event.

F1 regulations do not currently allow teams to enter the sport for anything less than a whole season, so for our purposes we will use Monaco—the shortest and narrowest track on the F1 calendar—for determining the maximum number of cars permitted to enter an F1 race.

The Monte Carlo circuit is 3.340 km long, which corresponds to a coefficient for L of 12. A quick Google search for the minimum width of the Monte Carlo circuit yielded 8 metres, which means that the coefficient W has a value of 9.

An F1 race lasts for a maximum of two hours, so T has a value of 1.15. "Single-seaters over 2000cc," such as F1 cars, are given a G value of 0.6.

As such, we can multiply these numbers together to give a maximum entry number for an F1 race, N, of 27 (the figure is rounded up to the nearest whole number, as given in the regulations).

According to the same regulations, "The maximum number of cars admitted to participate in a same practice session shall not be greater than the number authorised to start in the race increased by 20 %."

Therefore, assuming the structure of the F1 weekend remained the same, 33 cars would be permitted to practice and attempt to qualify for an F1 race. For practical purposes this would be 32, since single-car teams are no longer permitted in F1.

So the short answer to the question is that 16 teams of two cars each could be permitted to enter the F1 World Championship, and five cars each race would not be allowed to start.

In order to properly consider the question, however, we would have to take into account the facilities of the circuits, and how many teams they are capable of accommodating.

If this is the case, then the answer is actually much lower. Modern F1 circuits tend to be built with the capacity for 12 teams, with Monaco only actually having room for about 10.

In the days of pre-qualifying, when there were more entrants to the sport than there were spots allocated even in the qualifying sessions, teams used to set up shop in the paddock and were only allowed to move into the garages in the event of actually qualifying for the race.

One suspects that such an approach would not be particularly popular in today's age of high-tech F1, with more computers and machinery needed to run a Grand Prix car than can be realistically set up anywhere other than a garage built for that purpose.

In allocating an extra team to F1 for 2010, the FIA have obviously decided that they can make room on most of the circuits for a 13th garage, but expanding the grid any further beyond that may prove very difficult indeed.

Bernie Ecclestone is among those who have expressed a wish to return to those days, in the early 1990s, of pre-qualifying and overflowing entry lists for Grands Prix, but with the demands that modern F1 imposes on its circuits, it is unlikely that this will occur any time soon.

F1 Minus Four: What Would the Sport Be Like?

Andy Shaw — Thu, 14 May 2009 05:16:38 -0400

In the last few days four F1 outfits—Toyota, Red Bull, Ferrari, and Renault—have threatened to leave the sport if dialogue about the new-for-2010 budget cap is not entered into between the FIA and the teams.

This means that of the current ten Formula One teams, five would not be on the grid in 2010: Red Bull own two teams and have threatened to withdraw both if their demands are not met.

The incessant "Will they? Won't they?" pertaining to the future of these teams, especially Ferrari—who are regarded by a majority of fans as being integral to the success of Formula One as a global sport—has been dealt with elsewhere, but what if they really did leave at the end of the year? What would it mean for Formula One?

For one thing, the answer to this question depends on what the schismatic teams chose to do next season. The threat of breaking away and starting up their own series has been thinly veiled in recent weeks, but such an outcome would damage both sides, perhaps irreparably.

Assuming that to be the case, we would be left in Formula One with Brawn GP, Williams and Force India as the three remaining teams from 2009.

What BMW and Mercedes will do is unclear—McLaren will be unwilling to ruffle too many feathers in Paris after their recent run-ins with the FIA, but a mass manufacturer-backed exodus from F1 would hardly be something the Mercedes board would wish to ride out.

The three remaining teams would most likely be joined by a set of GP2 teams making the suddenly cheaper step up from motorsport's second rung to its first; other entrants such as Lola and Aston Martin would probably join them.

It is not inconceivable that, even with the manufacturers leaving F1 entirely, we could see a full grid of cars in 2010—but at what cost to the credibility of the sport?

F1 has existed without huge numbers of manufacturers in the past; those that did participate in the sport did so as engine suppliers rather than car builders, but there is a solid argument for the fact that mass manufacturer participation in F1 has helped make it the multi-billion dollar global enterprise that it is today.

With the option of a rival, manufacturer-backed series drawing away crowds and revenues, the new-look Formula One would probably suffer, as the Indy Racing League did upon its formation in 1996.

What the IRL had to offer was the flagship race of American open-wheel racing, the Indianapolis 500, and it is possible that the Monaco Grand Prix could hold similar sway in the event of a catastrophic split between Formula One and the manufacturers.

Tony George "won" the IRL/CART wars by radically modifying his vision for the sport: What he wanted was an oval-only, all-American race series. Only by moving onto road courses and allowing a steady influx of foreign drivers to participate did the ratings rise and the series' profile eventually rise higher than CART (later Champ Car).

Bernie Ecclestone, who occupies a position analogous to George's as head honcho of the Formula One effort, would probably require no restructuring of his goals to help the series move foward: All that would be needed would be a shrewd business attitude and an ability to bring money and sponsorship to his series.

This is exactly what Bernie has been doing for years, and the presence of a rival championship is unlikely to suddenly obliterate his business sense.

Many people have said that they would regard the pinnacle of motorsport as that with the best drivers; the drivers will follow the money, as they always do, and if F1 has more money then F1 is where the drivers will stay.

The only thing that may have to change in Bernie's business plan would be his attitude to race promoters; rather than raking in millions of dollars from every venue that hosts a Grand Prix, he would need to negotiate a better deal with the promoters to ensure that they do not jump ship to any rival series.

Either that or he will be, at this very moment, negotiating cast-iron, long-term deals with many of F1's more profitable circuits to ensure that no rival series can encroach on his turf.

If the same attitude for business that has made Ecclestone and countless other F1 people millionaires over the last 25 years or so can pull him through the threat of a rival championship—if he can keep the money coming in to F1—then in all likelihood the manufacturers will return, tails between legs, within a few years and ask to participate in F1 again.

They will be welcomed, of course, as their presence is undoubtedly good for business, but they will have learned a valuable lesson.

The whole situation becomes a lot simpler if the teams in question simply walk away from F1 and turn their attention to other categories of motorsport—Ferrari to GT racing, Toyota to Le Mans and so on.

When one considers the fact that the car manufacturers are currently bearing some of the worst fallout from the global recession—and the risk associated with building a new global open-wheel championship from the ground up—this surely seems like the most likely outcome.

If this proves to be the case, then Formula One will carry on as normal: Ferrari, Renault et al won't be there, but significantly they won't be in anything like Formula One either.

Fans complained when refuelling was introduced in 1994. They complained when the qualifying format and points systems were changed in 2003. They complained when the FIA introduced long-life engines and gearboxes, shuffled the tyre rules and chopped and changed aerodynamic regulations on a seemingly annual basis.

And now they are complaining about budget caps. But every year, thousands still turn up at race circuits, with millions more tuning in on television to watch the Formula One World Championship. And however much they complain, Bernie knows that they will continue to watch.

The sport has undergone several radical changes in the past and has never surrendered too many viewers: Indeed, what was more damaging to F1 was the dominance of a single driver and team in the early part of the decade. As long as the racing is good and the names vaguely familiar, Formula One will bounce back from its present low.

In short, Formula One without these teams will live on, but not as we know it.

The Great Game: Ferrari's Power Play And The Future of Formula One

Andy Shaw — Wed, 13 May 2009 05:11:46 -0400

Yesterday's threat by Ferrari to leave Formula One at the end of 2009 was not unexpected by those who have been paying attention, but it brought F1's present power struggle into the eye of the wider public for the first time.

The Italian marque, who have participated in the World Championship since it began in 1950, revealed their intention not to enter the championship in 2010 if the FIA refused to back down over the rules it has said it will introduce next year.

The major sticking points are the £40 million budget cap, which will be enforced for the first time next year, and the fact that such a cap is optional, with technical restrictions on those teams who choose to run with unlimited spending.

The "two-tier" nature of next year's championship is what irks Ferrari and the other teams the most, with Toyota and Red Bull already confirming their intention not to participate in F1 next year if that proposal stays.

The FIA yesterday, before Ferrari's announcement, offered a simple and workable solution to the two-tier dilemma: If all the teams sign up to the budget cap, no two-tier formula will result.

The same would be true in the opposite direction, of course, but the FIA claims to already have notices of intent to participate in a capped Formula One from several new teams.

Furthermore, Brawn GP, Williams and Force India are all expected to sign up to the budget cap without any real objections, as an inability to spend promiscuously is what keeps these teams (Brawn excepted, of course, though without Honda's backing next year may otherwise be much tougher for them) firmly at the back of the field.

That leaves the manufacturers, along with Red Bull, who are expected to engage in a block boycott of the new regulations and not sign up for 2010 entry when the deadline passes at the end of May unless changes are made.

What is interesting is that Ferrari hold a slightly different position to the other teams on these issues.

They are the only team who object fundamentally to the principle of budget capping. All the other teams have stated that capped costs are a good idea, but that discussion needs to take place to ensure a suitable level of spending is permitted and that there is no prospect of a two-tier formula such as is already being talked about.

In all probability the two-tier system, as alluded to by the FIA in their statement yesterday, is a political move designed to give teams the "option" of participating without a budget cap, so as to ensure that nobody feels they were forced into signing up.

The FIA was expecting the option of running uncapped to be so unsavoury as to convince everybody that capped costs were the best idea, thus doing away with the whole idea of a two-tier system.

But they have underestimated the resolve of the teams to stick together and ride out this crisis. Efforts to undermine FOTA have not affected the unity of the organisation so far, and if the FIA can be brought to the negotiating table they will undoubtedly discover that FOTA will drive a hard bargain and not be forced into accepting unfavourable terms.

The problem is that Ferrari, as the ringleader of FOTA, has a slightly different outlook to the rest of its membership on what the best direction is for Formula One.

By demanding that the budget cap exist in no form at all next year, Ferrari are slowly alienating themselves from the other teams. This is exactly what the FIA wish to happen.

Ferrari's bold statement yesterday casts the whole sorry affair into sharper relief; it demonstrates to the world just how far this sport has regressed in recent years, with childish tantrums from grown men who do not get their own way, a bitter struggle for power and money that threatens to tear the sport apart.

And tear the sport apart it would do, were the teams foolish enough to listen to the incoherent protestations of an ill-informed minority and break away from Formula One as a whole. Such a split would not be a clean break—the analogy has been made with the formation of English football's Premier League, but in reality it would be more like the tumultuous schism between IRL and CART in the United States.

The Premier League succeeded because all of football's top teams of the time elected to break away from direct FA rule. In Formula One, that simply will not happen—Williams have already received money from FOM relating to a new Concorde Agreement, which commits them to the sport for a considerable period of time.

They will necessarily be absent in any breakaway series; legal action from FOM would likely bankrupt the already struggling company, so for one of F1's most prestigious teams, joining the rest of FOTA in a new championship, should one happen, is impossible.

Add to that the considerable draw of Brawn GP, F1's fairytale story for 2009, as well as the slightly less marketable Force India, both of whom are likely to stick with F1 regardless of what the rest of FOTA do, and you have something with rather less potential than the fledgling Premier League.

Interestingly, reports during the Spanish GP weekend surfaced that a new candidate may emerge to challenge Max Mosley's premiership of the FIA in the October elections. News like this does not emerge from a federation like the FIA without being fairly serious, so this shows that discontent with Mosley's firm grasp on power is rising, and that a new era in the FIA may be about to begin.

This is a weakness that FOTA can exploit if they hold their nerve and negotiate hard when the time comes to do so. The FIA will have to climb down from their present position, but there is no doubting that the teams—especially Ferrari—will have to concede a little ground too.

The alternative is too bleak a prospect to even consider.

The Burning Question: Strange Calls From Brawn GP

Andy Shaw — Sun, 10 May 2009 16:41:16 -0400

As Rubens Barrichello mounted the second step on the podium for the 28th time in his Formula One career, the feeling of having been here before must have been running through his mind in more ways than one.

The body language of the Brazilian, F1's most experienced driver ever, said it all as he congratulated teammate Jenson Button on another astonishing victory in Barcelona.

From the very start of the weekend, Barrichello looked more comfortable than his championship-leading teammate...outpacing him in practice and coming close to pole in qualifying, when Rubens got past Button at the first corner the race looked like being his to lose.

And lose it he did. Both Brawns were scheduled to run three-stop strategies, but at his first pit stop, Jenson Button's crew elected to switch him to a two-stopper.

Barrichello stuck to the original plan of three stops, and Button took advantage of his teammate's extra pit lane time to take the lead and win the race.

Surprise, surprise—Brawn GP's claim that a three-stop strategy was fastest at Barcelona, which was contentious to begin with, was proven wrong.

No other driver save for Kazuki Nakajima, who was forced into an extra pit stop after an early accident, stopped more than twice, and Barrichello found himself very much on the back foot.

The mathematics may say that three stops is fastest around the Circuit de Catalunya, but as anyone will tell you, the mathematics mean little when compared to the importance of track position and the need to avoid traffic, especially on a track where overtaking is so difficult.

Button's crew obviously realised this and fuelled their man accordingly. Barrichello's, for whatever reason, did not.

The conclusion, for those who enjoy jumping to conclusions and do so habitually, is that Button was given the preferable strategy at the expense of his teammate.

It is easy to understand their reasoning. Button's first pit stop was before Barrichello's, and having seen that the British driver was switching to a two-stop strategy, surely Rubens' crew should have done the same thing?

They may have still felt that three stops were faster, but they were hardly likely to lose out to anyone other than Button. To be completely safe, they should have switched Barrichello's strategy to shadow Button's, thereby ensuring that the Briton could not get past.

So we are left with either accusing Barrichello's engineers of a fundamental oversight, or something more sinister: A deliberate ploy by Brawn to hinder one of their drivers.

If we are to believe the official version of events, as conveyed to us by Nick Fry of Brawn GP, Barrichello was simply not fast enough to make up the time saved by Button in not pitting again. In short, Rubens did not take sufficient advantage of having less fuel for most of the time.

There is at least a grain of truth to this. That Button drove a flawless race cannot be disputed; he was quick at all times and once in the lead never looked like relinquishing it.

But then, Barrichello's final stop was only two laps after Button's: If one of the advantages of a three-stop strategy, as Brawn contend, was to allow Barrichello to spend less time on the less competitive harder tyre, why was he brought in so early?

Why not give him extra laps on softer tyres to allow him to make up ground over Button, who was by then on harder rubber?

It is clear from the way the race played out that the three-stop strategy was certainly not faster than stopping just twice: Ability alone cannot account for the gap between Button and Barrichello by the end of the race, especially taking into account how Barrichello had been quicker than his teammate for most of the weekend.

Alternatively, Button may have just pulled something out of the bag when it mattered, made the most of a less competitive strategy and gone on to win the race in style.

But the explanation given by Brawn for the counter-intuitive result of today's race has not been accepted by a considerable number of people. Was Barrichello's strategy a genuine mistake, or something less palatable?

I genuinely can't decide.

Three Empty Spaces: Who Should Join F1 In 2010?

Andy Shaw — Sat, 09 May 2009 13:45:08 -0400

Budget caps and cheaper components have been controversial in F1 recently, but there's no denying that the promise of an affordable championship for next season have attracted some new names to the table, in the hope of securing a spot on the Grand Prix grid for 2010.

In anticipation of a flurry of new entries for next season, the FIA World Motor Sport Council voted last month to increase the number of cars permitted in F1 from 24 to 26. That means that—assuming all the current teams decide to remain in the sport—there are spaces for three new constructors next year.

Already, five parties have expressed an interest in signing up to the series under the FIA's proposed budget cap.

The first is the team formerly known as USF1, who are apparently shortly to be renamed from their current, somewhat cumbersome placeholder title of "US Grand Prix Engineering." Respected motorsports journalist and ex-Williams employee Peter Windsor, as well as long-time motorsport participant Ken Anderson, are spearheading this effort.

The second is Prodrive, the aborted 2008 entrants led by former Benetton and BAR team principal David Richards.

The third are Aston Martin, a manufacturer with no previous F1 history but a fine pedigree elsewhere in the motoring world. Formula One has already proven a successful marketing tool for the likes of Mercedes, Ferrari, Renault and Toyota, so Aston Martin will be keen to increase their brand exposure in this way.

The fourth are Lola, famed for their experience in chassis manufacture. In F1 they are infamous for the "MasterCard Lola" debacle, a team that ran embarrassingly slowly for a single qualifying session in 1997 before quickly folding.

The fifth are iSport, currently participating in GP2, who helped Timo Glock to his title in the category in 2007 and secured the runner-up spot with Bruno Senna last year.

It is being rumoured that other GP2 teams are considering an F1 entry as well, and with plenty of racing experience and a reasonable workforce already, it is easy to see why an affordable F1 would be an attractive option for these teams.

But with only three spaces left on the grid, something has to give. Who, then, should step aside?

The first and most obvious candidates whose application should be rejected out of hand are Prodrive. The last time the FIA invited teams to apply for a spot on the F1 grid, in 2006, Prodrive fought off the competition to secure the coveted position as F1's twelfth team for 2008.

Ultimately, the outfit never materialised. Richards had no intention of building his own car for the championship, instead hoping to purchase a chassis as Super Aguri and Scuderia Toro Rosso were doing at the time.

The legality of the "customer cars" used by these two teams was questionable at the time, and there was no guarantee that they would be made legal for 2008, given the opposition to the concept by other F1 teams, particularly Williams and Midland (later Spyker).

It would therefore have been prudent for Richards—backed by a significant Prodrive infrastructure, which was one of the reasons he had won the entry in the first place—to have constructed his own car rather than cavalierly assuming he would be able to simply buy one.

The affair ended with Richards withdrawing his entry early in 2008, far too late for a new team to fill his spot and with no promised twelfth team.

In short, Prodrive had their shot at F1 a couple of years ago, and their effort failed to materialise on the grid. Far better, then, to offer the opportunity to a team without a proven track record of failure.

That probably rules out Lola too. Times have changed since 1997; with today's technology and resources it would require a special effort to construct a car that was as significantly overweight as the 1997 MasterCard Lola was, but the team faltered on other aspects too.

Their "title sponsorship" deal with MasterCard was filled with so many loopholes that they never actually received any money from the credit card company. And folding after just one race is hardly a healthy business model to aspire to.

Commercially naive and equipped with neither wealth nor expertise, Lola were doomed to failure from the start. It is difficult to imagine the company arriving in F1 quite as disastrously as they did the first time round, but nonetheless their application can and should be discounted in favour of brand new entries.

Of the remaining applicants, we have heard the most from USF1, and what we know already sounds promising. Establishing their base in NASCAR's equivalent of Silicon Valley in North Carolina, they will not be short of a skilled workforce with which to produce a competitive F1 outfit.

Get rid of the jingoism and there might be a workable formula in there somewhere.

iSport have shown themselves to be up there among the best-run and shrewdest teams in GP2, and in a cost-capped F1 world could stand to do very well indeed. And the mutual benefit to F1 and Aston Martin of having an extra manufacturer on the grid cannot be ignored.

Things will become clearer as entries are submitted and the May 29 deadline approaches, but as things stand these three would be the best candidates for F1 in 2010.

Donington Doubts: The Future of the British Grand Prix

Andy Shaw — Wed, 06 May 2009 07:12:06 -0400

Over the last week or so fresh doubts have surfaced over the future of the British Grand Prix, with 2010 race promoters Donington Ventures being taken to court by the Wheatcroft family, who own the circuit, over unpaid rent.

After years of discontent with the current British GP venue, Silverstone, Formula One Management announced last July that the race would be moving to Donington for 2010.

But doubts about the ability of the promoters to get the circuit up to F1 standards have persisted since that time, with many believing that the project would fall at the first hurdle and fail to secure planning permission for the upgrades to the track and surrounding infrastructure.

Planning permission was duly granted in November by North West Leicestershire District Council, on the assumption that full details of how the project would be funded would be released to the public at the end of March.

Yesterday the council met again and extended Donington's deadline to the end of June, by which point all the funding must be in place. Sceptics have again suggested that this will not happen, and the future of the British Grand Prix therefore hangs in the balance.

Quite what this would mean for Formula One in Britain is unclear at the moment, as Bernie Ecclestone has insisted that there is no chance of the race returning to Silverstone.

The British Racing Drivers' Club, who run operations at the Northamptonshire circuit, must be confident that should Donington fail to deliver, the race will indeed return to their track.

The reason for this is that the FIA is duty bound by means of various agreements to protect certain "historic" Grands Prix, such as those in Britain, France and Italy.

Such agreements of course did little to help for the French Grand Prix, which for only the second time in F1 history will not run in 2009, though this is because the French national motorsport authority (FFSA) cancelled the event on cost grounds rather than it being forcibly removed by Ecclestone.

Moreover, FIA President Max Mosley insists that the FIA were never contacted by the FFSA over the future of the French GP, so they were powerless to act in that case.

Given the precarious current state of the British GP, and the importance of the race to fans and teams, it is far more likely that the BRDC would approach the FIA should the threat of a 2010 calendar without a British race become real.

The problem with this approach is that it seriously undermines the integrity of the sport.

It is difficult for most British fans to stomach, with the popular view casting Ecclestone as the perennial villain of the F1 soap opera, but the fault for the disappearance of Silverstone from the F1 calendar lies with the BRDC themselves.

For years, Britain has had an extremely privileged position on the F1 calendar. The BRDC paid less to Ecclestone for hosting the race than any other venue, and got away with having significantly lower-quality facilities.

In trying to redress this balance, Ecclestone asked for the BRDC to upgrade their facilities, perhaps not in keeping with ultra-modern venues such as Sepang and Shanghai, but at least to a standard acceptable to FOM.

The BRDC responded by making elaborate plans for upgrades, but never delivered upon them. So Ecclestone asked again.

More plans were drawn up, no improvement work was ever started upon. And so the cycle continued.

It has become abundantly clear over the last ten years that the BRDC was perfectly happy to make plans for improving their facilities, but had no intention of ever delivering upon them.

They were hoping that Ecclestone would fall for their deception and sign up to a long-term deal with the circuit; if that failed, they intended to fall back upon the British GP's "historic" status to forcibly keep Silverstone on the calendar.

It is unsurprising, then, that Ecclestone eventually grew tired of the politicking of the BRDC and chose to move the British Grand Prix elsewhere. Talk of a conspiracy to remove Britain from the F1 calendar, or a personal vendetta against the BRDC by Ecclestone, are diversions from the main point.

Ecclestone is an extremely astute businessman, a fact that nobody will deny. Letting personal grudges get in the way of good business would hardly make a billionaire of the kind that Ecclestone is.

It is inconceivable that he would allow personal feelings to trump business sense—he may have been less inclined to show sympathy for the BRDC, but the situation we are now in is all of their own making.

The BRDC have played the "history" and "tradition" cards many times in the last ten years, and look set to do so again should Donington's F1 venture not get off the ground. But they have clearly shown time and again that they do not deserve the Grand Prix.

Simon Gillett, head of Donington Ventures, has semi-ironically remarked that he could fund the entire Donington project if he had a pound from everyone who said that it wasn't going to happen.

Perhaps the mathematics are a bit off—a £10 contribution per person should cover it—but the message is clear: Donington will fight for their right to host the British Grand Prix to the end.

For the sake of taking it away from the incompetence of the BRDC, let's hope they are successful.

F1's Split Personality: The Dangers of Going It Alone

Andy Shaw — Fri, 01 May 2009 10:30:32 -0400

In the last 24 hours several of F1's teams have expressed grave doubts about the FIA's new budget caps, set to come into force in 2010, with many fans sharing similar views.

The feeling among the teams is that F1 must of course be sustainable, but ensuring its future must not come at the cost of the fundamentals of the sport, those that make it different from any other racing series.

Those key elements are generally agreed to include the best drivers, the quickest cars and the pinnacle of motorsports technology.

FIA President Max Mosley has long argued that these founding principles should indeed be retained at all cost, but they need not go hand-in-hand with seemingly limitless spending, as has been the fashion in F1 since the late 1990s.

The budget cap is a relatively simple way of controlling the way money is spent in the sport, ensuring that the kind of inevitable financial instability that put an end to Aguri Suzuki's dreams of running an F1 team no longer prevails.

Many teams are concerned about the "two-tier" nature of the proposals, with teams free to spend as much as they like as long as they adhere to certain technological restrictions.

This, of course, is another political tool used by Mosley: He expects no one to take up this option; instead everyone will sign up to the budget cap. The purpose of the "choice" is so that, if teams should come to protest about the caps in future, Mosley can point out that they were not forced into accepting his terms.

Strength of feeling among fans of the sport has run so high that many are now advocating that the Formula One Teams' Association break away from F1 entirely and start their own series.

FOTA's predecessor, the Grand Prix Manufacturers' Association, considered a similar tactic a few years ago, but feasibility studies and thinly veiled threats eventually came to nothing, and led to the GPMA disbanding in 2006.

The GPMA did not have Ferrari on board; FOTA does, and some believe that this would be enough to make any breakaway series viable.

A new series would be able to end Formula One Management boss Bernie Ecclestone's stranglehold on the financial affairs of the sport, resulting in a better deal for teams, circuit promoters and fans.

Moreover, getting FIA backing for such a series would be very simple, as the federation is duty-bound by European law to sanction any such competition in Europe.

But history tells us that breaking away for the sake of breaking away cannot be a good idea.

The tumultuous CART/IRL split in the United States destroyed the credibility and marketability of both series, with CART's successor Champ Car finally collapsing in early 2008.

The newly "merged" series, in attempting to please both sets of fans, has satisfied none, and the only ones to have gained from the whole sorry affair are NASCAR, whose brand has enjoyed unprecedented success while open-wheel racing in the US languishes as a shadow of its former self.

Any attempt by FOTA to leave F1 would certainly not be a clean break; some teams would choose to remain with FOM, and Ecclestone's aggressive contracts with many of the world's top circuits would undoubtedly mean they would be unable to host events from any FOTA-backed series.

Furthermore, FOTA is led and chiefly funded by major car manufacturers, whose participation in motorsport has been chequered at best; Honda's withdrawal from F1 at the end of 2008, as well as several threats over the years from the likes of Renault and BMW to leave the sport, show just how fickle this business can be.

With the automotive industry currently suffering major repercussions as a result of the global economic downturn, is it really wise to place the future of Formula One—or whatever championship that may succeed it—in the hands of the manufacturers?

They will only continue in motorsport as long as it is profitable for them, which in many cases may not be for much longer.

For F1 and FOTA to have a strong, sustainable future, they need to work together. With Mosley and Ecclestone currently bent on fracturing the unity of FOTA, this seems like an unrealistic aim.

But, despite being in a weak position to begin with, FOTA can increase their influence over F1's affairs without exercising the motorsport equivalent of hurling their toys from the pram and setting up their own series.

Bernie Ecclestone will not last forever: Any talk of a successor to F1's commercial guru has always been in hushed tones, but by working closely with Ecclestone, FOTA's Commercial Working Group, currently headed by Flavio Briatore, can certainly place themselves in a position to have a greater say over F1 finances when Ecclestone finally moves on.

Max Mosley's position is under threat even more imminently; his term of office as FIA President expires this autumn. A failed bid to oust Mosley from office this year need not be the end of it, either: Should he take another term, as has been hinted, FOTA will have four years to groom a suitable candidate to take his place at the head of the FIA.

All of this power politics may be a long and bitter struggle, but it is far more worthwhile than the incredible gamble of a new racing series. F1 is struggling enough these days without a spanner in the works like that.

F1 On a Shoestring: The Budget Cap

Andy Shaw — Thu, 30 Apr 2009 05:54:22 -0400

As McLaren breathe a sigh of relief after their slap on the wrist at the FIA's World Council hearing yesterday, the rest of the Formula One world will eagerly be awaiting the announcement expected today of the budget caps set to be implemented for 2010.

President Max Mosley yesterday confessed that the cap had been set slightly higher than his original proposal of £30m, with pundits guessing that the final figure will be in the region of £45m instead.

This is a drastic cut in the budgets of F1's current main players: Respected F1 journalist James Allen reckons that McLaren will have to lay off half of their staff to make such a budget work, and Toyota's employee numbers will need to be reduced by as much as two-thirds.

The major car manufacturers, most of whom appear to oppose the enforced spending the FIA is set to impose on them, have bemoaned the proposed changes. But a quick history lesson demonstrates that the necessity for these drastic measures was brought about by their own actions.

Aside from Ferrari, whose participation in Formula One has been uninterrupted since the beginnings of the World Championship in 1950, the early 1990s were a particularly lean period for manufacturers.

The customer teams on the grid—of whom there were many—relied mainly on Ford-badged Cosworth engines and Yamaha-badged Hart engines to power their cars, with a works engine deal from a major manufacturer little more than a pipe dream for most.

When Mercedes entered the sport, placing their badge on Sauber's Ilmor engines in 1994 and then upgrading to a full works operation for McLaren the following year, it signalled a sea change in the fabric of Formula One.

Renault briefly pulled out of the sport after 1997, then re-entered in 2001 with a view to buying up the Benetton team. Ford supplied Stewart with works engines before buying out the team, and labelling it after its Jaguar brand, for 2000.

BMW entered into a partnership deal with Williams, which ended acrimoniously and led to BMW buying out the Sauber team in 2005. Even Toyota, a team with no prior F1 history, came into the sport in 2002.

And Honda, who had enjoyed such success in the 1980s as engine suppliers to Williams and McLaren, supplied engines to both Jordan and BAR before abandoning the Irish team halfway through a three-year contract. They instead made preparations to buy BAR, with the buyout coming in 2005.

These manufacturers subscribed to the belief that spending huge amounts of money on Formula One would inevitably buy success.

They hired engineers from the privateer teams and doubled their salaries, they ran wind tunnels and computer simulations on a 24-hour basis, and set in motion a culture of seemingly unlimited spending that would pervade F1 as it entered the new millennium.

The private teams, relying mainly on sponsorship to get by, could not compete with such largesse. One by one the privateers disappeared, until by 2006 only Williams could be said to truly exist only for the purpose of racing.

By then, of course, Ford had gone too, unimpressed with Jaguar's midfield performance; they sold the team to soft drink manufacturer Red Bull in early 2005.

Fast forward to the end of 2008, where the global credit crunch began to seriously hit the automotive markets. Honda, in the face of making an unprecedented loss, decided to pull out of the sport entirely.

The story of the sale of the team to Ross Brawn, and the success they have had so far in 2009, is truly remarkable but beyond the scope of this article.

The point is that the influence of manufacturer teams in Formula One has driven up the costs to such a level as to be unsustainable even for the manufacturers themselves.

The FIA has had to step in, and some would say it is already far too late to repair the damage caused to the sport by unnecessary and ill-advised spending during the boom years.

But step in they must, and with five potential outfits—USF1, Lola, Prodrive, Aston Martin, and iSport—having expressed a possible interest in entering the new budget-capped Formula One, it appears that this idea is far from being universally unpopular.

The reason the FIA has needed to impose such an apparently draconian rule on its teams is that the manufacturers have thus far been unwilling to accept half measures. Only in the face of Honda's withdrawal did top figures like Ferrari's Luca di Montezemolo finally see that F1's rich "old boy's club" could not be allowed to continue any further.

While privateer outfits like Prodrive and Lola have suggested that they may be interested in entering the sport, the chief beneficiaries of the budget cap may well be the manufacturers themselves.

With their vast road car divisions, they can divert the R&D budget for expensive innovations like KERS to their road car projects, thus saving the F1 team money without necessarily impacting on performance.

Privateers like Williams will have no such option, but will doubtless save in other ways, having lived with their own self-imposed budget cap for many years now.

Arguments about enforcing the new rules are to some extent irrelevant: These details can be worked out at some time in the future; the real task is to get everybody pointing in the same direction, maintaining the future of the sport without diluting its essence, which is chiefly the requirement that teams build their own cars.

The budget cap may be unpopular with myopic team principals, who are unable or unwilling to grasp the dire situation Formula One has now found itself in, but it is surely the only way of sustaining the sport's future.

While the Knives are Sharpened: In Defence of Nelson Piquet

Andy Shaw — Wed, 22 Apr 2009 07:25:30 -0400

With three races gone in 2009, it is never too early for some pundits to begin compiling a "hit list" of drivers who should be removed from their prestigious F1 seats, and few other than Nelson Piquet have made the top of most of those lists.

The Brazilian, son of the three-time world champion with the same name, had a difficult debut season in 2008, with most expecting that he would not be asked to continue with his Renault employers this year.

Eyebrows were raised, therefore, when it was announced that Piquet would be continuing alongside Fernando Alonso in the team for the new season.

In his F1 career so far Piquet has given plenty of ammunition for his critics. Often while teammate Alonso was pushing for a points position, and even wins as the season drew to a close, Piquet would be scrapping in the midfield or spinning off the racetrack.

He is afforded particularly low regard in the UK, perhaps partly to do with his father's much-publicised feud with British racing hero Nigel Mansell in the 1980s.

In reality, few here were willing to give young Nelsinho much of a chance, and pounced on him as soon as he began making the same errors made by most rookies during their Formula One apprenticeship.

Even allowing for the difficulty of acclimatising to the ultra-competitive world of Formula One, ascribing his uninspiring debut season to the rigours of learning how to race an F1 car around unfamiliar tracks, most of those problems should have been dialled out by now, and we should be seeing more of Piquet's promise.

So far, it must be said, that has not been seen, but there are reasons why we should hold off on the barrage of abuse hurled at Piquet and at least give him a few more races to finally prove his worth.

When Piquet was competing in GP2, the category immediately below Formula One, he was driving for his father's team, a small outfit with resources that paled in comparison to the top ranks of the series.

Yet Piquet made the best he could of the situation, and was Lewis Hamilton's closest competitor as the British ace flew to the 2006 title, a year before he made his stunning debut in Formula One.

Are we to believe, then, that the only man to mount a serious challenge to Hamilton, now an F1 world champion, in those days, is really so useless as to warrant his immediate abandonment at the side of the Formula One highway?

Hamilton's entry into Formula One was tinged with greatness from the very start, and with Piquet making a similar impression in the junior formulae, the most natural comparisons are between this pair.

Hamilton finished on the podium in each of his first nine races in F1 and lost the world championship in his rookie season by a single point, eventually scoring the same number of points and winning the same number of races as his double world champion teammate Fernando Alonso.

Piquet had the same teammate when he entered F1, yet scored only one podium in the whole season and finished the year with just 19 points, 42 behind Alonso. Even leaving aside the fact that the 2007 McLaren was a far more competitive car than the 2008 Renault, shouldn't we have expected a little more from Piquet?

Well, no. Hamilton came into the McLaren team having been groomed and funded by the Woking operation for over a decade; he knew the team and its staff intimately, almost as if they were family. Alonso, by contrast, was new to a team already accustomed to working with world champions.

Piquet was the "new boy" at Renault for 2008: Though he had tested with the team for a year, Alonso was far more familiar with the Renault "family" than he was.

Furthermore, Piquet's role as Alonso's understudy was clear and well-established; at McLaren, Hamilton and Alonso began the year on equal terms, an opportunity that Lewis did not hesitate to take.

Looking back on Piquet's rookie season, it appears to be one strewn with errors and a fundamental lack of pace: the Brazilian failed to outqualify Alonso once all year.

But attention must be paid to Renault's strategy guru Pat Symonds, and his unconventional solutions to routine problems in Formula One.

Ever since 2005, when it became apparent that Giancarlo Fisichella was not up to Alonso's pace, Symonds would put one of his drivers on a long, one-stop fuel load at the beginning of the race. If something unexpected, like a safety car at a crucial point, happened, then that driver would be in the reckoning for an excellent result.

If not, as happened so often to Fisichella and later to Piquet, they would be destined for an unspectacular finish. Fisichella had the advantage of a strong car, so was usually able to scrape some points from the situation; Piquet did not, and thus most of his races were spent mired in the midfield.

But the one race where it did unquestionably work was the German Grand Prix of 2008. There, Piquet took advantage of a safety car to leap to the front of the field; though he was eventually passed by Lewis Hamilton, he held on to second place for his best F1 result to date.

Many drivers would struggle with the unique challenges of running a long strategy in a Grand Prix: Most are too hard on their tyres to even contemplate such an approach.

We saw Hamilton himself, for example, learn the hard way in China this year how important tyre management is when running a one-stop strategy: his race was punctuated by spins and excursions off the track as his tyres gradually wore down.

So Piquet's skills at handling and nursing a car, though rarely apparent as he quietly trundles along in the midfield, are not in doubt. When refuelling is banned for 2010 and longer strategies become more beneficial, we could see a revelation from Piquet.

That's if he lasts that long: He has been criticised for a poor start to 2009, though this has not been helped by two wet races. Some drivers simply do not get on with wet conditions, although Felipe Massa has shown that these problems can be solved with time.

The Australian Grand Prix was actually an excellent race for Nelson; taking advantage of the carnage at the start to leap from fourteenth on the grid to ninth on the first lap, he remained in contention until his brakes failed at the restart from under a safety car.

It could have been some solid points for Piquet otherwise, and the first occasion on which he had truly outperformed Alonso.

The ease with which Alonso obliterated Piquet in qualifying for Shanghai is deceptive, too: Piquet had none of the new aerodynamic updates delivered for Alonso's car in time for the Grand Prix.

Alonso believes that the improvements Renault are making to their car still mean that he is a contender for the world championship: If that is the case, then we should see a step forward from Piquet as well.

It is up to him, in the next few races, to prove that he deserves his place in Formula One, and to show this reporter why he alone hasn't lost faith.

McLaren's Great Leap Forward In China: Genuine or a False Dawn?

Andy Shaw — Fri, 17 Apr 2009 06:33:30 -0400

The great surprise of the Friday practice sessions for the Chinese Grand Prix came in the first of the two periods, with Lewis Hamilton topping the time sheets.

Teammate Heikki Kovalainen was impressive as well, finishing the 90 minute session with the fourth fastest time; only the dominating Brawns of Jenson Button and Rubens Barrichello split the McLaren drivers.

McLaren's pace has been poor so far this year, with just a single point to show for their efforts in the first two races.

Kovalainen has not even completed a single racing lap, triggering a first-corner collision in Australia, and then spinning off all on his own in Malaysia.

Hamilton drove a canny race in Australia to inherit fourth after a late collision at the front of the field, which became third when Jarno Trulli was penalised for overtaking under the safety car.

But, as we all know, Trulli's penalty relied on false testimony from Hamilton and his team. When the deception was uncovered the following week, Hamilton was disqualified from the Australian results and the Italian was reinstated to third place.

With the "Liegate" controversy rumbling on, set to come to a head at an FIA World Motor Sport Council meeting on April 29, and long-time team principal Ron Dennis finally walking away from the McLaren motorsports operation yesterday, the Woking team really needed some good news this weekend.

Hamilton and Kovalainen have duly delivered, although questions must remain about whether this performance is genuine.

The final time sheets at the end of Friday practice sessions for a Grand Prix rarely tell the whole story. Much more is revealed by analysing the individual lap times of competitors, and trying to deduce what programmes they were running.

For McLaren, while their single-lap pace was impressive, they reached their best lap times only on a handful of occasions. For the rest of the session, they appeared much slower, perhaps by as much as a second.

McLaren are not a team with a reputation for low-fuel glory runs. Then again, having consistently been near the head of the field for a very long time indeed, they have never needed to deploy the "glory run" strategy before.

Brawn, on the other hand, were focusing only on long runs, exactly as they did in practice for Australia and Malaysia.

Moreover, the second practice session saw McLaren resume their usual (for 2009) position in the lower end of the time sheets; ninth place for Kovalainen and 13th for Hamilton.

Brawn were first and third in that session, maintaining their earlier pace but still not venturing into low-fuel territory.

Nearly everyone improved on their FP1 times in the second session, with the track "rubbering in" and gaining grip for the cars.

Therefore, it is difficult to know just how representative the times were in the earlier session, as the track conditions have already changed significantly since then and will continue to do so as the weekend progresses.

Hamilton is running a version of the controversial double-decker diffuser, this week finally declared legal by the FIA's Court of Appeal in Paris. Kovalainen, however, is not, so this cannot be the reason for both drivers' improved pace.

Both McLaren drivers are also using a new front wing prepared by the team, which could account for the team's apparent improvement.

However, a single aerodynamic development, at a time when all the teams are radically revising their cars, is unlikely to bring the car from the lower reaches of the midfield to the very sharp end.

Ferrari's decision not to use KERS this weekend, on a track with one of the longest straights on the calendar, is baffling to say the least, and the loss of pace associated with the removal of this device gives McLaren a head start over at least one of their competitors this weekend.

Renault are ready to deploy an "interim" version of their own double-decker diffuser, so although neither car impressed today, they will improve in pace as the weekend progresses.

The second session shows that the new "big four" of Brawn, Williams, Toyota, and Red Bull are still a long way ahead, and despite McLaren's early showing, it is not likely that they will be troubling these eight cars just yet.

On balance, therefore, little has changed for McLaren. They will be on the brink of some points for China, but will require a little luck to acquire them.

Amid the Wailing and Screaming: The Diffuser Case in Depth

Andy Shaw — Tue, 14 Apr 2009 16:16:15 -0400

The words "sour grapes" are banded about perhaps a little too often in Formula One, and in no recent memory have they been uttered with greater insistence than in the latest technical debacle to descend upon the sport.

"Diffuser-gate," as it would undoubtedly be known had the world not already grown thoroughly sick of attaching the suffix "-gate" to any remotely scandalous news story, has divided opinion and heated up discussions in all corners of F1 since it reared its head in preseason testing.

There is little doubt that Brawn GP, who have used the questionable diffusers and are currently leading both championships, have established a commanding presence in Formula One, and it is thus natural to assume that rivals such as Ferrari and McLaren, themselves unusually uncompetitive this year, may be looking for a way to curtail Brawn's success by seeking methods off the track as well as on.

But this explanation is both overly simplistic and slanderously inaccurate.

It is all too easy to dismiss the claims of Ferrari, BMW Sauber, Renault, and Red Bull, who are leading the proceedings on the side of the plaintiffs this week, as being those of desperate charlatans who are seeking a competitive advantage at whatever cost, be it financial or to the fragile reputation of the sport.

Yet this explanation, as satisfying as it might be to supporters of the defendants, fails to grasp the full scope of the case or its importance for Formula One.

Max Mosley, in his capacity as President of the FIA, has previously admitted that F1's technical regulations are worded deliberately vaguely in order to allow teams maximum freedom in engineering their own solutions to the problems imposed by the rules.

We have seen this approach in action this year, with cars sporting radically different shapes from one another for the first time in many years.

However, the flip side of the FIA's intention is where controversy arises. When one team interprets a rule differently to another, it is perfectly reasonable to expect the teams to seek clarification, to determine whose interpretation is correct.

When the differing interpretations of a rule might mean the gain or loss of up to half a second a lap, the advantage allegedly conveyed by the diffuser designs in question, teams are bound to raise questions about whose designs are legal.

Today's hearing at the FIA Court of Appeal revealed that, contrary to the stated beliefs of some parties, this is not simply a case of some teams being irked that they had not thought of the "double-decker" diffuser concept themselves.

Andrew Ford, representing Renault, revealed that the French team had presented a similar idea to the FIA themselves: "It is not that Renault missed the boat, as Brawn have pointed out," Ford said. "It is because the FIA said it was illegal. It was at that point the diffuser was abandoned."

If this is true, it adds a further layer to the story: The FIA said one thing, yet their race stewards (who have ruled the designs legal at both of the season's opening Grand Prix) said another.

This is the same kind of difference of opinion that caught Renault out over their mass dampers in 2006: Though race stewards ruled them legal, a protest submitted to the FIA (and later upheld by the governing body) declared that they were not.

Renault had to contest the latter part of the 2006 season without the dampers, despite the fact that they had been declared legal from late 2005 onwards.

However, the FIA took account of the stewards' rulings in this case, and allowed Renault to keep their results from previous races on the basis that the dampers had technically been legal at that point.

Using this case as precedent, it is unimaginable that the paranoid scenario espoused by some panicked critics, in which Brawn, Toyota, and Williams were excluded from the results of the first two races of this year, would actually see fruition.

If the appeal by the non-diffuser teams is upheld, it is far more likely that the results of the first two races would stand, but that the three "diffuser" teams would be required to run "conventional" diffusers from the Chinese Grand Prix next weekend onward.

The outcome of the case appears to hinge on whether a particular opening in the diffusers of the teams in question constitutes a "hole" or not.

Holes are not permitted in the rear diffuser. Esteemed Ferrari designer Rory Byrne pointed out earlier this week that this is not a new regulation, as it has been in force for well over a decade.

With only two races gone, it would be premature to suggest that this ruling will decide the outcome of the world championship. However, since the definition of the word "hole" will come under close scrutiny as this case draws to a close, it is certainly reasonable to say that the diffuser saga could be settled on a technicality.

Perhaps the FIA is to blame for their lack of clarity in the rules. Before the start of the season, Max Mosley expressed relief that the legality of the diffusers was no longer his decision.

It is certainly the case that an FIA-issued clarification before the formal start of the season in Melbourne would have dissipated an awful lot of the tension that has been generated by this controversy so far this year.

Moreover, if Renault's claim is true, and a similar concept was dismissed as illegal by the FIA themselves at an earlier point, the FIA's unwillingness—rather than inability—to resolve this conflict sooner is highlighted, with obvious implications for the credibility of the sport in general.

That credibility will only be damaged further the longer this saga goes on, but the plaintiffs cannot be blamed for pursuing this matter to its legal end.

Gathering the Lost: Tonio Liuzzi, A1GP, and F1

Andy Shaw — Sat, 11 Apr 2009 13:05:48 -0400

There are a great many drivers, past and present, who could be considered "lost talents" in the world of Formula One. Drivers who promised and excelled in the junior formulae, only to never receive a proper chance at the top level and fall out of favour.

One such driver is Vitantonio Liuzzi.

The 2004 Formula 3000 champion, the last winner of the pan-European category before it was replaced with current F1 feeder series GP2, came into F1 with significant promise at the beginning of 2005, driving for the Red Bull Racing team.

He was supposed to share the second seat on that team with Austrian Christian Klien, but internal politics at Red Bull meant that he only competed in four races, a point in the very first one (at the San Marino Grand Prix) being all he had to show for what was supposed to be his first Formula One campaign.

By "internal politics," it is meant that Liuzzi was the wrong nationality. Eager to promote drivers from his own country, Red Bull boss Dietrich Mateschitz gave Klien the nod over the Italian.

In his season-and-a-half at Red Bull, Klien rarely impressed, and was dropped by the team toward the end of 2006 after they finally grew tired of his underperformance and signed Mark Webber for 2007 instead. Reserve driver Robert Doornbos filled in for Klien in the last few races of the season.

Meanwhile, Liuzzi was doing the best he could in the uncompetitive Red Bull "B" team, Scuderia Toro Rosso, with Mateschitz bringing Italian backmarkers Minardi in late 2005 and rebranding them according to his own company.

Throughout 2006 and 2007, Liuzzi outperformed American teammate Scott Speed. In the time the pair were together, Liuzzi scored the team's only point, at Speed's home race in 2006.

Speed fell out of favour with the STR management, literally coming to blows with team principal Franz Tost at the European Grand Prix of 2007. From then onward he was replaced by upcoming superstar Sebastian Vettel.

Vettel was clearly a favourite of both STR and the Red Bull senior team, with many believing that Speed's poor treatment had been a ploy to free up a race seat for the talented German.

After he left STR at the end of that year, Liuzzi also commented that he felt ignored at the team in comparison to Vettel, despite mostly being on a par with him in the time they were teammates.

Indeed, the only times Vettel convincingly beat Liuzzi were, unfortunately for the Italian, the only occasions STR were capable of scoring points: in Japan, where Vettel ran third before falling foul of erratic driving from some frontrunners and crashing into Mark Webber behind the safety car, and in China where the German finished a brilliant fourth.

Liuzzi drove a great race from a lap down in Japan to finish eighth, only to have his point taken away after it was adjudged that he had overtaken Adrian Sutil under yellow flags.

In China, he was sixth, but his teammate stole all the limelight.

For 2008, Liuzzi signed up as Force India's test and reserve driver, with team principal Vijay Mallya making it very clear that if either of the team's main drivers failed to perform, he would have no hesitation in promoting Liuzzi to a race seat.

Now it is being reported that the team is losing patience with veteran Italian Giancarlo Fisichella, so Liuzzi could be about to get his big chance.

With the in-season testing ban in F1 this year, the role of test driver carries less importance than it used to.

It is no surprise, then, that Liuzzi is trying his hand at other racing categories: This week it was announced that he would race for Italy in A1 Grand Prix. Today, he has marked his first weekend in the series by qualifying on pole position for his first race.

This shows that Liuzzi has lost none of his talent nor any of his hunger after more than a year on the sidelines. It is widely believed he has a contract to race with Force India in 2010, and he could convince Mallya to let him return to F1 racing even sooner if he continues to impress in A1GP.

Fisichella is a strong personality and has plenty of experience, but the 36-year-old Roman is nearing the end of his career and may be better placed in an advisory role, or indeed focusing on running his own team, which currently competes in GP2.

And Force India's other driver, Adrian Sutil, has never really shown anything beyond his ability to pay for a race seat, an oh-so-near fourth place at Monaco last year his only real F1 highlight.

With this in mind, and Liuzzi's talent being displayed yet again in the Algarve this weekend, Mallya may well be pondering if it is time to give this lost talent another chance.

Seeing Red: Michael Schumacher and Ferrari's Strategic Shortcomings

Andy Shaw — Fri, 10 Apr 2009 12:03:37 -0400

With seven-time world champion Michael Schumacher sitting on the Ferrari pit wall for the Malaysian Grand Prix, attention was always going to be focused on the team to see if they could recapture the kind of form that saw the German win five straight titles with them.

Much of Schumacher's success was down to the strategic genius of Ferrari's race team, on many occasions his car springing seemingly from nowhere to capture an unexpected win.

So when Kimi Raikkonen's race was ruined by a failed gamble on wet tyres at Sepang, the response was predictable.

Perhaps, some surmised, Schumacher had been involved in the decision-making process, his call to switch Raikkonen to wet tyres destroying any hope the Finn had of scoring points?

Schumacher has since announced that he will not be attending the races in China and Bahrain, adding fuel to the fire and prompting premature speculation that all is not well at Maranello.

In order to understand whether these claims are reliable, it is important to appreciate Schumacher's role at Ferrari, since he retired from racing at the end of 2006.

Since that time, the 40-year-old has been a consultant to the Italian marque, providing useful sponsorship exposure for the team, as well as testing their 2007 and 2008 cars.

He also advised the team on their transition from grooved to slick tyres in preparation for the new season, his first two world titles having come on slicks back in the mid-1990s.

However, Schumacher has no official role as a member of the race team, let alone in any strategic capacity; when he appears on the Ferrari pit wall at races, he is a guest of the team and nothing more.

Therefore, if it really was Schumacher who made the call to put Raikkonen on wet tyres, his opinion was not authoritative and must have been agreed upon by other engineers.

Moreover, Ferrari's woes in the race strategy department are not limited to last weekend in Malaysia.

Ever since Schumacher left his racing role at Ferrari, along with key team members such as Ross Brawn (now winning races with his new Brawn GP team), the Italian outfit has struggled in races undertaken in less-than-straightforward conditions.

In the Japanese race of 2007 the team for some reason ignored an order from the race director to don extreme-weather tyres as the race was being started under the safety car; the stewards were feeling lenient that day and both drivers escaped the black flag, but they fell to the back of the field as they had to pit for the appropriate tyres.

Even if their decision not to run the extreme tyre had not been in contravention of the officials' orders, what was baffling is that both drivers were given the same tyre; it is a fundamental rule in Formula One that when gambling on a strategy in adverse conditions, the two cars should be given separate strategies just in case one gamble fails.

The strategic troubles continued throughout 2008; in races affected by unusual circumstances Ferrari made wrong call after wrong call, such as not changing Raikkonen's tyres in the weather-affected British Grand Prix, meaning that his mounting challenge to Lewis Hamilton's lead petered out before it could really affect the race.

These poor decisions culminated in that disastrous pit stop for Felipe Massa in the Singapore Grand Prix, where he was released too early and ended up dragging his fuel hose down the pit lane.

So Ferrari's strategic difficulties, far from being an isolated incident that ruined Raikkonen's race this weekend, are part of a fundamental inability of the team to deliver the results when the going gets tough.

Even if Schumacher was involved in the decision to put Raikkonen on wet tyres in Malaysia, which he and his manager have both denied, it is nonetheless symptomatic of a major problem in the workings of the team.

In short, the incident reflects far worse on Ferrari than it does on Schumacher.

So what is lacking in the team now, that they had in abundance during the glorious Schumacher-Brawn-Byrne-Todt years of success?

Simply pointing to a single person, such as Ross Brawn, and highlighting him as the sole reason for Ferrari's decline is too simplistic.

The problem is leadership, or in Ferrari's case a lack thereof.

It is becoming increasingly clear, as Ferrari begin to truly struggle for the first time since the mid-1990s, that Stefano Domenicali may not be the right man to take the team forward.

His years of loyalty at Maranello and experience within the team have paid off, for he has one of the most envied jobs in the pit lane, but he has yet to make the same mark on the team that his predecessor Jean Todt undoubtedly did.

Moreover, Domenicali lacks a right-hand man, someone to fill the huge void left by Brawn; filling the shoes of Todt must be tough enough, but having to step in for Brawn as well is a task nobody could be expected to perform effectively.

Individuals with that spark of strategic genius characterised by people like Brawn, and Pat Symonds of Renault, are hard to come by in Formula One: There is, however, at least one person proven as a top strategist currently without a job.

Mike Gascoyne, however, said that he was finished working with big manufacturers after he left from an unhappy spell at Toyota, so to lure him back to F1 after his unceremonious dismissal from Force India may be too difficult for the Scuderia to manage.

What is certain, however, is that Ferrari need somebody else to help drag them out of the mire they have found themselves in.

Smoking Guns, Silver Arrows: Lewis Hamilton and McLaren's Lies

Andy Shaw — Thu, 09 Apr 2009 03:50:51 -0400

As the pressure mounts on McLaren, the team embroiled yet again in a damaging scandal, questions have to be raised about the role of world champion Lewis Hamilton in the affair.

Hamilton was disqualified from this year's season-opening Australian Grand Prix for providing information "deliberately misleading" to the race stewards, but the "Liegate" scandal, as it is now being called, threatens to run far deeper than this.

McLaren have been summoned before the FIA World Motor Sport Council to explain their actions in Australia and Malaysia, where they repeated their earlier misinformation relating to a safety car incident in the Melbourne race.

Jarno Trulli passed Hamilton under the safety car, but it was later revealed that the Italian had made the overtake because the McLaren driver had let him past.

Hamilton and his team denied this in the stewards' hearings, only to be countered by evidence from the team's radio logs.

McLaren could face a range of penalties, from a mere fine to exclusion from this year's world championship.

It is not the first time the team has found itself in such a situation: In 2007, they were found guilty of possessing and using information stolen from the Ferrari team.

McLaren were fined $100 million, an FIA record, and excluded from the Constructors' world championship.

During the "Spygate" trials, as they became known, McLaren's then lead driver Fernando Alonso offered his cooperation with the FIA's proceedings, in exchange for immunity from the sanctions that would eventually be levelled against the team.

Many believe that this offer explains why Alonso and teammate Hamilton escaped exclusion from the drivers' championship, even though they obviously benefited from McLaren's illegal activities and should, common sense permitting, have been punished.

It is being reported that Hamilton's father Anthony has already been on the phone to FIA President Max Mosley, making a similar offer concerning McLaren's latest transgressions: The Hamiltons will provide any evidence necessary to convict McLaren of wrongdoing, as long as they themselves are absolved of any guilt.

When Alonso used this tactic in 2007, he was criticised for his disloyalty: In this case, Hamilton will almost certainly (rightly) be understood to be protecting his own reputation, which has already taken a battering in the wake of this scandal.

The difference, of course, lies in the agenda of painting Alonso as the antagonist in the Spygate affair, whereas Hamilton will be portrayed as the innocent victim; such an analysis goes beyond the scope of this article.

Hamilton has already claimed that he was "misled" by sporting director David Ryan, yesterday dismissed from McLaren after 35 years of service due to his role in the Australian GP fiasco.

This claim is unbelievable at best, yet another fabrication at worst, because Hamilton himself was in the stewards' meetings and must have been involved in the discussions that eventually led to his disqualification.

Furthermore, the fact that Hamilton himself was disqualified from the Australian race for misleading the stewards is evidence that he must have been speaking, and therefore complicit in McLaren's wrongdoing.

However, McLaren are trying a tactic that they attempted to use during the Spygate hearing: Then, they suggested that McLaren employee Mike Coughlan had received confidential information from Ferrari's Nigel Stepney, but that the information had penetrated no further into the company.

That story was eventually found to be fabricated, and the complicity of senior McLaren figures uncovered, but the "rogue employee" hypothesis is something McLaren will be hoping will work this time around.

With Ryan no longer working for McLaren, and unlikely to work again in Formula One, he will almost certainly not be present at the WMSC hearing, and therefore unable to defend himself against the accusations McLaren are bound to level at him.

With the exception of a few people who still believe that the initial Australian Grand Prix decision (to penalise Trulli for overtaking under the safety car) was a stewards' error alone, most in the know now accept that McLaren and Hamilton lied to the stewards for their own gain in Australia and Malaysia.

The fallacy in the "stewards' error" reasoning is that they expected the stewards to make the correct decision despite the fact they had been deliberately denied access to critical information by McLaren.

As fans, we are entitled to expect a certain degree of competence from race stewards, but not to the extent of clairvoyance.

In any case, the revised Australian GP results are in the past, and all attention should now focus on the WMSC hearing, scheduled for April 29.

A young, talented, British world champion, Hamilton is commercially too important for the sport to be punished too severely by the FIA; it is reasonable to expect that whatever punishment McLaren face after their hearing, Hamilton's aspirations for a second world championship will remain unaffected.

In fact, if his father does strike a deal with Max Mosley, his testimony could grant him an all-too-convenient immunity from the fate that befalls his team.

But the scandal will have further sullied the star's image in the eyes of those who already view him as being scheming, manipulative and possessing an uncompromising win-at-all-costs mentality.

In short, Hamilton may escape punishment at the end of this month, but his reputation will not.

Brawn Free: How Jenson Button Won The Australian Grand Prix

Andy Shaw — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 13:24:35 -0400

After his landmark victory for Brawn GP at the Australian Grand Prix this weekend, Jenson Button denied that it had been easy.

The British driver cited difficulties with the tyres, the track surface and the low sun in the sky, which meant his second career win was not all plain sailing.

Watching the race from outside the cockpit, however, it was difficult to agree with Button.

The Somerset-born racer drove superlatively all afternoon, leading every single lap and never really being even remotely challenged for the victory.

He even managed to look after his super-soft tyres at the very end of the Grand Prix, which many other drivers complained had been graining after as few as three laps.

After two years in the wilderness, Jenson Button is well and truly back amongst Formula One’s front-runners.

This victory came in a very different manner to his first, back in the Hungarian Grand Prix of 2006, where he took advantage of race leader Kimi Raikkonen making a bizarre error in crashing into a backmarker to close up on the leaders under the safety car, having started from an uncompetitive fourteenth on the grid.

Button then ran second until his chief rival, world champion Fernando Alonso, slid off the road due to a loose wheel nut, leaving the then Honda driver to collect the win.

Whether his Hungary triumph was down to luck or skill, or more likely a mixture of the two, is still debated with vigour among F1 fans, a debate that has been rendered somewhat less relevant by the events of this weekend.

Regardless of the nature of Button’s first win, his second was incontestably a master class in level-headed, sensible race driving.

Knowing he had a massively competitive car under him, Button pushed as hard as he needed to and no harder—a truly mature decision given the unknown reliability of the Brawn car.

Watching the Australian Grand Prix, one got the impression that Button could have gone much quicker had he needed to.

But the British driver had it all under control as early as the first lap, and from there was able to drive his own race.

Compare Button’s simple and consistent race with the wilder one experienced by his teammate Rubens Barrichello.

Starting second on the grid, alongside Button, the Brazilian’s car went into anti-stall mode as the lights went out, immediately allowing several cars to overtake him on the run down to the first corner.

The traditional Australian first-corner chaos then ensued, with Barrichello miraculously escaping with a largely undamaged car while the races of Heikki Kovalainen, Mark Webber and Nick Heidfeld were all but ruined.

Webber was fuming with Barrichello after the race, though the Brazilian himself blamed Kovalainen for triggering the collisions.

Barrichello, F1’s most experienced driver, then got the opportunity to put one over his old team by overtaking Ferrari’s Kimi Raikkonen.

The Finn, unaccustomed to being overtaken after years in the fastest cars, gave Barrichello little room and the Brawn car left the scene of the incident with slight front wing damage.

The loss of downforce hurt the Brazilian’s lap times, and soon his teammate was out of sight in the lead.

After his first pit stop, in which the errant wing was changed, Barrichello matched Button—now way in front—for pace, but was too far behind his teammate to make a real impression.

Furthermore, he was somewhat hobbled by his team on strategy, who had fuelled him to the finish at the first stop and only brought him in again with seven laps to go, so that the Brazilian could make the mandatory change to the super-soft tyre.

From there he dropped from second to fourth, which became second again after Sebastian Vettel and Robert Kubica collided with three laps to go.

Thus Barrichello was able to join his teammate on the podium, but it was much more fortuitous a result than Button’s had been.

Where Button was driving smoothly and consistently, Barrichello was trying desperately to make up for his earlier blunders and appeared more “on the ragged edge,” less at ease with the car.

His job had been made a whole lot harder by the circumstances of the start, which Button had managed to execute perfectly while Barrichello struggled, but it was incontestable that the race was won by the more level-headed and consistent driver.

Whether this pattern will continue throughout the season remains to be seen, but Button will be much more confident going into Malaysia than his teammate.

Not Just Brawn, But Brains As Well: Australian Grand Prix Analysis

Andy Shaw — Sun, 29 Mar 2009 06:29:56 -0400

For all the talk of what the new F1 season would bring up, the Australian Grand Prix was, in the end, only about one team: Brawn GP.

The Mercedes-engined outfit, who came within a few weeks of not even making the grid for 2009, rounded off a dream weekend by finishing first and second in the first race of the season, Britain's Jenson Button coming home ahead of Brazilian Rubens Barrichello.

It hadn't all been plain sailing, though, especially for Barrichello: A poor getaway from his front-row grid slot left him down the order, and he only regained second in the closing laps when Robert Kubica and Sebastian Vettel collided.

The German, driving in his first race for the Red Bull team, was defending a second position he had held for most of the race from a resurgent Kubica, the Pole's BMW on the better-performing harder tyre compound.

Vettel, struggling as his softer tyres degraded, desperately tried to keep Kubica at bay and the two came together three laps from the end.

Trying to recover their cars to the pits and at least finish the race, the suspension on both cars broke and they suffered separate, heavy secondary accidents.

Vettel took advantage of the resultant safety car to attempt to keep his wrecked car on the road and in the points, an audacious and potentially dangerous decision which could and should be punished by the race stewards.

It was all academic for the young German anyway, as he was forced to pull off the road before the race was completed behind the safety car.

BMW say that Kubica could have caught and passed Button for victory had he not collided with Vettel.

Though the Pole was catching the leader at the time of the incident, he was probably not lapping fast enough to have reached Button by the end of the race.

Lewis Hamilton takes third after Toyota's Jarno Trulli was penalised for overtaking under the safety car; the reigning world champion should be pleased with a result that seemed so elusive after his woes in practice and qualifying.

Despite this setback, however, Toyota had an excellent race; had they not had to start the race from the pit lane due to a technical infringement, they could have got both drivers on the podium.

Another driver unlucky to miss out was Nelson Piquet.

For perhaps the first time in his career, the Brazilian was genuinely quicker than his teammate Fernando Alonso throughout his race; at the first safety car restart, however, a lingering brake problem caught up with him and he spun out.

Ferrari will want to forget this weekend as they were plagued by reliability troubles, a potentially promising result for Felipe Massa ruined by strategic foul-ups and an eventual mechanical failure.

2007 world champion Kimi Raikkonen showed precious little of his title-winning form, instead conjuring up memories of last season as he tagged the barriers in a seemingly unforced error late in the race.

The Finn eventually retired with mechanical problems, reliability and strategy again proving to be the Italian team's biggest difficulties.

Williams' promising pace, by their own admission, was wasted on their drivers.

Kazuki Nakajima clouted the wall early on, prompting the first safety car intervention; Nico Rosberg could not cope with the softer tyres and lost six places in the final ten laps.

Rosberg eventually claimed sixth after the Kubica-Vettel collision elevated him into the points.

Aside from Brawn, who delivered what many observers had expected, another team that can be satisfied with their performance today is Scuderia Toro Rosso.

Swiss rookie Sebastien Buemi was a revelation, driving a solid and relatively error-free race to pick up a point with eighth place, which became seventh after Trulli's penalty.

Toyota's loss is Sebastien Bourdais' gain, the second Toro Rosso driver being classified in eighth.

Force India claim to be pleased with their progress as well, Adrian Sutil finishing ninth and Giancarlo Fisichella eleventh.

The Italian could have achieved more, however, if he had not overshot his pit box at his first stop.

In general it was refreshing to see the cars racing again after a long winter break.

The new-for-2009 aerodynamic regulations produced a marked increase in overtaking, everywhere except first place being hotly contested throughout the race.

The regulations also seem to have made the cars more difficult to handle; the sight of rear ends twitching as the drivers fought to remain on the track was a joy to behold, and will certainly separate the men from the boys as the season progresses.

But the best job of adapting to the new rules has undoubtedly been done by the boys from Brackley, who can justifiably be proud of Button's lights-to-flag domination of today's race, as well as Barrichello's somewhat fortuitous runner-up spot.

We eagerly await Malaysia next weekend, to see whether anyone can challenge the supremacy of Ross Brawn's dream team.

The Car Behind Is a Toyota: Why Their Loss Could Be Our Gain

Andy Shaw — Sat, 28 Mar 2009 11:42:28 -0400

The Toyota F1 team have been bullish about their prospects for 2009 over the winter, with the team making no secret of the fact that they are targeting race victories this season.

Preseason form has been solid for the team so far, with Toyota tipped to be among the top performers this year.

Qualifying in Australia seemed to bear this out, with only Brawn GP having a clearly quicker car than the Japanese team; Williams and Red Bull both looked strong too, but were on a par with Toyota rather than clearly ahead.

But then, hours after the session had ended, the race stewards announced that Toyota's drivers, Timo Glock and Jarno Trulli, were being stripped of their top-10 grid positions and demoted to the back of the field after the cars' rear wings were deemed to be illegally flexible.

The news will come as a blow to the team, with the drivers publicly stating last week that they were targeting a podium in Australia.

Such a result must now surely look out of reach.

However, for fans of the sport there is a bright side to all of this technical book-throwing, because it means that two of the fastest cars in the field will be starting at the rear of the grid.

Melbourne is traditionally a difficult circuit to overtake on; Felipe Massa struggled to fight his way through the field in a Ferrari in 2007 after starting well down the grid.

The Toyotas, therefore, will be the perfect test subjects for finally finding out whether the raft of rule changes for 2009 have actually worked to increase overtaking.

Given their exclusion from qualifying, Toyota will probably opt to put both their cars on a heavy fuel load and start them from the pit lane.

This will allow them to avoid the inevitable first-corner carnage, and give them a strategy that lets them run long into the race before making a pit stop.

This way, they hope, they will improve somewhat on their disastrous starting positions.

A heavy fuel load, especially on the softer tyres, will slow the cars down tomorrow, but Toyota should be able to catch the midfield teams even with this weight disadvantage.

Thus we will be able to see if they are able to pass as easily as has been hoped, or whether the rule changes have failed and the Toyotas will therefore be consigned to a midfield finishing position.

Neither Trulli nor Glock have been highlighted before as particularly outstanding overtakers; Trulli's racecraft in particular is excellent, his defence of position unrivalled by almost anyone in the field, but overtaking is not something either driver is renowned for.

Therefore if they are able to breeze past the opposition with ease, we will know that the regulations are working.

As the F1 world prepares for the first race of the season, all eyes might be on the mighty Brawn GP, but spare a thought for the team at the other end of the starting grid.

Victory for Toyota this weekend might be out of the question, but at least we will see whether the efforts of the Overtaking Working Group have delivered results.

Williams on Top: Can They Finally Reclaim F1 Glory?

Andy Shaw — Fri, 27 Mar 2009 10:53:35 -0400

Friday practice at Melbourne threw up some surprises, but few of the events at Albert Park were quite as unexpected as the sudden resurgence of the Williams team.

After the Grove-based privateer outfit was cleared to race this weekend, with a protest over the legality of the teams' diffuser being thrown out, drivers Nico Rosberg and Kazuki Nakajima put in some impressive laps during Friday's practice sessions.

The first session saw the two cars first and second, with Rosberg ahead. In the afternoon session, Rosberg again topped the time sheets, while Nakajima was seventh fastest, half a second away from his German teammate's benchmark time.

It has been a long time since Williams saw success in Formula One; their last victory came at the end of 2004, courtesy of Juan Pablo Montoya.

Furthermore, the last of the teams' world championships came in 1997, with Jacques Villeneuve taking the drivers crown and helping the team secure a ninth Constructors World Title, then a Formula One record.

Since then Williams has had a difficult time in F1, a hatful of victories in the early part of the decade thanks to a lucrative association with German car manufacturer, BMW.

But the relationship with the Bavarian company turned sour in 2005, when team boss Frank Williams refused to allow BMW to supply assistance in designing the car as well as providing engines for the team.

BMW and Williams parted company at the end of that season, and the British team endured a difficult 2006 using expensive and sponsor-unfriendly Cosworth engines, a strong chassis plagued by dreadful reliability.

An engine deal was struck with Toyota for the following season. 2007 was a slightly better year for the team, though their only visit to the podium was a fortunate third place for Alexander Wurz in Canada.

In 2008 the team seemed to be improving, two podiums for Rosberg highlighted the year, though they finished the season eighth in the Constructors standings.

Now in 2009 they are looking to return to F1's winner's circle. The question is, are they likely to do it?

Given this morning's form alone, one would be tempted to tip them for victory at least once this season.

But Williams, especially in recent years often starts a season strongly before rapidly dropping down the field.

In 2006, Mark Webber and Nico Rosberg finished the season opening Bahrain Grand Prix in sixth and seventh respectively, with Rosberg setting the fastest lap of the race.

And last season Rosberg drove a great race in Australia to finish third behind Lewis Hamilton and Nick Heidfeld, himself a former Williams driver now in the BMW Sauber.

But as the season progressed, in both cases Williams fell further and further down the order. 2006 saw the teams' worst points haul in nearly thirty years, and a competitive midfield in 2008 meant that they could not improve on eighth overall.

The teams' budget is small compared to most of the other competitors making up the 2009 F1 field. Therefore it is inevitable that Williams will be outstripped in the in-season development race by their rivals.

The pace we see from Williams early in the season may not be representative of how they will perform throughout the year.

There is also the question of drivers.

Nico Rosberg is one of the most highly-rated young drivers in the Formula One field, but with rising stars such as Robert Kubica and Sebastian Vettel not only being talked about a lot, but actually delivering results, Rosberg's stock is falling quickly.

The Germans' excellent debut is still talked about, but it is becoming increasingly clear that whatever flash of brilliance inspired that performance from Rosberg, it doesn't come around very often.

Superb qualifying performances from Rosberg in 2008, such as in Monaco, were diminished in the race when he crashed heavily, throwing away the chance of a strong points finish.

And in the following race in Canada, a top five finish was in the offing before he embarrassingly ran into the back of Lewis Hamilton in the pit lane, the British driver having embedded his McLaren into the rear of Kimi Raikkonen just moments before.

Thus, as highly as Rosberg is rated, questions surely still persist over his ability.

If he wants to leave Williams for a stronger team in 2010, as he has hinted, this year would be the perfect opportunity for him to prove his doubters wrong and deliver a spectacular set of results for the team; until then, caution must be exercised over whether young Nico is as good as we have been told.

Japanese youngster Nakajima, Williams' second driver, showed excellent promise and a regrettable lack of discipline in fairly equal measure last season.

When the Williams team was capable of scoring points, Nakajima almost always finished in the top eight, but his raw pace was lacking, and he often failed to complete a race without being involved in some kind of amusing incident with another car.

Kazuki has much to learn in his second full season of Formula One. he will deliver results on his day, but whether those days will coincide with strong races for the team remains to be seen.

With technology and the standard of the car so important in F1, it is often tempting to sideline the drivers as incidental to the success of a team.

Indeed, Williams has been guilty of this on many occasions in the past, with world champions such as Nigel Mansell and Damon Hill dropped from the team after demanding too much money.

But a good car with a mediocre driver, in today's ultra-competitive world of F1 cannot hope to win races, let alone challenge for the title.

It is the drivers who will make the difference between front-of-the-midfield obscurity and headline making performances, and in this respect Williams may come up short this season.

Billed as F1's "last true privateer," it would be a heartening day for the sport as a whole if one of Frank Williams' drivers could take to the top step of the podium at some time in 2009.

It would also be a just reward for the huge amounts of hard work that go on at the teams' factory.

But while the teams' prospects, on Friday in Australia, look pretty good, it is hard to imagine this little outfit being truly at the sharp end for the whole year.

F1's Inflation Of Expectation: Who Will Disappoint In 2009?

Andy Shaw — Wed, 25 Mar 2009 06:39:56 -0400

As we wait in eager anticipation for the 2009 Formula One World Championship to begin, there is no shortage of people willing to tip drivers to succeed this year.

The problem is, everyone seems to have different views on who will excel and who will flop this season.

This article is a focus on which of F1's talented roster may, for whatever reason, not quite live up to expectation in 2009.

Nico Rosberg

As a Formula One driver, Rosberg is popular and highly rated, amongst fans and "insiders" alike.

But, apart from an impressive first Grand Prix in Bahrain back in 2006, Rosberg has so far failed to set the world alight; he has taken advantage on a few occasions of the traditional Williams "false dawn" at the beginning of the season, but aside from that has done little to justify his high reputation.

Rosberg is a decent driver and excellent at setting up a car, but as David Coulthard will tell you, experience and technical expertise will only get you so far in Formula One.

Rosberg's Williams contract is up at the end of the season: If he wants to continue driving for the team, or perhaps join another competitive outfit for 2010, he will have to start showing why he is so highly rated.

Kimi Raikkonen

The flying Finn has been tipped for the world championship this year as he begins his third season with Ferrari, but perhaps realistic sights should be set lower.

With many teams besides Ferrari having built competitive cars, the competition for the ultimate prize will be stiff in 2009.

Furthermore, none of Raikkonen's principal rivals for the title are carrying the same question marks over their ability as the Finn, as he aims to bounce back from a bitterly disappointing 2008.

Raikkonen can never be excluded from being a factor in the destination of the world championship, but it is premature to say the least to crown him champion without a race having even begun.

Sebastian Vettel

Dynamic, talented, massively popular, Vettel has begun his Formula One career superbly so far, and the inevitable comparisons to Michael Schumacher have been coming in thick and fast.

But 2009 will represent Vettel's greatest challenge yet, as he takes on the tough and experienced Mark Webber at Red Bull Racing.

Webber is no slouch behind the wheel and is mentally very strong, so the suggestions that Vettel will blow the Australian into the weeds are perhaps a tad unrealistic.

Furthermore, it is not yet known precisely how quick Adrian Newey's latest creation really is; Vettel may not be in a position to surpass everybody's expectations of him, simply because he may not have the equipment to do so.

Jenson Button

Brawn GP's sensational testing performance has caused Button to be a pre-season favourite to take the world championship.

Brawn themselves have urged caution on the team's actual prospects, and it is easy to see why: Though the team may have an early advantage, it is almost certain that bigger, financially stronger teams will catch and pass them later in the season.

Button has the ability to wring the best possible results from the Brawn car, the most competitive he has had for years, but whether those results will actually give him a world championship remains to be seen.

Finally there is the matter of having to beat his teammate, a fired-up Rubens Barrichello, which on the strength of the last two years may not be as simple as many are predicting.

Conclusions

In most cases, the raw ability of the drivers mentioned is not in question.

But, for whatever reason, it seems that the expectations of what these drivers can deliver have been inflated beyond what can realistically be supposed.

If these drivers can really achieve what they have been tipped to do, they can certainly look back on 2009 as a success; it would be more prudent, however, to urge caution on each of their prospects until we fully understand what they are capable of doing this year.