Bleacher Report - Articles by Jim Graham

A Legal Analysis of the Phoenix Coyotes Situation

Jim Graham — Thu, 07 May 2009 11:58:21 -0400

I am a licensed attorney in the United States. I specialize in contracting disputes and contract litigation. I am not an expert on bankruptcy, but I do have a working knowledge of the subject.

Below is a quick legal analysis of the situation facing the Coyotes, their current owner Jerry Moyes, the NHL, and the fans in Phoenix and southern Ontario. The conclusions are purely my own speculative assessments and not intended to be used as legal advice of any sort. Some if it may be a bit dense, but for those interested, I hope it is informative.

As everyone knows by now, Jim Balsillie has engineered a daring backdoor bid to buy the Phoenix Coyotes and relocate them to southern Ontario.

This effort attempts to circumvent the rules of the NHL by taking Gary Bettman and the Board of Governors out of the decision-making equation.

While Balsillie’s tactic is perhaps reflective of the same “enterprising” spirit that led him to his fortune as the CEO of Research In Motion and the mastermind behind the Blackberry, when matters such as this become tied up in the judicial system, the rule of law will ultimately decide what Balsillie can or cannot do.

There are two distinct legal hurdles at play in this melodrama—the authority to declare bankruptcy, and the authority of a court to compel the relocation of an NHL franchise.

Bankruptcy Authority

Jerry Moyes is the owner of the Phoenix Coyotes. He declared bankruptcy on behalf of the Coyotes on May 5, 2009.

Under normal circumstances, the owner of a business has the authority to declare Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization. The inner workings of a Chapter 11 filing are extremely complicated but largely irrelevant for the purposes of this article other than to note that the owner of the business maintains the right to conduct a bankruptcy sale, but such a sale is supervised—and must be ultimately approved—by a special bankruptcy court.

The NHL now disputes Moyes’ authority to file for bankruptcy. According to the league, when the Coyotes took a significant loan from the NHL in April (and likely on multiple occasions prior to April), Moyes agreed to forfeit his right to declare bankruptcy on behalf of the team in exchange for the cash.

If the NHL has its way, this promise will be deemed to be part of the loan contract between the NHL and the Coyotes, and Moyes will be barred from violating the deal.

But there are significant questions about the viability of a promise not to declare bankruptcy. While a contract is a contract, courts have long recognized the right of a contract participant to breach the contract, so long as they are willing to live with the consequences and pay financial damages. This is called the rule of the "Efficient Breach."

The only exception to the rule of "efficient breach" is when a court determines that there is no way to assess damages. In this setting, damages are easily valuated—the amount of loan money Moyes accepted from the NHL.

Prior to making the loan, Moyes had full authority to declare bankruptcy. The only thing that has changed now is that he took a loan. The NHL is forced into a difficult position of arguing that the promise not to declare bankruptcy is worth more than the loan itself (plus whatever interest was agreed upon).

While such questions are never cut and dry, based on the evidence currently available, I believe it is unlikely that the NHL will be able to convince a bankruptcy judge that Jerry Moyes has permanently and completely forfeited his right to manage the team he owns when it comes to filing for bankruptcy.

Undoubtedly, they can declare damages, but they would only be able to do so in form of a bankruptcy creditor, and would be repaid from whatever funds are collected as a result of the bankruptcy sale.

The Viability of the Balsillie Bid, and the Court’s Ability to Accept It

In tandem with Jerry Moyes' Chapter 11 filing, Jim Balsillie provided the court with a $212.5 million bid to buy the team, conditioned on his being able to relocate the franchise to southern Ontario. It is widely believed that nobody else will come within $50 million of Balsillie’s bid—and perhaps not even within $100 million.

If Moyes’ bankruptcy filing is deemed valid over the NHL’s objections—as I have speculated above that it will be—the next question is whether the bankruptcy court can and/or must accept the Balsillie bid.

In normal Chapter 11 bankruptcy settings, the court will only approve of the sale to the highest bidder. Because it is extremely unlikely that anyone is going to outbid Balsillie, for the sake of this article, we are going to assume he is the definitive high bidder.

Thus, the obvious snap conclusion is that the court is going to have to accept the Balsillie bid, and the Coyotes' days in Arizona are numbered.

Not so fast, my friend!

The bankruptcy court has no authority to order Gary Bettman and the NHL Board of Governors to approve the relocation of an NHL franchise. The NHL is a private entity, and because they are not directly a party to the bankruptcy sale (only Moyes and the bidders are), the court cannot tell the NHL what to do.

This matters because the Balsillie bid is a conditional contract offer. Instead of making a bid and stating his intention to move the team down the road, he has made his offer but said that he will only pay the money if he is allowed to move the franchise.

Under the law of contracts, a conditional offer is very different from a plain offer. A conditional contract cannot be accepted unless the condition is agreed to. If Moyes (or the bankruptcy judge) tries to accept the $212.5 million bid without the relocation condition, that contract will be deemed legally invalid, because Balsillie never agreed to offer $212.5 million for the team absent the right to relocate.

Given the conditional nature of the offer and the court’s limited authority over the NHL, it appears that the Balsillie bid is not really a bid at all—at least, not a legally viable bid. Were any other bidder to step in and offer a lesser sum for the team, and do so without conditions, the court would be compelled to accept the lower bid.

This explains why Gary Bettman has been scrambling to try to put together a bidding group headed by Chicago Bulls and White Sox owner Jerry Reinsdorf.

All this said, if Balsillie feels like gambling, he could opt to cut his offer significantly and remove the condition, thereby securing his rights to own the team. Once he takes over, then he could wage an Al Davis-like anti-trust war with the league to move his franchise.**

Such an effort would be expensive, time-consuming, and not guarantee success. But it could end up working out—and it may be Balsillie’s only option.

Conclusion

It is unlikely that a bankruptcy court will allow the NHL to block Jerry Moyes from filing for bankruptcy. However, once in bankruptcy, it is highly improbable that Jim Balsillie’s conditional offer can and/or will simply be accepted by the bankruptcy court without considering the NHL's self-determination rights.

Accordingly, it is likely that the Phoenix Coyotes will remain in Phoenix for the relatively near future, regardless of who the next owner is.

For fans in Phoenix, you are rooting for the NHL to successfully generate a condition-less offer from someone willing to keep the team in Arizona.

For the folks of southern Ontario, your best bet is to hope Balsillie decides to revamp his offer, remove the condition, and buy the team anyway. Once he does, you can safely assume that he will go to the ends of the Earth to try to get his franchise relocated.

- - - -

**A couple hours after publication of this article, it was brought to my attention that there is a third possible option: the Bankruptcy Court could decide to consider the relocation dispute at the same time it decides on which bid to accept.

In other words, the Court could determine that any future effort to block the relocation of the team would be an illegal anti-trust violation, and therefore decide that the condition in Balsillie's bid is no longer a hurdle to accepting it. If it would be illegal for the NHL to block the relocation, then the court can accept a bid predicated on that relocation without violating the rights of the NHL to govern its franchises.

It is up to the bankruptcy judge whether or not he/she will consider both issues simultaneously. Therfore, it is hard to predict how likely this third scenario is. However, this is probably what Jim Balsille is hoping for.

This option would allow Balsillie to avoid the risk of buying the team then fighting the NHL to move it. If he wins the relocation dispute, the practical effect is minimal. But if he loses, he can find that out before sinking a ton of money into an unhealthy franchise in a city he doesn't care to be in.

Capitals Win a Game They Weren't Supposed to Be Able to Win

Jim Graham — Sat, 02 May 2009 21:26:19 -0400

Unreliable goaltending. Weak penalty killing. Overly reliant on the power play. Not defensively sound enough to withstand the pressure of good offensive teams. In spite of the Washington Capitals’ many impressive offensive credentials, it was these negatives that were cited by most pundits as a big reason why they were picking the Pittsburgh Penguins to win a series in which Washington had home ice advantage.

So, in a game where the Washington offense was inconsistent and turnover prone (22 giveaways, only 26 shots), where they got only two power play opportunities (none after the first period), where the defense had to kill five penalties (including two in the third period), where the team was out-chanced throughout (a playoff-high 36 shots allowed), and where their 21-year-old goaltender allowed a crushing softy in the midst of a second period that the Caps were dominating, the table was set for a Pittsburgh blowout. But something strange happened.

The deficiency-ridden, misfiring Caps won anyway.

A defense that played poorly played just well enough when it mattered most (on the penalty kill and in the late game frenzy). A goalie that cost the Caps a second period lead with a stinker suddenly morphed into a human highlight reel. An offense that couldn’t click got a big play from a secondary player. And buoyed by a raucous home crowd clad in red, the Caps eeked out a 3-2 win to take a 1-0 edge in the best of seven Eastern Conference Semi-Final series.

It is far too early to say what this game portends. No doubt, if the Penguins win Game 2 and continue to outplay the Caps in Pittsburgh, people will say that Game 1 was the first sign that the Caps were outgunned in the series. If things continue to go well for the boys in red, it will be a sign that the intangible puck luck is in their corner.

But whichever way hindsight will further define today’s outcome, the Washington Capitals just won a game that everyone told them they couldn’t win. For Caps fans, that is something to be very encouraged about.

Hits: The Defensive Statistic Nobody Recognizes As a Defensive Statistic

Jim Graham — Wed, 08 Apr 2009 14:42:38 -0400

In this years heated Hart Trophy (MVP) race, two players have separated themselves from the pack in the eyes of fans and voters. With all due respect to the spectacular seasons of Zach Parise and the ever-underappreciated Pavel Daytsuk, this one is coming down to Alexander Ovechkin and Evgeni Malkin.

With two games to play, this duo is almost dead even in points. Malkin leads the league in assists. Ovechkin leads the league in goals.

But this is not an MVP debate article.

In attempting to break the Ovechkin-Malkin deadlock, much has been made by media and pundits about the value of two oft ignored secondary statistics: hits (used as proof of Ovechkin's physical dominance) and takeaways (used as proof of Malkin's defensive superiority). Regardless of who each of us ultimately sides with in the Hart debate, it strikes me as odd that so many people seem to ignore the fact that “hits” are not only a form of defense, but statistical evidence of successful defense.

Most fans are unaware that “Hits” as a statistical category is not synonymous with “body checks.” A player can land a thunderous check and not get credit for a “Hit” because hits only count as official “Hits” when they “remove the opposing player from the puck.” To wit, Dion Phaneuf probably lands more body checks than any other player in the NHL, but he only ranks 42^nd in “Hits.”

The Relative Value of a Hit Versus a Takeaway

Because of this narrow definition, hits and takeaways have far more in common than most fans seem to think. Both are methods of dispossess an opposing player of the puck, and thus both are a form of defensive play. Both require speed and quick thinking, because the defensive player needs to make his move before the offensive player has recognized what is about to happen and dished the puck to an offensive teammate. Both create offense from defense.

While much is similar between hits and takeaways, there are also some key differences. Takeaways, by definition, have a 100% correlation with turnovers. A takeaway isn’t a takeaway until the defensive player has gained possession.

On the other hand, there is no guarantee that a hit will result in a turnover. While the majority do, because all that is required for a hit is the generation of a loose puck, that puck could be recovered by an offensive teammate, or even the recipient of the hit himself in rare instances.

Clearly, there is not 1-to-1 equivalency between these two metrics. Of course, it is also true that hits have the ancillary benefits of all physical play – intimidation, wearing down an opponent, etc – that a lift-check can never provide. It is difficult, if not impossible, to say how much more valuable (if at all) the average takeaway is than the average hit. What is certain is that hits are more prevalent than takeaways. The NHL leader in hits had 346. The NHL leader in takeaways only has 91.

Because both hits and takeaways are defensive statistics, one might expect that ‘good’ defensive players will rate highly in both categories. But just the opposite is true, and this presents a bit of a mystery. Looking at the respective leader lists, only two players rank in the top fifty league-wide in both hits and takeaways. (Ovechkin: 9th in hits, 25th in takeaways; James Neal: 22nd in hits, 17th in takeaways).

Takeaway artists tend not to hit, and hitters tend not to be masters of stick work. Cal Clutterbuck leads the league in hits, but has only 21 takeaways – less than a quarter of the league leader. Evgeni Malkin leads the league in takeaways, but has only 80 hits – also less than a quarter of the league leader.

Is there any way to explain this? Maybe.

If hits and takeaways are properly understood as two very distinct ways to skin the cat defensively, it is perhaps not so surprising that players would tend to resort to one method at the exclusion of the other. Encountering an opponent with the puck, the defensive player must either commit to the hit, or commit to attempt to make a play with the stick. It is all but impossible to try both in the course of one play. Players will tend to go with the maneuver they are ore comfortable with. And the player who can master both methods is few and far between.

Conclusion

Anyone who has thought hard about the subject recognizes that defensive play is almost impossible to quantify.

Plus/minus is mildly informative for a quick sketch, but is rife with flaws if you’re looking to make a conclusive case.

“Goals against,”’ defined as a goals scored by the opponent while the player is on the ice, tells a lot about how the player helps in denying scoring chances but doesn’t tell us how much the individual is contributing vis-à-vis his teammates.

Takeaways gives insight into individual players who have mastered a particular defensive skill.

And, I would argue, hits deserve to be mentioned in the same breath as these statistics, as yet another imperfect – but meaningful – metric by which to assess individual defensive contribution. Unfortunately, misinformation about what defines “a hit” has led to this statistic being severely overlooked. Hopefully this article will help change that, even a bit.

Should the Penguins Be Deadline Sellers?

Jim Graham — Mon, 16 Feb 2009 21:14:58 -0500

Friends, readers, hockey fans, lend me your ears—or eyes. With apologies to William Shakespeare, I come neither to bury the Penguins, nor to praise them.

Instead, I ask a simple, pragmatic question. Is it time for Ray Shero and the Penguins to take a big picture look at their organizations and make a strategic retreat at this season’s trade deadline?

In the preseason, the Penguins were a popular pick to return to the Stanley Cup to represent the Eastern Conference. As of the time of completion of this article, the Pens sit in 10th place in the East, four points out of eighth, and spotting every team in front of them at least one game in hand. The trade deadline is a little over two weeks away. They just fired their coach.

The conventional wisdom from most Penguins fans and media has been to suggest that the team has made its coaching change with the hopes of getting ready for the trade deadline and then making a few big moves to get this team into the playoffs.

But is that really the right approach?

In 2008, the Penguins made a hail mary trade for Atlanta’s Marion Hossa, giving away two character forwards, their top prospect Angelo Esposito, and a 2008 first round draft pick. The move almost paid off in a Stanley Cup. But when Hossa bolted for Detroit, the Penguins were left with no long term gain to a move that both severely damaged its already weak prospect pool and harmed the wing depth of the NHL team.

For better than three months, the Penguins have suffered the ill effects of a club that lacks depth, lacks talent on either wing, lacks character and grit, and lacks an effective Plan B in the minors. But the core of the roster remains intact, with Sidney Crosby, Evgeni Malkin, Jordan Staal, Ryan Whitney, and Mark Andre Fleury all signed to recent long-term contracts. Ray Shero believes this core to be of championship caliber.

If one shares the organization’s faith in their crop of young franchise players, then the reasonable expectation is that the Penguins will compete for titles nearly every season into the near future. However, they will continue to be betrayed by a lack of a supporting cast unless the front office does something to improve the status quo. Given salary cap constraints that weigh heavily on any team with five young players locked up to long term contracts, significant roster additions via free agency are not a realistic option.

With this in mind, is Pittsburgh truly well served to trade even more draft picks, and what few prospects they do have left, in the hopes of saving a season on the verge of already being wasted? To make the playoffs, Pittsburgh realistically needs to pick-up at least 32 points in their final 24 games (16-8). Given the strength of the Atlantic Division, this is a tall order indeed. If they end up in ninth or 10th, their farm system will be even more depleted and next year will be that much more challenging to construct a rebound.

The alternative is to recognize the season for what it is—all but lost, even if they sneak into the eighth seed and end up against a vastly superior Boston squad—and start focusing on 2009-2010. The Penguins have trade assets other teams would covet, and could sorely use the draft picks and prospects who would come in return.

For example, Petr Sykora is a pending unrestricted free agent who is also a top six winger that could add offensive punch to any playoff team. It is not unrealistic to think he could draw a late first round pick or a second round selection plus a prospect. Hal Gill, another pending UFA, was worth a second and a fifth round pick just this time last year, and could still bring a return of a second or third rounder. Miroslav Satan has been a disappointment, but his goal scoring pedigree could draw interest, and might result in the return of a prospect or mid-round draft pick.

In just one draft, Pittsburgh could go a long way towards restocking the prospect pool. This could result in quick returns in the form of immediate contributions, or at the very least it positions the Penguins in an excellent spot to make trades prior to and during the 2009-2010 season, when everyone is back to zero points in the standings and an ugly prior season is nothing but a passing memory.

Organization discipline will be put to the test in Pittsburgh in the coming weeks. Shero’s desire to save his own job could force the Penguins down the wrong path for the longer term fortunes of the team. But if they choose the other route and make a painful retreat, fans in Pittsburgh may well look back at the failed 2008-2009 campaign as a blessing in disguise.

Is Mike Green the Best Defensemen in the NHL?

Jim Graham — Tue, 03 Feb 2009 01:03:43 -0500

Admit it. You saw the title and immediately thought something to the effect of: “You can't be the best defensemen if you don't play defense, and all Mike Green does is play like a fourth forward.”

Your commenting fingers are a tingle, ready to drop some knowledge on the hapless teenage author desperately in need of a Hockey 101 lesson. Mike Green can’t play defense, Jim. Everyone knows that!

Well, I hope you will keep those commenting fingers on standby, but I’m not a naïve teenager, and I’m well aware of the public perception of Mike Green even amongst hockey diehards. Great skater, great shot, great power play quarterback,and great defensive liability.

I’m here to argue that Mike Green is more than just a non-liability in his own zone. In fact, I’m here to suggest that Mike Green is amongst the most effective defensive defensemen in the NHL this season. Counter-intuitive as it may be, the numbers bear it out.

Combined with his immense offensive talents, Mike Green is an elite defensemen waiting to be fully recognized by fans.

Prologue - Offense

Before diving into the tough stuff, Mike Green’s offensive prowess deserves a survey.

At age 23, in only his third full season, Mike Green’s offensive game is impossible to miss.

On the heels of a season where he led the NHL in goals by defensemen, Mike Green again leads NHL defensemen in goals scored (15), and is tied for the defensive lead in NHL points (40). All this, despite missing 13 games with a shoulder injury.

In the past 82 games—a full season’s worth—Mike Green has 25 goals, 53 assists, 78 points, and a +30 rating.

Having played only 38 games this year, Mike Green is scoring at a point per game pace. For some perspective, only 15 forwards can match Mike Green’s scoring rate this year.

It has been 13 seasons since 2010 Hockey Hall of Fame inductee-to-be Brian Leetch last achieved the point per game plateau as a defensemen. If Mike Green is not already the NHL’s best offensive defensemen, he is certainly on the short list, and the list is getting shorter by the day.

Quantifying Defense

Measuring defensive prowess is a matter of finding a group of meaningful statistical snapshots rather than a single all-clarifying formula. My thesis is that the essence of defense is preventing goals.

Put simply, if the opponent doesn’t score when a defensemen takes a shift, the shift has been a success. Is this a perfect definition? Absolutely not. But it is has the luxury of being simple and surprisingly informative.

The oft-utilized plus/minus stat is inherently flawed as a tool of defensive prowess. A player who scores a ton, or plays on a top offensive club, will always benefit from an inflated plus/minus even if he is responsible for a bunch of goals against. However, goals against per game (GA/G) isolates a player’s ability or lack of ability to prevent goals from being scored.

With this in mind, we proceed.

Even Strength Defense

Zdeno Chara. Chris Pronger. Scott Niedermayer. Nicklas Lidstrom. Shea Weber. Jay Bouwmeester. Duncan Keith. Brian Campbell. Dion Phaneuf. Kimmo Timonen. Andrei Markov. Dan Boyle. Aside from being a who’s who of elite NHL defensemen, what do these players have in common? Every single one of them has been on the ice for more even-strength goals per game than Mike Green.

In 38 games, playing over 25:35 per game (10th in the NHL) Mike Green has only been on the ice for 23 even strength goals against. That’s good for a 0.6 goals against per game (23 / 38 = 0.6).

By comparison, at a GA/G of 1.2 (57 goals against in 48 games), 2008 Norris finalist Dion Phaneuf is literally twice as prone to being on the ice when a 5-on-5 goal is scored against his team compared to Mike Green.

Six-time Norris Trophy winner and all time legend Nick Lidstrom is at 0.7. Even leading 08-09 Norris candidate Zdeno Chara, playing for a team that has allowed the fewest goals per game in the NHL, rates worse than Green with a 0.65.

If the goal of a defensemen is to avoid surrendering goals, Mike Green stacks up exceptionally well with the most reputed defensive talents in the NHL. This, while playing without a consistent defensive partner, without an elite defensive teammate, and without an elite goaltender on a team that ranks in the bottom half of the league in total goals allowed.

The Penalty Kill

One of the more common knocks on Mike Green is the fact that he is not a premier penalty killer. Even on his own team, Mike Green only ranks fourth in shorthanded time on ice per game among the everyday top six defensemen.

From this fact, some assume that Mike Green doesn't play big minutes on the kill because he can't. Or, at least, because nearly anyone else the Caps have is more desirable for the job.

However, these folks simply do not account for the possibility that a coach may elect to devote a young player who logs top five power play minutes in the entire NHL to a role that does not include penalty killing as a major priority.

Take a look at Green's shorthanded work compared to his teammates. The following is a list of the Caps' eight leading players in terms of shorthanded ice time, ranked based on frequency the opposition scores when they are on the ice killing penalties:

Karl Alzner: 1 PP goal against every 4.6 PK minutes
Shaone Morrisonn: 6.7 minutes
Milan Jurcina: 6.8 minutes
Tom Poti: 6.8 minutes
Jeff Schultz: 7.8 minutes
Tyler Sloan: 9.2 minutes
John Erskine: 10.2 minutes
Mike Green: 29.1 minutes

Somewhat amazingly, Mike Green has played over 88 minutes of shorthanded hockey, and been on the ice for only three power play goals against. Said another way, that’s the equivalent of killing off 41 out of 44 minor penalties, a 93.2 percent clip.

Playing with the same forwards, the same goalie, in the same game, Mike Green has a staggering edge on his defensive teammates.

And once again, even when one adjusts for games played and shorthanded time on ice per game, Mike Green ranks better—usually dramatically better—than just about every other elite NHL defensemen one can think of, including each of the guys discussed above.

All time great Scott Niedermayer is on the ice for a goal every 9.0 minutes of shorthanded time. All-star starter Andrei Markov rates at a man-advantage goal against every 6.9 minutes. Trade deadline darling Jay Bouwmeester is on the ice for a power play goal against every 7.1 minutes.

While 2:17 short handed minutes per game is significantly less than many top “shutdown” defensemen, and 88 minutes is not a tremendous sample size. It speaks volumes that Mike Green never seems to be on the ice when the other team scores, no matter the situation.

That his coach chooses to ask this young player to focus much of his energy on scoring rather than penalty killing does not mean his defense is a weakness.

Conclusions

I will be the first to admit that these numbers do not tell the whole story. Few would argue that Mike Green gets the best of Nick Lidstrom in a battle of defensive ability, and I’m not one of them. Lidstrom gets matched up against opposing teams’ best lines.

Green generally does not play that role because the Caps don’t play matchups with their defensive lines. This alone can have a potent effect on the statistical metrics. However, any way you slice it, Mike Green’s defensive product has been effective in the most important way of all—he prevents goals.

Fans may be a little slow on the uptake, but those within the sport and in the media are taking notice. The Norris buzz is already starting. While the award is Zdeno Chara’s to lose this year (with good reason), Mike Green is going to be in the mix for the next decade or more.

So, the next time you hear someone mock Green as a one-dimensional player, remember that perception is often slow to catch up with reality. Mike Green is an elite two-way defenseman, and he’s only 23 years old.