Bleacher Report - Articles by Tom Au

The Tail Wagging The Dog: The Role of Fantasy Baseball

Tom Au — Mon, 23 Nov 2009 11:17:16 -0500

Professionals in the game of baseball, managers perhaps more than players, will hate to admit this. But it was fantasy baseball that shaped a lot of how we now think about the actual sport. And while few, if any teams are as yet run by amateurs, it must be conceded that the amateurs to the game revolutionized the way the game is currently run.

Everyone knows what ACTUALLY happened in a particular game. What people want to know, however, are the "what if" scenarios: What would likely have happened if a manager had replaced Player A in the batting order with Player B. Or even, what is likely to happen if Player A is traded for Player C. Or should pitcher X have been "lifted" for a reliever, and if so, which one?

Following the development of high speed computers, "quants" have long wondered whether baseball teams can be managed analytically. Foremost among them is a writer named Bill James, the creator of "sabermetrics" or baseball science, who was perhaps the most avid person in this pursuit.

Such writers would pose questions like, do pitchers lose effectiveness after they get above a certain "pitch count?" And what kind of batters/pitchers fare best against left or right handed pitchers/batters? A painstaking analysis of historical statistics would often provide an answer.

Proponents of "scientific" baseball like James presented their findings to managements of teams, who listened with a tin ear. This was new twist, because most of the similar talents seem to end up in places like hedge funds (although yours truly spans both worlds).

The "professionals" had their own long-established ways of doing things, based on established practice, rather than "science," and "amateurs" like James were regarded as unhelpful at best, heretical at worst.

Sabermetrics was, instead, "adopted" by the new past time of fantasy baseball, which provided an outlet for answering these questions. It allowed amateur "managers" to use real players to create fictitious teams in combinations that usually differ from real life ones.

The results of the fantasy teams are an aggregate of the real-life players on the team, more or less, but some judgments will have to be made. Suppose the members of your fantasy team collective produced ten hits, two of them home runs; how many runs would that translate to?

It could be as few as two, if the home runs were solo, and the other hitters were stranded. On the other hand, eight runs is a possibility if the bases were loaded both times. (And let's say that the other hits produced no runs).

Realistically, four or five runs might be produced by the homers, with the other hits producing one or two runs more. Any given thing could happen in any given game, but over time, the aggregates would provide a history of outcomes from any given situation.

This could, in turn, be reduced to a set of likely outcomes (in the above example, the number of runs credited to the team would not be two or eight but some intermediate number).

These fantasy leagues raised some important questions. Do runs scored correlate with wins? Or should managers concentrate on getting "clutch" hits and runs? Apparently, the answer is a bit of both. As I discussed in a previous piece, the Los Angeles Dodgers get enough hits (and runs) to be a World Series contender.

While they didn't, in large part because of "unlucky" games, a fantasy team that was a facsimile of it would earn more wins by "formula" would do well in fantasy. Likewise, teams like the Chicago Cubs and Colorado Rockies win more games facsimiles of such teams would be penalized in fantasy.

This effort led the theorists to study relationships about the value of different components of offense in scoring runs, and ultimately wins. The least common denominator was total bases (the number of walks and singles plus one additional base for each double, two for each triple, and three for each home run).

One result was that walks, hitherto relegated to the role of "pitchers' errors," were reinstated as a legitimate batting tool. This was particularly true if you had sluggers behind the walkers to drive them home.

Suddenly, people realized that batters like the Toronto Blue Jays' (formerly the Pittsburgh Pirates) Jose Bautista (pictured above), who had a mediocre batting average, but drew an inordinate number of walks, and thus got on base frequently, had real value to a team.

Pitching could be analyzed in much the same way. About a decade ago, an amateur analyst named Voros McCracken hypothesized that pitchers' "contributions" to the game could be reckoned by the number of home runs, strikeouts, and base on balls given up.

This was because they were the only plays where the interaction was solely between pitcher and batter. Everything else, specifically batting average on balls in play (BABIP) could be attributed to luck or defense.

McCracken's backtests on historical pitching data showed that this was at least a plausible hypothesis, and if there is any other relationship that better describes pitching, no one has found it. Bill James described these findings as "very significant, very useful."

Their hobbyhorse came of age with the arrival of a new generation of young Ivy League educated General Managers like the Los Angeles Dodgers' Paul DePodesta or the Boston Red Sox' Theo Epstein. Either of whom could have parleyed their talents into MBA programs and careers on Wall St., but chose instead to focus on baseball.

Also noteworthy is DePodesta's former boss, Billy Beane of the Oakland A's, who was eager to adopt this "collegiate" way of thinking because he was a major league ball player who didn't go to college.

Fantasy leagues can also test the effect of hypothetical new game parameters by imposing team restrictions not found in the sport itself. For instance, it could help answer the question of how much of an "unfair advantage" the New York Yankees' almost unlimited budget gives them.

Some leagues could restrict budgets to, say, $80 or $100 million a year to prevent the phenomenon of having a bunch of highly qualified, highly paid players on one team.

In such a fantasy league, a manager who drafted, say Alex Rodriguez, might not be able to also afford Derek Jeter and/or Mark Teixeira unless (s)he wanted to fill some spots with cheap "replacement" players; a problem that the real Yankees don't have.

Fantasy could answer the opposite questions by removing the budget constraints of "small market" teams. How far could a Kansas City Royals team go if you put some hitting next to Zack Greinke? Or a good-hitting Texas Rangers team, if you gave it some decent pitching?

Nevertheless, fantasy baseball has already made its mark. Fantasy players (and sports writers on this site) are now getting entry-level jobs in "front offices" of baseball clubs on the strength of what they did there. So it may contribute a general manager someday soon.

Dodgers' "Unclutchness" Kept Them Out of The World Series

Tom Au — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 13:32:18 -0500

The Dodgers have most of what it takes to enter, or even win, the World Series. But they need to be more "clutch."

FanGraphs had them ranked first in National League teams in raw hitting ability for 2009. But they were behind the Phillies in batting "win probability." Meaning that the Phillies had fewer hits, but hit more when it counted. Sound familiar from the NCLS?

FanGraphs also had the Dodgers ranked first in Major League baseball in raw pitching. But the Dodgers' "clutch" value was a MINUS 1.84, putting them seventh in pitching "win probability."

That meant that the Dodgers lost two more games than their raw statistics would suggest because their hurlers pitch well in games that the batters were likely to win anyway, and poorly in close ones.

The Giants, Rockies, Cubs, Red Sox, Yankees, and Angels ahead of them all had positive clutch values, the three National League teams at the expense of the Dodgers.

Overall, the Dodgers' "win probability" was between fifth and sixth in baseball.

Meaning that even after the Giants and Cubs were eliminated before the postseason, the Dodgers did well to beat a clearly inferior Cardinals team, before falling to one of the three superior teams (the Yankees, Phillies, and Angels were all ahead of them).

During the season, the Dodgers had the largest differential (+169) between runs scored and runs allowed; more than the New York Yankees (+162) who won the World Series.

More than the Philadelphia Phillies (111), who beat them out of the NLCS. More even, than the other LA team, the Angels of Anaheim (122). It's just a matter of translating those extra runs into more wins.

"Sabermetrically," the Dodgers' win total should have been closer to 100 wins than the 95 that they actually got, putting them neck-and-neck with the New York Yankees, who should have earned fewer wins.

The culprits are not the ones that I would have thought (they're mostly veterans, not rookies). Among pitchers, aging Randy Wolf and Guillermo Mota accounted for more than the Dodgers' deficit, with part of it made up by other players.

On offense, the "drags" included Manny Ramirez and Orlando Hudson. The young pitchers like Clayton Kershaw and Chad Billingsley are good, and getting better. Ditto for hitters like Andre Ethier.

Thus, writers like Jesse Motiff are right, that the Dodgers would be foolish to trade Chad Billingsley, even for someone like the Toronto Blue Jays' Roy Halladay. The Dodgers might need to think about replacing Ramirez, and Wolf, but that's about all.

This is a lesson for those who would advocate major trades or big signings: The Dodgers don't need more talent to go to the World Series. They just need to make better use of what they have.

Whither the Cleveland Indians?

Tom Au — Sat, 14 Nov 2009 12:49:15 -0500

The decline of the Cleveland Indians over the past two years, from playoff contender in 2007, to league average in 2008, to cellar dweller in 2009, has been perhaps the most dramatic in the major leagues.

And it (mostly) came from a different source than I thought.

Indian batters tend to be among the better ones in the league on traditional metrics, even in 2009. But their contribution hovers around league average because they aren't very clutch.

That's because they exhibit a feast-or-famine pattern, that often causes the team to win or lose by a lot. A game like the 22-4 romp over the Yankees' Chien-Ming Wang does a lot more for raw stats than it does for win-loss percentage.

It's Indian PITCHERS that decide close games, the wins that (in most cases) determine whether the team will be in the top or bottom of their league. Hence, the surprising importance of pitching to a team traditionally short in this area.

FanGraphs ranked Indian pitchers 13 and-a-half wins above league average in 2007. That was second only to, get this, the Boston Red Sox in that year, which is why Boston ultimately won the ALCS, 4-3.

In 2009, on the other hand, Indian pitchers were collectively 11-and-a half games below league average, second from the bottom only to the Washington Nationals.

That's a swing of 25 games in two years, which by itself, represents the difference between 65 wins and 90.

One pitcher, Fausto Carmona, single-handedly represented a large part of this decline. In 2007, he was arguably a more productive pitcher than CC Sabathia, and perhaps should have been the Cy Young winner.

In 2009, he would have been a candidate for the "negative" Cy Young award, had there been such a thing. The difference between the two years was almost eight wins, or about one-third of the 25 total.

Rafael Betancourt lost almost six-and-a-half wins of value between the two years (before he was traded), a quarter of those 25 Indians' wins. Rafael Perez is also a shadow of his old self, having lost over four wins (one-sixth of the Indian total).

For the rest, Jeremy Sowers and Aaron Laffey are no CC Sabathia (even the former one). Cliff Lee was not a factor in 2007 (he emerged in 2008), nor will he be going forward (after his trade to the Phillies).

So in order of priority, the Indians' rebuilding pattern should be something like the following: first, shore up your hitting, the team's traditional area of strength, while adding defense to your lineup, to save that marginal run (and game).

Second, rebuild your bullpen to "save" games in late innings for your hitters. Develop some solid, middle-of-the-rotation types.

Finally, when everything else is in place, get some top-of-the-line pitchers, another CC Sabathia or Cliff Lee, through trade or signing. You can't win without them.

"Bay" Players to the Seattle Mariners' City on the "Sound?"

Tom Au — Fri, 13 Nov 2009 09:05:03 -0500

Jason Bay. Lyle Overbay. No, they don't play for Tampa Bay. But they may be playing for the city on the (Puget) "Sound," if the Seattle Mariners, or at least Mariners writers like Andy Augur, have their way.

In 2009, the Mariners were something like No. 7 in the American League playoff sweepstakes. That was despite American League-leading team pitching.

But "offense" is something that the Mariners have historically lacked; they were in the bottom third in this regard. Which is why they might pay a premium for it. A few more games could push them at least to No. 5, hopefully to No. 4 in their league.

Offensively, the Mariners' weakest areas are the left field and the corner infield slots. Which is where Bay and Overbay come into picture.

Jason Bay, certainly. On offense, he is a five "win above replacement" (WAR) player who would be worth $20 million, and is reportedly asking $18 million from the Boston Red Sox. What detracts from Bay's market value is his defense; to the tune of MINUS 1.5 WAR.

But the Mariners have a centerfielder in Franklin Gutierrez, who is a wide-ranging player similar to the Pirates' former Nyjer Morgan. As such, Gutierrez could "recapture" some of Bay's lost defensive WARs, making Bay worth closer to his offensive value.

And left field is currently being occupied by a platoon of replacement players. Put Bay, a genuine player in that slot, and Seattle adds ALL of his WARs (four or five, depending on Gutierrez' defensive recapture) to its total.

Overbay is a bit harder to understand. He would platoon with, or push out, Russell Branyan. Overbay is a solid, all around first baseman, with good defense and on-base percentage, and decent power, without excelling in any category.

Branyan's average is "lighter" than Overbay's, but his 31 home runs in 2009 would be a major asset to Mariners. Except that this feat is so far out of line with his earlier performance that it might not be repeatable. With a salary of only $1.4 million, he is easily releasable if he doesn't produce.

Overbay is worth about one win less than the 2009 Branyan, but one win more than the "previous" Branyan. And it's possible that a platoon arrangement (as with Overbay and Kevin Millar in Toronto) would maximize both players' contributions.

Seattle had a problem at third base with Adrian Beltre's mediocre 2009 performance. Its solution could also be Beltre, who would be two wins better if he reverted to his pre-2009 form.

Or the Mariners could sign a second baseman, move Jose Lopez to third, and let Beltre walk.

Four or five extra wins from Bay. Two from Beltre (or his ultimate replacement). Insurance in the form of Overbay. Add these wins to Seattle's 2009 base of 85, and you're in the 90-92 win range, looking at a possible wild card slot.

Or even the American League West Division, if the Los Angeles Angels falter.

Is New York Yankees' SP Chien-Ming Wang Up For Grabs?

Tom Au — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 09:36:04 -0500

Word is that the Yankees will not "tender" (salary arbitration) for their injured former-ace, Chien-Ming Wang, thereby prematurely making him a free agent. The idea is to get him to a lower base salary, with incentives. That's a penny-wise, dollar-foolish move that may backfire.

Although they pay top dollar for sought-after athletes, the Yankees have always been chintzy with less popular players such as Wang. For instance, after his splendid 2007 season, they offered him only $4.0 million for 2008 in his first arbitration year.

Wang countered with a request for $4.6 million. The Yankees took him to arbitration instead of ponying up the relatively small difference.

First, second, and third year arbitration players are typically awarded 40 percent, 60 percent, and 80 percent of what arbitrators feel they would be worth as free agents.

FanGraphs pegged Wang's 2007 value at $18 million, meaning he should have been offered $7 million or so before his first arbitration.

But the Yankees' offer of $4 million implied that Wang's free agent value was only $10 million; Wang's implied self-valuation was a modest $11.5 million.

In arbitration, the arbitrator has to accept either the team's or the player's valuation; he cannot split the difference or go outside it.

To get Wang down to $4 million, the Yankees denigrated their ace's accomplishments, saying that he had a low strikeout rate, and a relatively high ERA (for a No. 1 starter), meaning that Yankees' hitting, rather than Wang's pitching, was responsible for his high win rate.

What they overlooked was that Wang pitched 30 games for almost 200 innings and consistently went six innings or more, typically yielding three runs or less, sparing Yankees' relievers. The operative metric is quality starts: Wang had 20 in 2007.

This means his "runs allowed" represented a low enough hurdle for the Yankees' vaunted batters to overcome in most games. Wang also won as many games in 2006 as Cy Young winner, Johan Santana (although the latter had less run support).

At the end of 2007, the New York Mets were almost $2 million apart with Oliver Perez, a truly questionable pitcher, but the arbitrator ruled in favor of the loud-mouthed Perez. Quiet Wang didn't defend his salary request nearly as well.

The Yankees did the same thing with the "aging" Andy Pettitte, beating him down to $5.5 million, after dangling a much higher offer that he didn't accept within the time limit.

Based on his production relative to CC Sabathia and A.J. Burnett, he should be on the "short" end of a $15-17 million range with the other two.

There, it was at least understandable; after an expensive winter signing Mark Teixeira, CC Sabathia, and A.J. Burnett, Pettitte was signed with "spare change."

Wang has been close mouthed about the way he has been treated. But as an Asian-American, I would guess that it was highly demotivating to his performance in 2008 and beyond. At some level, Wang may not want to play, at least for the Yankees.

Such resentments often run deeper and last longer with Asians than with most Americans. Meaning that Wang might even turn down an offer of X from the Yankees for an equivalent, or slightly worse offer elsewhere.

In an earlier piece, I opined that the Pittsburgh Pirates should try to sign Ben Sheets. Or someone like him. Wang would fall into the "someone like him" category.

The low-budget Pirates made a "spec" trade for an injured Japanese player, Akinori Iwamura, making between $4 million to $5 million. Given his arbitration history and subsequent performance decline, Wang would command no more, possibly less.

High-budget teams want a "sure thing." Low-budget teams often prefer to take the equivalent of a long-shot draw to a straight or flush and hope to hit it. It may be time for Wang to go to a different team, and a different type of team

Andy Pettitte of the New York Yankees Is an Outstanding Third Starter

Tom Au — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 08:58:23 -0500

Andy Pettitte is not the best pitcher on the Yankees' staff, but he was the winningest Yankees pitcher in the 2009 postseason.

That's because he was their No. 3 starter.

CC Sabathia is clearly the front-runner, but between A.J. Burnett, who has a slightly lower ERA, and Pettitte, who has a marginally lower FIP (sabermetric ERA), it's not clear who's really second or third.

FanGraphs valued Pettitte's worth at $1 million more than Burnett's in 2009, meaning that he is a "very qualified" No. 3.

Sabathia had to pitch against top-of-the-rotation Cliff Lee of the Philadelphia Phillies, John Lackey of the Los Angeles Angels, and Brian Duensing of the Minnesota Twins in the first game of each series.

Burnett's initial opponents were Philadelphia's Pedro Martinez, Los Angeles' Joe Saunders, and Minnesota's Nick Blackburn.

On the other hand, Pettitte faced Cole Hamels of the Phillies', Jered Weaver of the Angels, and former Yankee Carl Pavano, the weakest of the Twins' pitchers in his first games of each series.

I experienced this firsthand on my high school chess team, where I was "first board" with a middling 6-4 record.

My "lower boards" could beat me if they played exceptionally well , but other teams' lower boards could not beat their first boards (my opponents). Therefore, my lower boards were much better than their respective lower board opponents.

The three days of rest for the Yankees' rotation altered the dynamics somewhat. In the ALCS, Sabathia got to pitch against the Angel's unreliable Scott Kazmir the second time around, while Burnett was the sacrificial lamb against Lackey. Pettitte, however, beat Joe Saunders.

In the World Series, Sabathia faced Joe Blanton on his second go, while A.J. Burnett was matched against Lee. Pettitte drew Martinez, which is to say he was the only one of the Yankees' starters that did not go against Lee (2-0).

So Pettitte won both his games in the World Series, Burnett won one (against Martinez), and Sabathia earned a loss (against Lee) and a no-decision (against Blanton).

A similar thing happened to the Cleveland Indians in the 2007 ALCS against the Boston Red Sox. The winners of their three games were: the bullpen, Jake Westbrook (third starter), and Paul Byrd (fourth starter).

What of their first starter?

It was CC Sabathia, who went 0-2.

In terms of pay, Burnett actually out-earned Sabathia (barely over CC's $16 million), while Pettitte was a bargain at $5.5 million, especially considering he was arguably the Yankees' MVP in the postseason, if not the World Series.

In this regard, Pettitte's compensation is nearly equivalent to that of Chien-Ming Wang, the former ace that's still an "apprentice" in his arbitration years.

Pettitte is nearing retirement age so the Yankees will have to offer more to keep him, which they should considering Wang is still a question mark.

With his consistency, Pettitte is easily worth $10 million, and $15 million would not be unreasonable. Between him and say, Johnny Damon for one to two years at similar pay, the Yankees should re-sign Pettitte, and make another run for the World Series.

Steeler Defense 7, Denver Broncos 3 (At Halftime)

Tom Au — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 10:10:45 -0500

This halftime score defined the game in what was a defensive duel for at least three quarters. And it also defines why the Steelers have a chance at another Super Bowl win.

On the opening drive of the game, a third down Bronco pass attempt was broken up by corner back William Gay. Actually, he should have had an interception, except that HIS play was broken up by Steelers' safety Troy Polamalu. The Broncos kicked a field goal from the Steelers' 40 that they would not have had if the "interception" had stood up.

On paper, the Broncos continued to dominate the first half, having held the ball for over 16 minutes at the 23 minute mark. But they were unable to score afterward, with all their drives being stopped short, after starting deep in their own territory because of poor punting.

On one of those drives, Tyrone Carter, a "backup" safety replacing Ryan Clark, played as "free" safety, running left to right across the field in order to pick off a Kyle Orton pass and run it back for a touchdown. This led to the halftime score displayed in the title.

On the other hand, Steelers' QB Ben Roethlisberger had two turnovers in the second half. The first was a 13-yard sack that caused him to fumble the ball, that the Broncos' Robert Ayers ran back for a touchdown, and their last lead, 10-7.

To his credit, Roethlisberger came storming back with a four pass touchdown, giving the Steelers a 14-10 lead, all they needed to win.

But the next Steelers' drive was thwarted by stellar BRONCO's defense. Andre Goodwin intercepted a Roethlisberger pass in the end zone for a touchback.

The fourth quarter was something of an anti-climax. About halfway through the quarter, Polamalu intercepted an Orton pass at the Denver 25, that Roethlisberger converted into a touchdown with seven minutes to go. You could argue that the score was now Steelers' Defense 14, Offense, 7, Broncos 10.

After a "three and out" occasioned by the "Iron Curtain" defense, the final Steelers' drive not only put up another seven points, but ate up five minutes on the clock. With less than a minute and half left in the game, the Broncos weren't able to do anything.

This would not be the first time this that Steelers' defense defined the game. The Steelers won their first game, a defensive gem, 13-10 against the Tennessee Titans (who beat them last year) in overtime.

But star defender, safety Troy Polamalu was injured for several weeks.

In the second game with Polamalu out, and the score tied at 14-14, the Steelers missed a field goal from the Chicago Bears' 43, and the Bears used great field position to get within field goal range for a 17-14 victory.

Polamalu was also missed when the Steelers lost a road game to the Cincinnati Bengals, normally an underdog, won 23-20, a contest which "sets up" a rematch next week in Pittsburgh for the leadership of the AFC North.

But a fumble return and an interception return were the keys in a 27-17 victory over the Vikings (Steelers' Defense 14, Offense 13, Vikings 17). Without the defense, it would have been 17-14 Vikings.

Steelers' victories against the San Diego Chargers, Detroit Lions, and Cleveland Browns, were won in the conventional way, by Roethlisberger's offense. But except for the Chargers, these were much weaker teams than the ones discussed above.

Dustin Pedroia and Bronson Arroyo: A Tale of Two Red Sox

Tom Au — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 09:34:51 -0500

One of these men IS a Red Sox. The other WAS a Red Sox, having been made available by the Pittsburgh Pirates who failed to protect him off waivers, and then having been traded to the Cincinnati Reds for Willy Mo Pena.

One was a league MVP in 2008. The other has, at times, been kind of a marginal player in the game.

One of these men might unkindly, but reasonably accurately, be described as "pint sized." The other is a "hunk," over half a foot taller than the first.

The first set of attributes belongs to Dustin Pedroia; the second, to Bronson Arroyo.

If you met Pedroia out of uniform, you would not take him for a baseball player, let alone an MVP. Many scouts would pass him up, and many did.

He was drafted with Boston's first pick toward the end of the second round, because Boston had given up its first-round pick to Oakland to sign Keith Foulke.

Arroyo is an obvious athlete. The only real question would be which is his game. A person might reasonably mistake him for a basketball or hockey player; perhaps he plays football. But if he said, "I pitch Major League Baseball," no one would doubt him.

Pedroia was once described by a coach as "the best player in baseball relative to his natural ability." Few players are better than him. The handful that are—Alex Rodriguez, perhaps—are obviously "better endowed."

Arroyo is considered a multi-tool player with considerable promise. Nevertheless, he has not been able to rise above the "pack," except for short periods of time.

This example shows that appearance, either of the athlete, or of his tools, is not always a reliable guide to his playing abilities. Maybe "intangible" qualities like Pedroia's "character" are more important than, say, Arroyo's "build." A more reliable guide is his record.

At Arizona State University, Pedroia beat out Texas Rangers' Ian Kinsler for the shortstop position and posted a batting average in the high .300s. He also generously relinquished two years of his scholarship so that ASU could offer them to other players, all of which says something.

Boston is now a "record" team, being among the first to recognize the new (baseball) science of "sabermetrics," and placing its founder, Bill James, on retainer as a consultant. They also have on staff Voros McCracken, who designed the sabermetric formula now used to evaluate pitchers.

Arroyo was drafted by Pittsburgh (where I come from), right out of high school. This means that Pittsburgh, still very much a "tools" team, didn't have much of record on him to go by.

Among the few people outside Boston that understands these things is Oakland's Billly Beane (whom the Red Sox almost signed as general manager late in 2002). With J.P. Ricciardi and Paul DePodesta gone as general managers, Beane is probably the only GM who practices "Moneyball" other than Theo Epstein.

In 2002, Beane (and DePodesta) drafted an overweight catcher, Jeremy Brown, who "owned the Southeast Conference record books," against the advice of their scouts, in the "compensation" portion of the first round.

He was a star in AAA, but petered out in the majors, thereby becoming "4A." Scouts sometimes cite this as a "failed" signing. But the fact is that 60 percent of first-round draft choices do not make it to the majors, so Brown's success in AAA implies that he was in that 10 percent sliver between "above average" and "made it."

Brown was perhaps second in girth that year to Prince Fielder, whom the Milwaukee Brewers signed successfully, in part because of the exploits of his similarly weight-challenged father, Cecil.

"Father" is part of the "record," at least in otherwise borderline situations. Ditto for Nick Swisher, son of Steve, or Kyle Drabek, son of Doug. Even an older brother is meaningful in this regard; think of the LaRoches or the Uptons. DNA counts.

So don't judge by appearances. It's unlikely that Hollywood would cast Pedroia as a baseball player; unless, perhaps, he were playing himself. On the other hand, Arroyo would be central casting's dream of a World Series pitcher.

Yet the one that is more likely to go to the next World Series would not be the screenmakers' choice.

Any given thing could happen on any given day. It's possible that Pedroia will go 0-for-4, with an error, in his next game. And it's possible that Arroyo pitches a shutout in his next game.

But the record suggests that the one will be at or close to the top of his league, and the other will be perhaps "league average," over the course of a whole year. And these would not be the ones that most people would expect.

Why Jason Bay Might Be Worth $20 Million a Year, to the Right Team

Tom Au — Sun, 08 Nov 2009 10:36:16 -0500

You (probably) can hold out for more than the $15 million a year Boston is reportedly offering you, Jason Bay.

Based on his hitting, Jason Bay would be a "five win" (above replacement, or WAR) player. At $4 million a WAR, (the going free agent rate), Bay should be worth something like $20 million a year, at least for the first two years. (Maybe with third and fourth year cuts to $18 and $15 million to reflect his aging.)

But the conventional wisdom is that Bay may be worth as little as $12-$14 million. That's not misguided, because Bay is now MINUS at least one and a half wins on defense. Even since he hurt his knee in 2007, he has very limited range.

This leads to a low ultimate zone range (UZR) score. On the other hand, he is a fine defender in the "traditional" sense, making few errors on the balls he can reach.

Bay would be a valuable addition to the team that is light on hitting, but has strong defense in center field, hopefully from a player that is under club control for all, or most of the four years that Bay would want on his contract.

That team, by the way, is, or rather was, the Pittsburgh Pirates. That's because they had an outfielder named Nyjer Morgan who meets the above description. Maybe Bay's new team should be the one that now has Morgan, the Washington Nationals.

Nyjer Morgan's WAR is 4.5, actually more than Bay's 3.5 (5.0 on offense - 1.5 on defense). A lot of people overlook this, because Morgan gets his WARs in a "strange" way.

Because he has no power, Morgan is only 1.5 WAR on offense, about league average. But he is 3.0 WAR on defense, because he has exceptional range.

Not only does he play center field exceptionally well, but he appears to be doing part of the job of the left and right fielders.

But Morgan can achieve this only if players on either side of him need help. That's where Bay's fielding weakness would actually be an "asset," because it would allow Morgan recapture those 1.5 WARs.

We could expand Morgan's range and limit Bay's, allowing him to play "perfect" defense within those limits, while getting the full benefit of his hitting.

Bay and Morgan would produce 8.0 WARs between them or $32 million of value. Basically, if you get a Nyjer Morgan to "fix" Bay's defense, Bay would be a $20 million producer, based on offense.

Now the Pirates have a center fielder, Andrew McCutchen, which is why they (unwisely) traded Morgan to the Nationals for Lastings Milledge. But McCutchen costs about half a game on defense, which is why he should have been moved to right field.

McCutchen and Morgan have been buddies before playing for the Pirates, which is why McCutchen would consent to this. Nate McLouth wouldn't, which is why he was, and had to be, traded.

OK, so the Pirates don't pay "full price." But Bay as a standalone might command only a little more than Bobby Abreu's $9.5 million per year over two years.

(They had similar value, according to FanGraphs, in 2007-2009 but Bay is four years younger, meaning that Bay can be signed for four years instead of two, and for more money.)

The Pirates should have talked "contract extension" with Bay in 2008, offering $10 million a year (and being prepared to go to $12 million), before trading him. Because of the configuration of their outfield, they could have paid something close to "market rate" for Bay while getting top value for him.

He wanted to stay then, although it's unlikely that he'll come back, having tasted something different in Boston.

Pirates' management has made a number of shrewd standalone trades. But I nevertheless fault them for not considering the systemic impact of those trades.

They traded Jason Bay before knowing what they had in Nyjer Morgan, then traded Morgan without realizing what he was worth. They did pick up one win ($4 million a year) for the "tied" trade of Sean Burnett for Joel Hanrahan in the Morgan-Milledge deal.

But if they could have paid Bay-Morgan an average of $17 million a year ($12 million to Bay, $5 million to Morgan), and had gotten $32 million of annual production between them it would have far outweighed what they actually got for Morgan.

Why Others "Distrust" the New York Yankees' Success

Tom Au — Sat, 07 Nov 2009 15:00:53 -0500

The New York Yankees have a number of great homegrown players. They include shortstop Derek Jeter, pitchers Andy Pettitte and Mariano Rivera, and catcher Jorge Posada.

I'd even include World Series MVP Hideki Matsui, given that the Yankees is the only American team that he has played for. Consider him "drafted" from a "collegiate" level Japanese team.

And the Yankees sure pay these people well to live in New York City. Jeter (among others) makes over $20 million, and Rivera, Posada, and Matsui make $13 million-$15 million a piece. Only Pettitte is a bargain at $5.5 million.

The Yankees also have some able lesser paid players coming up, such as second baseman Robinson Cano, centerfielder Melky Cabrera, pitchers Joba Chamberlain, Phil Hughes, and formerly, Chien-Ming Wang.

Perhaps the Yankees could have won the World Series with these players, plus a complement of others, say an Andy Phillips or Josh Phelps at first base, and a modern-day Scott Brosius at third. They'd even be "entitled" to an occasional transplant, say a Nick Swisher in right field, and his equivalent in left.

However, what's troubling to most people is not the high paid home grown talent. It is the fact that the Yankees' budget allows them to fill out their roster with the "best and brightest" from other teams:

Alex Rodriguez and Mark Teixeira from the Texas Rangers, CC Sabathia from the Cleveland Indians, AJ Burnett from the Toronto Blue Jays, and Johnny Damon from the Oakland As (originally).

Remove those five players from the Yankees, and you remove something like $98 million from their payroll. That would leave it around $110 million, still at the high end, but "in front of the pack" not "way ahead."

Then the argument of "it costs more to live in New York" might hold up. Another author argued "Money doesn't buy rings, the Yankees are just better."

It's true that the Yankees are "just better." But they are "just better" because of the money. That's because they are a "complete" team.

The high budget teams that the other author cited, that didn't go anywhere, failed to do so, because they had "holes."

One of them was the Detroit Tigers, who lost out to the low budget Minnesota Twins, because the Tigers' superior pitching couldn't compensate for inferior hitting.

The Chicago Cubs didn't go to the playoffs for a similar reason. The New York Mets have good players that are managed terribly, while the Houston Astros and Seattle Mariners have overpaid mediocrities.

As a National League team, the Philadelphia Phillies had a major "hole" at the DH spot, the Angels' pitching was not as good as the Yankees' and the Twins were simply overpowered.

The Yankees' "hole" use to be pitching. (The former) Chien-Ming Wang was solid, as staff ace, but not Cy Young material. His collapse was a blessing in disguise for the Yankees, who were then forced to acquire Sabathia and Burnett.

Suppose we sent back the five "imports" to their original owners, so that Rodriguez and Teixeira took the Rangers to the playoffs, while Burnett, Sabathia, and Damon Toronto, Cleveland, and Oakland made more competitive in their respective divisions.

And then suppose the Yankees won the World Series anyway. Then we could truly say that "homegrown" Yankees were the series champions.

Phillies' Emergence Threatens World Series Chances of Low-Budget Teams

Tom Au — Fri, 06 Nov 2009 08:44:12 -0500

Can a low-budget team win the World Series? The answer is a qualified yes.

But it appears to have gotten harder just within the past year or two. That's because historically it has been easier to do so from one of the two leagues than the other.

Who are the high-budget teams? I drew the line at a payroll of $100 million for this year.

Start with the two New York teams, the two Chicago teams, and the two Los Angeles teams. Then add Boston, Detroit, and Seattle in the American League, and Philadelphia and Houston in the National League.

In the American League, if you said that three of the four contenders will be Los Angeles, New York, and Boston, you'd be right most years. Only the American League Central has any real competition, with all but Kansas City having won the division within the past five years.

Who were the low-budget World Series winners? The St. Louis Cardinals in 2006. The Florida Marlins in 2003. The Arizona Diamondbacks in 2001. All National League teams.

There was almost an exception to the rule in 2008 when the low budget Tampa Bay Rays won the American League pennant, only to to be defeated by the high budget Phillies from the National League for the World Series.

Why this is so can be seen from the following matchups: New York Yankees and New York Mets. The Yankees have gotten to the postseason in all but one of the past 14 years, with the Mets, only occasionally, leaving room for others in the National League East.

The Los Angeles Angels vs. the Los Angeles Dodgers. They both tend to get to the postseason, but the Angels tend to go further.

The Chicago White Sox vs. the Chicago Cubs. The White Sox are a credible postseason threat, the Cubs aren't.

Consider Detroit (and Minnesota) possible alternatives to the White Sox. But Cleveland has lost its "teeth" with the departures of CC Sabathia and Cliff Lee, and the collapse of Fausto Carmona.

Boston is a counterweight to the New York Yankees on the east coast in the American League, and Philadelphia is more than a match for the New York Mets in the National League.

On the other hand, Houston's and Seattle's postseason chances are basically no better than those of other teams with lower payrolls.

The National League West is quite competitive, with every team except the San Francisco Giants (who won the pennant in 2002) having won a division title in the past five years.

The National League Central is less competitive over the same period, with the Cardinals and the Cubs monopolizing the division title (although the Houston Astros and Milwaukee Brewers have won wild cards).

In the National League East, the Philadelphia Phillies, after having won second-place spots behind the Atlanta Braves and New York Mets in 2005-06, won three division titles in a row plus two pennants (and one of the two World Series).

In the past five years, the high-budget Phillies have occupied three slots (out of 10) in National League pennant races, the high-budget Dodgers two, and the high-budget Astros and Mets, one each. Only the St. Louis Cardinals and Colorado Rockies, among low-budget teams, have competed for (and won) pennants in the league.

The emergence of the Phillies has changed the picture, at least in the National League East. With the addition of Cliff Lee (and others), they appear to have cemented their status as division winners for some years.

That's bad news for the Atlanta Braves and New York Mets, who have won the division in the past. What's worse, the East has contributed no wild card contenders in the past five years (although the Florida Marlins were such in 2003).

Moreover, the Phillies, like the New York Yankees, have recently improved their ability to advance to the World Series, meaning that we may see one or more additional Phillies-Yankees Series in the near future.

This may make the National League as uncompetitive for low budget teams as the American League has been.

New York Yankees: "Strategy" Is Paying Off in World Series

Tom Au — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 09:25:10 -0500

You don't want to pitch CC Sabathia against Cliff Lee. So the Yankees found out in the first game of the Word Series, which they lost, 6-1 (trailing 2-1 on Sabathia's watch).

This is the reason why the strategy of pitching Sabathia (and others) on three days' rest appears to be working. This, in spite of the fact that starters on three days' rest are 12-36 in playoff games since 1999, according to Fox News.

But after the Yankees' win in game three, Sabathia pitched game four against the Phillies' fourth starter, Joe Blanton. The Yankees won (even if Sabathia didn't). Pitching on short rest in game five, A.J. Burnett was just a sacrificial lamb against the fully-rested Lee. The Yankees won two out of three. In Philadelphia.

It was PHILADELPHIA that should have gambled on another Sabathia-Lee matchup, after the loss in the third game. Lee gave up only two runs in seven, yesterday (three of his runs were in the top of the eighth, meaning that he would probably have been relieved earlier in a close game).

Match those two runs, and assume that the bullpen gives up two more (instead of the one it actually surrendered), for a total of four against Sabathia et.al. in game four, and the Phillies might have won it 5-4, even against Sabathia.

Then pitch Blanton against short-rested Burnett in game five, and transpose the seven runs allowed in game four into game five, and the Phillies can win 8-7. In that case, they'd be 3-2, and the odds-on favorite, even going back to Yankees Stadium.

Instead, it is the Yankees who are 3-2, going home, where they have to win only ONE game. And they have CC Sabathia available for game seven if they lose game six. Given his short game five tenure, even Burnett might be available as a "long reliever" by then.

As Yogi Berra supposedly said, "it isn't over until it's over." It's barely possible that the Phillies will win the last two in enemy territory and thus, the World Series, after dropping two out of three at home.

The Pittsburgh Pirates did this against Baltimore in 1979. But for now, the Yankees are in the catbird seat as a result of Joe Girardi's "three starter" strategy.

Sanchez's San Francisco Signing Shows Pirates What Might Have Been

Tom Au — Sun, 01 Nov 2009 13:45:02 -0500

Freddy Sanchez is a good "sport." The Pittsburgh Pirates' management is not.

Sanchez re-signed with the San Francisco Giants at a total of $12 million for two years, or $6 million per. This compares to the $10 million that FanGraphs values him at for 2009 alone.

My readers know that I would have gladly offered Sanchez $12 million for ONE year. Given a limping second half, after his strong first half, that may represent an overpayment for his baseball contributions. It would probably fairly value his baseball AND civic contributions to the city.

But Sanchez was willing to sign for much less than $12 million per. We now know that he would have signed for six. And for two years, not three.

Even if we "padded" the deal to $8 million per (as a very shrewd hotel man named Conrad Hilton would do in "strategic" situations), Sanchez would still be a bargain.

But the Pirates tried to chisel him down to $10 million over two years or $5 million per, and wouldn't listen to a counteroffer from him before trading him for Tim Alderson, a prospect.

So why try to keep Sanchez when you can trade him for someone like Alderson, who's PROBABLY worth more than $8 million to the Pirates (the difference between Sanchez' $20 million production over two years and his $12 million salary).

First, Alderson is just POTENTIAL, and possibly a "pig in a poke." Sanchez is "for sure" (almost, anyway). Second, and more important, is the effect of Sanchez on OTHER players.

He is one of the $10 million dollar players who is not holding out for top dollar, unlike e.g. Los Angeles Dodgers' Juan Pierre, who's been overpaid since 2006. Pittsburgh needs more examples of people like him who will play for "love" rather than money.

People might say, "If you keep Sanchez, you need to keep Jack Wilson," who was worth about $8 million a year, but who would have been willing to work for $6 million if he could do so with Sanchez.

Here's another example of the "Pittsburgh discount," for a lower cost of living, a less hectic lifestyle, and greater chances for local celebrity. Wilson, like Sanchez, was also a superlative "citizen" OFF the field.

And apparently, coach Perry Hill left in disgust because of so many changes, particularly to the infield. Under him, the Pirates had the lowest error rate in major league baseball. And a large part of the reason was the Wilson Sanchez double play combo.

Sanchez and Wilson AND Hill, was too much a price to pay for Tim Alderson. Great guys on and off the field. In fact, I'd pay up for them just for their potential contributions AFTER baseball.

Firing His Wife Jamie: Not Los Angeles Dodgers' Frank McCourt's Worst Move

Tom Au — Fri, 30 Oct 2009 09:30:55 -0400

No, that would have been that of Paul DePodesta, in 2005. As a Moneyball fan, I was sorry to see DePodesta go. And in fact, it may have cost the Dodgers the 2009 World Series, as discussed below.

Shortly after taking the reins, DePodesta angered Dodgers fans with a trade that at its heart was Paul Lo Duca for a pitcher, Brad Penny.

Despite being a catcher, Lo Duca was a "league average" hitter, that is to say, one of the better batters on a light-hitting Dodgers team.

But Penny helped restore the team to its traditional strength, pitching (In 1965, when the Dodgers won my first World Series behind Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale, the team batting average was only .245.).

And I have a sneaking suspicion that DePodesta dumped Lo Duca in part because of the latter's off-the-field "philandering," something that Mr. McCourt can now relate to.

DePodesta also signed Derek Lowe (above) on the cheap, because he had a 2004 ERA of 5.42, even though his FIP (sabermetric ERA) was only 4.26, meaning that he had been "unlucky" for more than a run.

Lowe's ERAs dropped below 4.00 for the next few years, meaning that DePodesta had used the right metric.

On the other hand, DePodesta had the annoying, but ultimately rewarding, habit of letting go of fan favorites at their top level.

He used sabermetrics to determine which players' peak performances were incompatible with their "peripherals" (raw stats), meaning that they had been "lucky" rather than good.

The most unpopular of these "dumps" was that of Adrian Beltre, who reverted from truly astounding (Jason Giambi or Barry Bonds levels) in 2004, to just above league average in 2005. Instead, DePodesta replaced him with Jeff Kent, a (subsequently) equivalent infielder for $2 million-$3 million a year less.

And who has heard of Alex Cora, Jose Lima, or Steve Finley since their role in the 2004 playoffs, whom DePodesta was also derided for letting go?

Finley, who made $7 million with the Dodgers in 2004, last signed for $1 million with the Colorado Rockies in 2007.

Interpolating, he was worth at most $5 million in 2005 and $3 million in 2006 (FanGraphs puts him at a NEGATIVE value for those two years.). Instead, he was paid $13 million, or $5 million more, over those two years by the Los Angeles Angels.

DePodesta also traded expensive Shawn Green for Dioner Navarro and three other (later "busted") prospects, an admitted "downtrade." But the savings on that deal were about $14 million, which he used to sign J.D. Drew.

At its heart, the "trade" was one of Green for the slightly less-expensive but equivalent Drew, meaning that he got Navarro for "free."

On the other hand, the post-DePodesta Dodgers have a habit of retaining players that are genuinely good, but cost "too much" relative to their abilities.

At $23 million, Manny Ramirez was an expensive player who was worth only half that in 2009, according to FanGraphs, because he had to sit out 50 games for using steroids.

A less egregious example is Juan Pierre, an admittedly above-average hitter with no power and no extra defensive ability who strikes out as often as he walks and has annoying runs in hot and cold streaks.

He is also standing in the way of higher potential, club-controlled players like Andre Eithier and Matt Kemp, who are paid a fraction of what he is.

The problem extends to pitchers. One is Vicente Padilla, who is worth anywhere from $5-$10 million in a given year, based on FanGraph's comparables, but is consistently paid above the upper end of that range. Hiroki Kuroda is an aging hurler who's barely above league average, but who is paid like a star.

The Dodgers have a good team that was a legitimate pennant contender, but no thanks to the above. Instead, it was the result of an exceptionally productive 2003 draft that produced Chad Billingsley and Matt Kemp, among others.

With DePodesta at the helm, they could have just as good a team for a little more than half the money, meaning that they could have used the savings to sign a C.C. Sabathia or trade for Cliff Lee.

This would have given them a better shot at the pennant and World Series this year. Moreover, the person they would have acquired was someone their opponents would NOT have gotten.

I do wish Mr. McCourt good luck in a battle with his wife. Thirty years is certainly enough time to see if a relationship of that sort will work out or not.

But I wish he had been more patient with the other "non-performer," Paul DePodesta, and given him a fraction of that time, say three years instead of less than two (The Dodgers went to the playoffs in 2006).

2007: The Cleveland Indians' World Series that Wasn't

Tom Au — Wed, 28 Oct 2009 10:19:40 -0400

The Cleveland Indians' best chance at a World Series ring in recent times was when they were leading 3-1 in the ALCS against the Boston Red Sox in 2007. Given the Red Sox's 4-0 slaughter of the redoubtable, but overmatched, Colorado Rockies, does anyone doubt that the Indians would have won in at most seven, if they had advanced?

The Indians had a formidable lineup that year: Victor Martinez, Ryan Garko, Casey Blake, Grady Sizemore, and Jhonny Peralta all hit .270 or better, with Travis Hafner not far behind at .266. All of these, except Blake, also hit 20 or more home runs (18 for Blake).

They also had two pitchers named C.C. Sabathia and Cliff Lee, who will start the World Series Game One in 2009 (neither as an Indian). Sabathia and Fausto Carmona were both Cy Young award candidates in 2007 (Sabathia won).

But Sabathia and Carmona didn't pitch anything like Cy Young candidates in the 2007 ALCS. And Lee, the 2008 Cy Young winner, wasn't a factor in the playoffs, not having his breakout year until 2008.

The two heroes of the Indians' 2007 postseason were Jake Westbrook and Paul Byrd. Although they were only third and fourth starters, they had the advantage of being better than their opposite numbers on the Red Sox team and won games, with the third victory coming in relief of Carmona's badly pitched second game.

In 2009, by contrast, the Indians hit a respectable .264 (vs. .268 in 2008), but only Shin-Soo Choo hit 20 or more home runs. They trailed their opponents in total bases (2,321 to 2,484), versus a lead of 90 in 2007.

But what killed them in 2009 was pitching. Their ERA of 5.06 was more than a run worse than in 2007. Sabathia had been traded to the Milwaukee Brewers (before signing as a free agent with the New York Yankees), and Carmona had reverted to his erratic, pre-2007 self.

Westbrook was out for the year with Tommy John surgery, Byrd's career was sputtering to an end (elsewhere) because of his age and personal problems. So the Indians traded Cliff Lee and their new signee, Carl Pavano, mid-season, leaving their rotation a shell of its former self.

The Indians' troubles have also taken a toll on their lineup. Victor Martinez was traded to the Red Sox and Ryan Garko to the San Francisco Giants.

Grady Sizemore is just another player, not a wonderkid. Jhonny Peralta is back below 2006 levels of productivity. Asdrubal Cabrera and Travis Hafner are marking time. Only Choo was clearly a better player in 2009 than in 2007.

With the Pittsburgh Pirates having "pirated" Neal Huntingdon, the Bucs seem to be in a more aggressive rebuilding mode, particularly in terms of pitching. Specifically, they've lined up their trade and draft choices for 2012-2014, three years of overlap, before individual players start going into free agency.

Cleveland needs to do somewhat the same to be a contender again. In almost any given year (except 2009), the Indians are a threat at the plate. They need to restore this threat in 2010, then go out and find the starters they'll need. Pitching typically makes the difference between a good Indians team and a mediocre one.

C.C. Sabathia Vs. Cliff Lee: "Cleveland Indians" In The World Series

Tom Au — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 09:19:05 -0400

No, the Cleveland Indians' team is not in the 2009 World Series. But two individual former Indians are. They're C.C. Sabathia and Cliff Lee.

Such are the trials of low budget outfits like the Indians. They can't pay enough keep their best players after the team-controlled six years, and are forced to trade them, or lose them in free agency.

The beneficiaries of such a system are high budget teams like the New York Yankees, who signed Sabathia for $161 million over seven years, and the Philadelphia Phillies who traded four prospects for Cliff Lee and Ben Francisco this summer.

Meanwhile, the Indians, 2007 ALDS winners, dropped to a losing season in 2009 after trading Sabathia to the Milwaukee Brewers for Zach Jackson and three minor leaguers, and Paul Byrd for a minor leaguer in 2008. They lost Jake Westbrook to injuries in 2009.

All of which led them to trade Lee in mid season. With the trade of Carl Pavano to the Minnesota Twins, what's left of the rotation isn't much to write home about.

If key hitters "wake up" in 2010 after an uncharacteristically poor season, the Indians will likely have above average batting. But their pitching figures to be below average.

Meaning that the team as a whole will be no better than "league average" (as in 2008), possibly worse. Clearly, the Indians are a rebuilding team. Let's hope that the minor leaguers acquired in recent trades helped.

Pitching will be the key to the Indians' getting back to the playoffs. When their batting gets back to "critical mass," they might need to do something drastic in this regard.

Like sign Roy Halladay when his contract comes up. Unless, of course, some of their prospects become the next "C.C Sabathia" and/or "Cliff Lee."

New York Yankees: Why They Need To Win The ALCS In Six

Tom Au — Sat, 24 Oct 2009 12:44:59 -0400

Playing at home is a bit like having the serve in tennis: It confers a distinct advantage. As between two evenly matched contestants, the one with the home field/serve will win most of the time.

The Yankees "held serve" for two games at home, and then "broke the serve" of the Angels in the middle of three games played in Anaheim. It is this fact, and not the 3-2 tally, that suggests that the Yankees are the better team.

(If Los Angeles was leading 3-2 by virtue of their homestand, it would be far less clear they were the better team.)

Now that the playoffs are back to Yankee Stadium, the Angels have a very steep hill to climb. Asking them to "break serve" even once on the Yankees' home turf is asking a lot. For them to do it twice would require a miracle.

Nevertheless, the Yankees need to win it in six in order to be more than a slight favorite against Philadelphia. That's because their other weapon is C.C. Sabathia.

He's the one whom they wouldn't want to use in a Game 7, so he could be available for three games against the Phillies.

The Yankees play the majority of their games at home because they were the top seed in the American League. The Yankees would have this advantage against Philadelphia as well, by virtue of the American League's victory in the All Star game.

Sabathia did lose eight times in the regular season (only once after July 31st), but only one of those games was at home. If he were to pitch Games One, Four, and Seven of the World Series, he might win at least the two home games, and possibly three times against the Phillies.

Three wins in Sabathia's games would force the Phillies to sweep the remaining four to win the World Series; two wins would force the Phillies to win three of the remaining four.

Which brings us to tonight's other topic: Andy Pettite. If the Yankees win his game tonight (whether or not he gets the decision), both he and A.J. Burnett would have contributed a game apiece in the ALCS, meaning that Sabathia put them over the top. Then one could hope for the same against the Phillies.

If Pettite loses tonight, that paradigm will go out the window. Then two wins by Sabathia might not be enough—meaning that the Phillies might actually have a chance to win the World Series if they can defeat Sabathia in Citizen's Park.

The worst scenario would be a loss tonight (or tomorrow), followed by a seventh game Monday, because of a weather postponement. Then Sabathia would not be ready even for Game Two of the World Series.

The result is that he'd have only one road start and one home start (instead of two home starts in Games Two and Six). It's possible that even Sabathia might not be deliver two wins under these circumstances. And even if he does, one would have to worry that Andy Pettite will not deliver even one win.

None of the worst scenarios apply if the Yankees win Game Six and there is no Game Seven...which is why Game Six is so important.

Los Angeles Dodgers: Pitching Slide Dooms Their NLCS Chances

Tom Au — Fri, 23 Oct 2009 09:36:41 -0400

What happens to a team when its strongest attribute goes south? Although the Dodgers' hitting was nothing to write home about, what really ruined them was their pitching.

A 5.30 ERA in the postseason. A 7.30 ERA in the NLCS. Starters like Kershaw, Wolf, and Kuroda fell apart against the Phillies.

Who would have thought it? Would the Dodgers have won their division if their pitchers had pitched like this in the regular season? Probably not.

By contrast, the Phillies had ERAs of 3.04 in the postseason, and 3.07 in the NLCS, basically Dodgers type numbers.

The Dodgers "outhit" the Phillies. In batting average, that is, .232 to .231, with two more hits in eight more at-bats. This, after being first in the National League in this regard.

But the Phillies' batting was superior in every other way: 10 home runs to six; 19 extra base hits to nine, and tellingly, 23 walks to 12. Put another way, the Phillies had many more total bases (78 to 59) and a much higher on base percentage or OBP, (.348 to .287).

By multiplying total bases by the respective OBPs, the Phillies led in (theoretical) runs created, 27 to 17. The actual tally was 35 to 16, meaning that the Dodgers were sabermetrically unlucky for about nine runs (small sample size), but it hardly made a difference.

The Phillies' "Pythagorean" (theoretical) winning percentage was .827 using actual runs, and .716 using runs created, versus an actual percentage of .800. Either way, the Phillies should have won at least "three and a half" games out of five, so far, which rounds to four.

The Dodgers' one win started out as pitching duel between Vicente Padilla and Pedro Martinez, but was decided by their better bullpen. And even the division series was won by the bullpen, with Padilla earning the only victory for the starters.

To beat the Yankees (or the Angels) in the World Series, the Phillies will have to maintain their strong hitting, while continuing to "get lucky" (perform above normal) with their pitching, as the underdog St. Louis Cardinals did in 2006.

Had the Dodgers advanced, they would have had to get lucky with their hitting, while maintaining strong pitching. But that is precisely what did NOT happen for them in the NLCS.

Why the Pittsburgh Pirates Should Sign Ben Sheets

Tom Au — Fri, 16 Oct 2009 10:20:56 -0400

First, the price would be right. Yeah, Sheets is probably injured, but he's good. Meaning that he'd probably be worth more as a cut-priced injured player than many a full-priced healthy player.

According to Brewers' Featured Columnist, Jesse Motiff, "The best Sheets could hope for after missing an entire season would be a one-year, incentive-laden deal with a base salary likely between $2-3 million." That would not be more than the Pirates' established pitchers, Paul Maholm, and Zach Duke are making.

According to FanGraphs, Sheets' average annual value is about three and a half wins over replacement, even counting injuries. (He could be a Roy Halliday or C.C. Sabathia without them.) That may be more than Maholm or Duke can contribute in a given season, even when healthy. That's also about as much as say, Lastings Milledge can be expected to contribute as a hitter.

Second, Sheets could affect the balance of power in the National League Central Division, at least between Pittsburgh and Milwaukee, arguably Pittsburgh's biggest bugaboo. Pittsburgh was a decidedly better, if losing, 38-47 (.447) team outside its division, than inside, and actually beat non-division rivals at home in 2009.

But the Pirates' 5-9 record against the Brewers is representative of its overall 24-52 (.316) record in its division. And unlike the case with other divisional opponents, the Pirates have not won a game in Miller Park in over two years.

Sheets could be a huge part of changing that equation. Certainly you don't want to see him on the other side.

Third, and most important, Sheets would fill an important "hole" in the Pirates rotation, which is now good, but needs to get better. They have a plethora of back end pitchers, Kevin Hart, Jeff Karstens, and Dan McCutchen, but need a true top of rotation starter.

Maholm has been there by default. Ross Ohlendorf and even Charlie Morton show potential for filling this role, but don't yet have enough experience.

Imagine a Pirates' rotation of Sheets, Ohlendorf, Morton, Maholm and Duke (yes, Maholm and Duke might be the fourth and fifth starters). And Sheets' periodic absences would give the back-enders a chance to step up to the mound.

Finally, such a signing would demonstrate that the Pirates can recruit top notch talent for relatively little money. They took a baby step in the right direction this year by signing "orphaned" Eric Hinske for a song, then trading him to the Yankees for two minor leaguers. The signing of Sheets, or someone like him, would be much more than a "baby" step.

Could the New York Yankees' ALCS Pitching Strategy Get Rained On?

Tom Au — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 09:25:30 -0400

Given his druthers, Joe Girardi would like to start C.C. Sabathia in Games One, Four, and Seven for the pennant. This would allow him to use a three-man rotation, with the others consisting of A.J. Burnett and Andy Pettite. That's possible, because of one day breaks after Game Two and Game Five.

But early indications of heavy showers, hence a rainout on Friday, could nix this plan. Then the first two games would be pushed back a day, with no break between Games Two and Three.

Of course, Girardi could pitch Sabathia on three days' rest. But that doesn't seem like a good idea.

It didn't work in 2007, when Chien-Ming Wang, then the Yankees' ace, was asked to pitch a fourth game against the Cleveland Indians on three days' rest. Nor did it when Sabathia pitched Game Two of the NLDS for the Brewers last year on short rest.

The problem is, the Yankees have only three, more or less, reliable starters. What do you do about the fourth?

Do you use Joba Chamberlain, or possibly Phil Hughes, and hope that he will be more than a "straw" starter.

Maybe you use the two of them in tandem, having each pitch three innings or so (as the Pittsburgh Pirates have done with the former Yankee Jeff Karstens and others). In this sequence, I'd even have Alfredo Acevedo pitch one inning of a "straw" start to give both the others a chance for a win.

Let's not even talk about Sergio Mitre or (this year's) Chien-Ming Wang.

But using a fourth starter might not be the worst thing in the world, if only for reasons of "diversification." Paul Byrd was a pleasant surprise for the Indians in 2007.

And if Sabathia started in only Games One and Five of the pennant series, he'd be available in Game One of the World Series. And what if the Yankees win in the series in six?

Choices, choices. It's a dilemma most managers would be happy to have.

Bi-Coastal League Rivalries Could End Up on One Coast for World Series

Tom Au — Wed, 14 Oct 2009 09:11:54 -0400

It could be a "Freeway Series," between Los Angeles and Anaheim for two southern California teams. Or it could be a (New Jersey) "Turnpike Series" for two teams in major cities in different Mid-Atlantic states, just off the one turnpike.

Or the two league rivalries of one Los Angeles-based team and one east coaster could reduce to a final contest featuring one of each.

What are absent from the pennant races this year are "small market teams" from the interior of the United States. No Minnesota Twins or Tampa Bay Rays. Not to mention Cleveland Indians or Pittsburgh Pirates.

The four teams competing in the current round all had payrolls of $100 million or more this year. Which is to say that they have more than their share high-paid stars.

Torii Hunter, Vladimir Guerrero, and Gary Matthews Jr. for the LA Angels; Manny Ramirez, Jason Schmidt, Jim Thome, Hiroki Kuroda, and Vicente Padilla for the LA Dodgers; Ryan Howard, Brett Myers, Brad Lidge, and Chase Utely of the Phillies; and A-Rod, Derek Jeter, Mark Teixeira, Hideki Matsui, Jorge Posada, Johnny Damon, plus three pitchers of the New York Yankees, all earned over $10 million this past year.

Three "low budget" teams, the St. Louis Cardinals, the Colorado Rockies, and the Minnesota Twins did make it to the Division Series, but that's all. And as discussed in a previous article, the high-budget Boston Red Sox's early demise was foreshadowed by their weakness against similar teams outside their division and on the west coast.

So far, the playoff results have rung "true" to the season results, which is to say that the team with the stronger season record has won each division series. There will be no team with an 80-something win season record winning the world series (as was true with the 83-win Cardinals in 2006).

On this basis, the Yankees ought to beat the Angels for the pennant, and then the Dodgers, in the World Series. This is a plausible result, but be warned that there are real possibilities for "upsets" along the way.

The Yankees' batting is about as good as the Angels' batting, meaning that superior Yankee pitching ought to give them the edge. But historically, Angels' pitching has been stronger against American League East teams than against the League as a whole.

This was certainly true recently, against the Boston Red Sox. Given this, plus the fact that the season series was 5-5, I would rate these two teams a toss-up for the American League Pennant.

On the other hand, the Los Angeles Dodgers appear to be genuine favorites against the Philadelphia Phillies, if for no other reason than they had two more days' rest. Their lineup is also more solid, overall, than Philadelphia's. And they won the season series 4-3.

People from eastern Pennsylvania will disagree with me, but I consider the Phillies "challengers," rather than a true championship team. They did win the World Series in 2008, against another "challenger" team, the Tampa Bay Rays. They also beat a much weaker Dodgers team in the playoffs last year. But they will not have these advantages in 2009.

Assuming that they beat the Angels, the Yankees might be modest favorites against the Dodgers. The New Yorkers have better hitting and a better bullpen, which might compensate for the Dodgers' better starting rotation. Overall, the Yankees may have a 30 percent chance of winning the World Series.

On the other hand, the Dodgers appear to be favorites in an all California matchup. They and the Angels were first in the Major Leagues in pitching and hitting, respectively, but the Dodgers rank much higher in the other's area of leadership than the Angels do.

Assuming that they are favorites in the pennant race also, the Dodgers have a 35 percent-40 percent of winning the World Series, and the Angels 20 percent. And the Dodgers did win two out of three in Anaheim this year in Interleague play.

The least likely result is that the Phillies will beat both the Dodgers and the American League Champions to repeat as World Series Champions. This possibility may be as low as 10-15 percent, versus 25 percent for two "coin flips."

Boston Red Sox's Weak Record Outside of Division Foreshadowed ALDS Sweep

Tom Au — Mon, 12 Oct 2009 09:26:23 -0400

It's a miracle that the Boston Red Sox even won the wild card. They got there on the strength of a 45-25 record in their division. This consisted, in turn, of tied 9-9 season series against both the New York Yankees and Tampa Bay Rays, a score of 11-7 against the Toronto Blue Jays, and a very lopsided 16-2 tally against the Baltimore Orioles.

That left them only 50-42 against the rest of Major League Baseball. If you further back out their 9-6 record against National League teams in Interleague play, that left them only 41-36 against the American League West and Central teams. Hardly playoff material.

In all fairness, the Red Sox had robust season records of 4-2 against the Minnesota Twins, and an even better 6-1 against the Detroit Tigers, their potential Central Division rivals.

But Boston was a 4-5 underdog against the Los Angeles Angels, and still more so, 2-7, against the Texas Rangers, among the top Western Division teams.

The Red Sox might still be in contention if they had won the American League East and had drawn the tired Twins, whom they had beaten in the regular season, as their division opponents. But that didn't happen because the New York Yankees won more games against third parties, after a tie in the season series with the Red Sox.

Assuming the latter beat the Twins, their chances of winning the pennant would have depended on who won the resulting New York-Los Angeles division round. Boston might be even money against New York, and probably an underdog, as we have just seen, against Los Angeles.

The Yankees and Angels both have better batting averages than the Red Sox. But the Angels' pitchers somehow do a better job of neutralizing Boston's hitters than the Yankees' pitchers.

Now, it seems like the focus might be the ALCS, because whoever wins this pennant is likely to be a favorite in the World Series over the National League Team, as was the case in 2004 and 2007 when the Red Sox won.

Sometimes, how far you go depends on how far others don't go. In last year's Super Bowl Playoffs, the Pittsburgh Steelers might have been underdogs if they had faced the Tennessee Titans, who had beaten them in the regular season, for the AFL Conference title.

But the Baltimore Ravens beat the Titans in the division series, and the Steelers later beat the Ravens (whom they had defeated twice in the regular season) for the "pennant." Then they were favorites in the Super Bowl.

Jason Bay (a former Pirate) would understand this.

Pirates Start to Exorcise Demons Against Division Rivals

Tom Au — Fri, 02 Oct 2009 10:10:43 -0400

Two days ago, the Pittsburgh Pirates won two consecutive games. On the road. Against the Chicago Cubs, who usually dominate them.

With the last game cancelled due to rain, the Pirates actually won a road series. That's awesome.

Counting their win in the opener of the season series, that's the third Pirate victory this year in Wrigley Field. Now, if they could only win more than one game against the Cubs at home.

Prior to these two games, the Pirates were all of 20-56 on the road for the season. Their new 22-56 road record is still the worst in the majors, but by a smaller margin.

In an earlier piece, I opined that Charlie Morton would be in a class with the Cubs' Ted Lilly if he were a bit more consistent. But Morton actually out pitched Lilly, 4-0, in the day game of Wednesday's doubleheader. Maybe he is as good as Lilly after all, without a three-game "handicap."

Jeff Karstens, who's only a mediocre pitcher overall, was "lights out" again against the Cubs in the nightcap after having debuted with the Pirates in a six-inning shutout against the same Cubs over a year ago.

Prior to the first game of the doubleheader, the Pirates had never won by as many as four runs in a game where they scored only in the first inning, and the last such three-run victory was in 1986, over 20 years ago.

Recently, the Pirates won one out of three in Houston's Minute Maid Park, in games that were all tight (at least in terms of earned runs). That's about par for the course on the other team's turf. But they need to win more than one game out of three at home against this team.

The Pirates also won the home portion of the season series against the formerly unbeatable Milwaukee Brewers, 5-3. That compares favorably with their single victory at home against the Brewers in 2008. But they've lost 20 consecutive games, over three seasons, in Miller Park.

The Pirates were also 3-4, a not-too shabby result, in Busch Stadium this year against the division leader. But they won only two of eight against the Cardinals at home.

After they leave Chicago, the Pirates go to Great American Field to show what they can do on the road against the Cincinnati Reds. After the two teams split their first eight games 4-4, Cincinnati has won seven in a row.

The Pirates are finally beginning to win their share of games on the road against some National League Central rivals and against others at home. But they're going to have to do better overall against their division if they are going to amount to anything.

Pirates Lost Badly On "Stealth" Trades

Tom Au — Wed, 30 Sep 2009 11:03:00 -0400

Forget about the highly visible trades like those of Jason Bay and Nate McLouth. It is the trades of supposedly "B" players (who are anything but) that have been hurting the Pittsburgh Pirates.

Take the heavily lamented trade of Nate McLouth. At least we got THREE prospects for him, including Charlie Morton, who may soon become as good a pitcher as McLouth is a hitter.

But how many Pirates remember a utility outfielder named Rajai Davis? He became a star this year as an Oakland A, the equivalent of the late lamented McLouth.

Yet he was traded in 2007 to San Francisco for Matt Morris, then a league average pitcher, commanding a "market" $10 million salary.

Forget, for a moment, Morris' subsequent decline, which set something of a speed record: the Pirates "never" pay market price for talent. In essence, they traded the equivalent of McLouth for far less than Morton alone.

Everyone knows that outfielder Jason Bay was traded for third baseman Andy LaRoche, outfielder Brandon Moss, and two no-name (and so far useless) pitching prospects.

What people forget is that the Pirates dumped Jose Bautista in the process, getting replacement catcher Robinzon Diaz from the Blue Jays.

Bautista had a breakout year in Toronto, with a .350-plus on base percentage (about the same as Nate McLouth's), although with less power. LaRoche's is about 20 points less.

Netting this against LaRoche's better defense gives two players of roughly equal value, meaning the Pirates didn't gain anything by trading for LaRoche and losing Bautista.

Looked at that way, no one would consider the trade of Bay for Moss, the equivalent of the former Rajai Davis, plus Diaz, and two random pitchers a good trade.

Or if you net Moss against Davis, which is being kind to the Pirates, the Bucs (effectively) traded Bay for Diaz, Matt Morris, Craig Hansen, and Bryan Morris with the three trades.

Nyjer Morgan was given up too easily, mainly because the Pirates didn't get to know or understand him before trading him. Lastings Milledge is now living up to "average expectations" (three and a half wins above replacement), and Sean Burnett for Joel Hanrahan was a one win upgrade.

But between defense and a high on base percentage, Morgan is a five win above replacement level player, which the Nationals didn't expect to get for Milledge.

They would probably have traded their head case for Brandon Moss plus a little more. That "little more" could, and probably should have been Ian Snell, the Pirates' head case.

Some consider the trade of Aramis Ramirez the worst Pirate trade of the decade. But the Pirates had to deal him, because unlike other Pirate stars such as Jason Bay, Freddie Sanchez, or Jack Wilson, Ramirez had made clear his intention to seek greener pastures in free agency.

The problem with trading Ramirez was not what the Pirates gave up, but what they failed to get. Specifically, they traded Ramirez AND a lesser player, Kenny Lofton, for three no-name prospects.

In fact, Ramirez was worth the equivalent of Kenny Lofton and the prospects. So the Pirates' loss on the deal was TWO Kenny Loftons, the one they gave up, and the one they failed to get. That, not losing Ramirez, was what hurt.

A former boss told this stock trader, "Don't just chase a bunch of new stocks out there. Study what you own! Every time you buy a stock, you have to sell a stock. And you're not going to make money if what you're selling is worth more than what you're buying."

Backs To The Wall, Pirates Hit Back Hard Vs. Division Leaders At Home

Tom Au — Mon, 28 Sep 2009 15:38:25 -0400

A series against the cellar-dwelling Pittsburgh Pirates was supposed to be the "last stop" for the Los Angeles Dodges in clinching their division, right? Not so fast, when it is in Pittsburgh—as the New York Mets found out in 2006.

Having beaten the division-leading Mets 3-0 at home in mid-September three years ago, the Pirates won their final homestand 3-1 against the Dodgers in 2009.

In the first game of the series, the Pirates pitched "by committee," with the score at 3-1, Pirates, after a three inning contribution from "straw" starter Jeff Karstens, who didn't pitch long enough to get the win.

That went instead, to rookie Donnie Veal, who pitched two scoreless innings to the end of the fifth, followed by one and two inning contributions from Steve Jackson and Jesse Chavez. Matt Capps closed a scoreless session against Pirate relievers.

In the second game, Paul Maholm pitched seven innings of a three-run quality start, earning a no-decision, leaving with the Pirates ahead 4-3. But Denny Bautista lost the game by giving up two runs in the top of the eighth, and three more relievers each allowed one run toward an 8-4 debacle.

Dan McCutchen pitched six-plus innings of a two-run quality start in the third game, but was denied the win when the second Dodgers run tied the game at 2-2.

The Dodgers went ahead by three runs, 5-2 in the top of the ninth, against Matt Capps. But Capps got the win when an error-laden bottom of the ninth led to a Pirate rally for four runs.

Zach Duke pitched eight innings of shut-out ball in the last game, before giving up a run on a triple and sacrifice fly in the ninth. So Donnie Veal closed out the game.

Meanwhile, the Pirates ran up their tally to 11 runs, scoring five runs in an error-laden second inning, two solo homers by Andy LaRoche and Garrett Jones in the fourth, and two more runs on a double sandwiched between two singles in the sixth. Andy LaRoche hit a two run homer in the eighth.

This series win echoes a similar victory against the Eastern Division-leading Mets in 2006. Maholm and Duke were the two starters that won games in that series, with Duke pitching eight innings of scoreless ball before being relieved in the ninth, with Salomon Torres protecting his shutout.

In the third game, a "committee" of Tom Gorzelanny, Shane Youman, and Damasco Marte pitched eight and a third innings to a 2-2 tie. Matt Capps closed out the top of the ninth, and was credited with a win as Ronnie Paulino hit a walk-off RBI double in the bottom of the ninth.

The series against the Dodgers may augur well for the Pirates' start in 2010. It will be in PNC Field, against the Los Angeles Dodgers.

Cleveland Indians: The Saga Of Jeremy Sowers

Tom Au — Sat, 26 Sep 2009 14:46:25 -0400

Jeremy Sowers didn't really belong on a rotation with C.C. Sabathia, Fausto Carmona, Cliff Lee, and Jake Westbrook, who took the Cleveland Indians to the playoffs in 2007.

In fact, he was used mostly as a "replacement" pitcher, in the two years prior to the current one, meaning that he was called up when someone was injured and a rotation spot needed to be filled.

He was one of five who competed for the final starting slot in spring training in 2009, and lost. The winner, Scott Lewis, was injured early in the season, and his replacement was Aaron Laffey.

But now, Sabathia and Lee have been traded, and Carmona has gone "south" (figuratively). Westbrook has been out for the 2009 season with Tommy John surgery.

So Sowers was called up in May, when reliever Vinnie Chuik was designated for assignment.

Sowers got off to a typically bad start in the month, with an ERA well above 7.00. But his monthly ERA dropped below 5.00, in June and stayed there subsequently, finally pulling his full year ERA below that mark as well.

That's not great, but that is the best showing of a career that has seen annual ERA postings above 5.00 and 6.00

After the mid-season trades of Cliff Lee and Carl Pavano, the last-place Indians are operating largely with inexperienced starters. Besides Sowers, these include David Huff and Anthony Reyes, whom Sowers had outlasted in spring training.

While most other Indians are playing well below their potential, Sowers is having a "career year," at least relative to himself. His ERA of just below 5.00 is now second as a starter only to the far less durable Laffey.

Sowers is now the Indians' third most experienced starter, although to call him "middle of the rotation" caliber is probably being kind. He has a repertoire of pitches limited mainly to a fastball and changeup, and depends largely on control, which he doesn't always have.

Even so, as a top 2006 draft choice in the process of "rebuilding," he is a metaphor for a rebuilding team crippled by trades of better, but unaffordable, pitchers. His success or failure in the coming years may well be representative of the team's overall success or failure.

The Cleveland Indians have gotten worse over the past two years. Sowers has gotten better. There's finally a match between the two.

The Pittsburgh Pirates Don't Find Much Treasure Buried on Their Bench

Tom Au — Fri, 25 Sep 2009 09:55:58 -0400

Forget for a moment that the Pirates' everyday team is below league average. The Pirates' replacement players are below the average for the league. And that may be at the core of the team's problems.

Well-financed teams like the New York Yankees have respectable strength even on the bench. Cody Ransom is no Alex Rodriguez, but he did his team no harm as a "sub" while the latter was out for a month due to injuries.

Not so for the low-budget Pirates

Neil Walker, Steve Pearce, Brian Bixler, Ramon Vazquez, Virgil Vazquez, Craig Monroe, Luiz Cruz, Jason Jaramillo? Who outside of Pittsburgh has heard of them?

To say that they are typical replacement players who (collectively) can win 40 games a season is probably being kind. After a respectable (if losing) 36-41 start to June 30, a team composed largely of those players is 20-54 thereafter, because of injuries to better starters.

And that includes one notable 7-2 stretch at home, with the Pirates at basically full strength, with all their best players on the field.

On the other hand, a number of Yankee rejects find their way to the Pirates, one team where they are plausible players. Take Shawn Chacon, Josh Phelps, Doug Mientkiewicz, Jeff Karstens, Ross Ohlendorf, Dan McCutchen, and most lately, Anthony Claggett (although many Yankees now have sellers' remorse with Ohlendorf).

And with such a weak pool to choose from, it follows that a number of "everyday" Pirate players are basically replacement level.

On what other team would Brandon Moss be anything other than a replacement? Yet he has played in 124 games, making him an everyday player.

And Andy LaRoche is a replacement-level hitter (although his superior fielding moves him part of the way toward league-average). Ditto, during his 2009 tenure with the Pirates, for his brother Adam (whose strong second half pulls up his replacement level first half to something approaching league average for the whole year).

Delwyn Young is an adequate, though not superlative, replacement for Freddy Sanchez. But what happens if he is benched?

All this cancels out the fact that the Pirates have genuinely strong players in Andy McCutchen, Garrett Jones, and probably Lastings Milledge, as well as a now-respectable rotation.

The Pirates apparently had a good draft in 2009, and to a lesser extent, in 2008. But the effects of the former won't show up until 2011 at the earliest. This predicament is the fault of Dave Littlefield, not current management.

Maybe Pedro Alvarez will be available sometime in 2010, allowing Andy LaRoche to "platoon" with Delwyn Young at second. And at some point, Jose Tabata should be available to play right field, meaning that we'll have a better alternative there than Brandon Moss.

But for the time being, the Pirates have a team that looks more like an AAA team. "Replacement level" is on the FIELD. Meaning that when there are injuries, what's on the BENCH is less than replacement level.

Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Slider: Consistency Keeps Charlie Morton From Being a Monster

Tom Au — Mon, 21 Sep 2009 09:34:11 -0400

This question comes into sharper focus after the Pirates' two defeats over the weekend, even with solid starts by veteran starters.

But Charlie Morton, one of the three players acquired from the Atlanta Braves for Nate McLouth last spring, pitched a seven-inning, one-run start against the San Diego Padres in PNC park on Friday night. That's very good.

He also opened a game against the Chicago Cubs in Wrigley field by giving up 10 runs in the one inning he pitched.

That's Baaaad, to the point of being record breaking. Are we dealing with Doctor Jekyll and Mr. Hyde here?

Not quite. There's a lot more good than bad. The start against the Cubs is largely the exception. The strong start against the Padres is (almost) the rule.

The fact of the matter is that Morton's home ERA is just 0.01 over 2.75. That's second only to Ross Ohlendorf, who is 0.01 below this figure.

This suggests that these "transplants" are the best two Pirate pitchers on raw ability. Clearly, Morton's problems are on the road, which is attributable to his inexperience.

The 10-run, one-inning doozy, on the road against the Cubs featured an ERA of 90.00. If it were 10 runs in nine innings, the ERA for the game would "only" be 10.

But fortunately, you can lose only one game at a time.

Morton also had a bad four-inning five-run start against the Astros in Minute Maid Park, and another bad five-inning six-run opening against the Cincinnati Reds in Great American Field. (I define "bad" starts as those involving at least as many earned runs as innings pitched, meaning an ERA of 9.00 or greater).

Overall, Morton's ERA is 5.00. But if you threw out the three bad games, it would be just above 3.00, with the ERA for the remaining away games about 3.60.

That would put him in a class with the likes of the Cubs' Ted Lilly, or the New York Mets' Johan Santana. Clearly, Morton's ERA is well in excess of 3.00, meaning that he's not yet in the same league as the other two.

But it's nice to know that most of the excess was concentrated in the three above-mentioned games. One could even call it an ERA of 3.00, with a "handicap" of three games.

Put another way, if you started Morton at 0-3 for his bad games, and assumed a 3.00 ERA the rest of the way, you would come up with a reasonable facsimile of his actual productivity.

Santana is 13-9, meaning that Morton might be 13-12 with the Mets behind him. Lilly is 12-8, meaning that Morton might be 12-11 if he were a Cub.

On the other hand, a "true" 5.00 ERA would put Morton in the company of the Mets' Mike Pelfrey, or Livan Hernandez, or the Pirates' Jeff Karstens, all of whom have losing records. (And the first two have much better run support than Morton is getting.)

Morton is clearly better than that, which is to say that he is really better than his raw stats seem to imply. Adjusting his stats, as above, gives a better picture.

I had earlier thought of Morton as "down payment" for McLouth, with Gorkys Hernandez and Jeff Locke making up the difference.

If he continues to be this good, he would represent "full payment" for McLouth, with the other two representing "profit."

The Pirates Have No Excuses For Not Winning The Next Series

Tom Au — Fri, 18 Sep 2009 16:17:05 -0400

The next series is one that the Pittsburgh Pirates should be able to win. It is at home, against a non division team. And the opponent, San Diego, is near the bottom of Western Division. We're not talking about the Los Angeles Dodgers (yet).

More specifically, the Padres is one of two teams whose batting is worse than the Pirates'. Typical of San Diego's problems is a former Pirate slugger named Brian Giles. That means that pitcher matchups will be crucial to the Pittsbrugh's success.

Here, the Padres have a slight advantage on paper for the season. That is until you take into account that the Padres are away, and the Pirates are at home. So the relevant matchups are the Padres' road ERAs against Pirates' home ERAs.

Based on overall ERAs, Tim Stauffer has it all over Charlie Morton tonight. But Morton has an ERA of just over 3.00 at home, better than Stauffer's overall ERA, which in turn is better than his road ERA of 3.70.

Tomorrow, Ross Ohlendorf has a better ERA than Clayton Richard's in any event, but his home ERA is about 2.75. Richard's road ERA is double that.

Sunday, Kevin Correia is just a bit better pitcher than Paul Maholm overall. But Maholm's home ERA is about 3.50, and Correia's road ERA is a point and a half higher.

The only pitching matchup advantageous to San Diego will be on Monday, where Wade LeBlanc's road ERA is actually better than Dan McCutchen's home ERA. It may be up to the better Pirate batters to pull this one out of the fire.

The Pirates won two out of three last spring, in Petco Park. They should do better than this, or 3-1, with the home court advantage. And a sweep is not out of the question.

Pirates-Astros: An Opportunity for the Bucs to Shine

Tom Au — Fri, 11 Sep 2009 09:20:13 -0400

Call me an optimist, but I think the Pittsburgh Pirates will "do well" on their next road series against the Houston Astros.

This is in spite of the fact that Pittsburgh has Major League Baseball's worst road record, particularly against the National League Central.

The Pirates have won only 18 games on the road this year. Only six have come against division rivals, and only three since the first week. But two of these have been against the Astros.

One reason is that expectations are so low. Two out of three would be a fantastic result. One out of three would be "not so bad," all things considered.

Three out of three, though unlikely, wouldn't be out of the question. The only unacceptable result at this stage of the game, would be another sweep.

There are two reasons for the optimism. One is that despite their much superior won-loss record, the Astros are sabermetrically barely better than Pittsburgh.

That is to say, they have scored only 12 more runs than the Pirates and given up one fewer. That's about as evenly matched as two teams are likely to be this late in the season.

The second is that the three starting Pirates pitchers all have better ERAs than their Astros' counterparts. Barring a schedule change, we won't be facing Wandy Rodriguez or Roy Oswalt on this trip.

The worst match up for the Pirates is tonight with Charlie Morton against Bud Norris. Morton's ERA is more than half a point better than Norris,' but that counts for only a little with 5+ ERAs.

More to the point, Morton had his second worst outing of the season against the Astros in July. (The worst was his 10-run, one inning start against the Cubs.)

The presence of two weak pitchers suggests a free-for-all. The Pirates shouldn't be a huge underdog, but they aren't favorites either tonight.

Tomorrow, we have emerging star Ross Ohlendorf versus Brian Moeller. Ohlendorf was beaten rather badly in his earlier encounters with the Astros at home.

But his new, deceptive, overhead delivery since late July suggests that he will now benefit more from his experience with this team, than they will from their experience with him.

On Sunday, we have our staff ace, Paul Maholm, pitch against Felipe Paulino, with an ERA nearly two points higher.

The Pirates' better pitchers (for the weekend), vs. Houston's somewhat better hitters, could make for a surprisingly even series; 2-1 either way, with the "rubber game" of the match being decided by one or two runs, or even a "tie" (at the end of nine innings, and a decision in extra innings).

Then hopefully on to Los Angeles for another "surprise:" At least one out of three, on the road, against the National League team with the second-best record.