Bleacher Report - Articles by Bernie Horowitz

The Top 10 Individual Seasons in NHL History

Bernie Horowitz — Thu, 04 Sep 2008 13:10:59 -0400

Before reading this list, please note the criteria. I did not use two seasons from the same player, otherwise this list would have consisted of Gretzky and Lemieux only. That’s not an exaggeration.

When I made my selections, I took into account several attributes aside from the number of points scored. I considered the era, andhow much scoring there was in the league at the time. It was important to consider how the output of the player matched up with other high-point scorers from the same year.

Finally, I took into account the supporting cast of the stars who recorded these phenomenal scoring totals.

Honorable mentions:

1992-93 Pat LaFontaine - 53 goals, 95 assists for 148 points in 84 games

As is the case with all seven honorable mentions, this was a hard one to leave out. LaFontaine had a dynamite season, but scoring was up in 1992-93, and amazing as 148 points are, I don’t think season was good enough to crack the list. There were several players who scored 120+ points that year.

1992-93 Temmu Selanne - 76 goals, 56 assists 132 points in 84 games

See LaFontaine. 76 goals is a hell of a season. If you think that Selanne’s season is more impressive than that of LaFontaine, that only gets him to spot 11.

1992-93 Pierre Turgeon - 58 goals, 74 assists for 132 points in 83 games

See Selanne and LaFontaine.

1992-93 Adam Oates - 45 goals, 97 assists for 142 points in 84 games

See Selanne, LaFontaine and Turgeon.

1981-82 Mike Bossy - 64 goals, 83 assists for 147 points in 80 games

Certainly an impressive season. Bossy recorded 147 points, how could he not make this list, right? Wrong. Bossy’s 64 goals pale in comparison to Wayne Gretzky’s 92 that season. On the other hand, if Bossy had not enjoyed the benefit of playing with Brian Trottier and Clark Gillies, I probably would have put him on the list.

1988-89 Bernie Nicholls - 70 goals, 80 assists for 150 points in 79 games.

Nice season, but without Gretzky, this would never have happened. Just look at Nicholls’ career.

1995-96 Jaromir Jagr - 62 goals, 87 assists for 149 points in 82 games

Considering the level of scoring in 1995-96 compared to the eighties, Jagr’s season is very impressive. However, he did play on a line with Mario Lemieux and Ron Francis. I would never suggest Jagr was just a product of his linemates, but I still don’t think his season is good enough to make the list.

The List:

10. 2007-08 Alex Ovechkin - 65 goals, 47 assists for 112 points in 82 games

We all saw what Ovechkin did last year. That many goals in today’s NHL was an incredible achievement. Furthermore, Ovechkin didn’t have much help. Michael Nylander was supposed to be his main setup man, but missed most of the season. It will be interesting to see what will happen if Ovechkin spends a year on a line with a playmaking center.

9. 1976-77 Guy Lafleur - 56 goals, 80 assists for 136 points in 80 games

In 1976-77, only three players topped the 100-point plateau. For that era, 136 points was an especially high total, and if you watch film of LaFleur from this time period, he was always a step ahead of the competition.

8. 1988-89 Steve Yzerman - 65 goals, 90 assists for 155 points in 80 games

The argument against this one points out that Gretzky and Lemieux both substantially topped Yzerman. A final reason why Yzerman’s season was so exceptional is that he outscored the next-best offensive player on the team (Gerard Gallant) by 62 points.

7. 1985-86 Paul Coffey - 48 goals, 90 assists for 138 points in 79 games

This one doesn’t need much explaining. Coffey shattered the goal-scoring record for defensemen and finished near the top of the NHL in scoring. Forty-eight goals for a defenseman... try to imagine that happening today. It seems practically impossible when the best scoring D-men in the league only manage 20 goals per season. Yes, Coffey had Gretzky and Kurri, but that can only go so far.

6. 1970-71 Phil Esposito - 76 goals, 76 assists for 152 points in 78 games

Esposito destroyed his own scoring record of 126 points. It’s rare that major records are broken by such a margin. Of course, Espo had a supporting cast of Bobby Orr, Johnny Bucyk and Co., but 152 points was an immense accomplishment.

5. 1990-91 Brett Hull - 86 goals, 45 assists for 131 points in 78 games

Hull’s 86-goal season occurred after the scoring-madness of the eighties had subsided. He was the league’s leading goal scorer by a staggering 35 goals, as Cam Neely, Steve Yzerman, and Theoren Fleury tied for second-most goals with 51.

4. 1970-71 Bobby Orr - 37 goals, 102 assists for 139 points in 78 games

You knew this one was coming. Before Bobby Orr, it was unusual for a defenseman to score 15 goals. Let me put Orr’s career in perspective for a statistical standpoint: Doug Harvey had been considered the greatest offensive-defenseman before Orr.

Harvey—the powerplay quarterback of the Canadiens’ dynasty of the 1950’s—never scored more than nine goals in a season! His career overlapped with that of Orr, and only two years after Harvey’s retirement, Orr not only scored an unimaginable number of goals for a defenseman, but broke 100 assists during a time when 100 points was a rare accomplishment for a forward.

3. 1944-45 Maurice Richard - 50 goals, 23 assists for 73 points in 50 games

In the five previous seasons, the leading totals for goals had been 24, 26, 32, 33, and 38. Richard’s accomplishment was impressive at the time, but in retrospect it only becomes more significant because it took over 30 years for the 50-in-50 record to be broken.

2. 1988-89 Mario Lemieux - 85 goals, 114 assists for 199 in 76 games

Probably Lemieux’s best season. Not much explaining to do here. He had a solid supporting cast, but that’s immaterial. He defeated Gretzky for the scoring title by 31 points.

1. 1985-86 Wayne Gretzky - 52 goals, 163 assists for 215 points in 80 games

This record will never be broken. Gretzky make a joke of the scoring title, which he would have won by 22 points had he not scored a single goal. As he did score 52 goals, he won the scoring title by a margin of 74 points.

Perhaps the only other thing to discuss is the Lemieux-Gretzky debate. I think that Gretzky is by far the better player for several reasons.

From a statistical standpoint, his single-season records in goals and assists top those of Lemieux. But, for me, what truly divides them is the 1996-97 season. Gretzky showed that he was so talented, you could take away the skills he used for his incredible seasons in the early eighties (his speed, shot, and relative size), and he still tied Lemieux for the NHL lead in assists at the age of 36.

Lemieux was only 31 and was playing with Jagr and Francis. Gretzky was playing with Luc Robitaille and Niklas Sundstrom. In the playoffs, Gretzky scored two hat-tricks and carried the Rangers through two tough opponents (Florida had been in the finals the previous year and the Devils). Lemieux and the Penguins lost to the Devils in the first round in only five games.

Wayne Gretzky's Hidden Legacy

Bernie Horowitz — Fri, 29 Aug 2008 02:20:04 -0400

As Wayne Gretzky’s career becomes a memory, I find myself worried that people have begun to misconstrue the way he played.

For instance, almost every Gretzky video on YouTube is a compilation of goals scored in the early 1980s on goalies who look pathetic. Many of these clips do not do Gretzky justice.

There’s much more to Wayne Gretzky than the hurting he put on goalies of the early 1980s, who were completely unsuited to face a player so far ahead of his time

For most of the 20th century, goalie pads were made of deer hair covered with fabric. This was an unfortunate trend, because deer hair absorbs water easily and becomes heavier when waterlogged. It was impossible for a goalie using the old-style pads to quickly drop into the butterfly and jump back to his feet.

Some goalies managed to excel with these pads despite their limitations—Ken Dryden, Billy Smith, Vladislav Tretiak, Tony Esposito, and Pelle Lindbergh were some of the best. Either they were unusually nimble to the point where the pads couldn’t hold them down (Tretiak, Smith and Lindbergh), or incorporated their size into their style especially well (Esposito and Dryden).

The old-style pads were still the trend in 1980, as were many other archaic hockey traditions. Many goalies still wore old-fashioned flimsy masks, and the stick handling and speed of the game was incomparable to today—except for the Montreal Canadiens, who made a mockery of the rest of the league during the late seventies) The NHL game still lacked the pace which it had seen in a flash when the Red Army played Canada in 1972.

Enter Gretzky in 1980. By 1983, the old-style masks were gone. By 1990, no goalie in the league used the old-style pads, and the game was infinitely faster.

It’d be crazy to attribute this all to one player—but there is no denying that Wayne Gretzky was ready to play the modern game of hockey years before the rest of the league, and was by far the most powerful agent of change in the game.

This is the contrast we see in the clips from the early '80s, when Gretzky blazes past the apparently untalented goalies. However, by 1990, the power of Gretzky’s slapshot was average compared to the rest of the league—in the old clips, his shot looks like it’s 150 MPH.

The point I wish to make is that Gretzky’s scoring dominance somewhat hides the fact that he was far ahead of his time in all facets of the game. The NHL eventually caught up to Gretzky’s goal-scoring abilities, and by 1990, he was just one of the best snipers. However, he was still far ahead (and still is) of everybody in terms of his resourcefulness on the ice.

Gretzky was always far and away the smartest player in the NHL, and his ability to come up with logistical answers to various attempts to stop him should be better remembered than it is.

I’ve always felt that the most important statistic showing what Gretzky was really about is that he led the NHL in assists at the age of 36, in '96-97, which also happened to be one of the lowest-scoring seasons of the past 60 years. Even though his speed, stamina, and shooting ability were fading, Gretzky still was unparalleled in his playmaking and vision.

What was Gretzky like during games in which he scored seven points, aside from the 25-seconds of film showing the highlights? Throughout his career, nine times out of ten, Gretzky would do something ingenious whenever he got the puck.

I worry that people who never saw him play except for the highlights don’t realize the extent to which this was true. One of the reasons that I wrote this article was that it occurred to me that the three greatest plays I’ve ever seen Gretzky make are actually not well-known, at least in the sense that they do not appear in Gretzky highlight reels on youtube or on his DVD, The Ultimate Gretzky:

The first of the three plays took place during the 1987 Canada Cup Finals, perhaps the three most exciting games I’ve ever watched. Canada faced the Soviet Union, which was crumbling politically, but very much alive hockey-wise. Watching this series, you can see the full potential of a national team, because the Soviet players had been teammates for a decade.

It took a juggernaut to beat the Soviet team. The Canadians were just that, with 11 Hall-of-Famers on their roster (Hawerchuk, Messier, Gartner, Goulet, Gilmour, Mario Lemieux, Gretzky, Bourque, Coffey, Larry Murphy, and Grant Fuhr), and featuring a frightening five-legend umbrella powerplay of Messier centering Gretzky and Lemieux, with Bourque and Coffey at the point.

Game Two was played on a small ice surface, Copps Colosseum in Hamilton. With Canada on the power play, a blocked shot ricocheted off the boards and towards Gretzky in the corner. A Russian penalty killer was on him immediately. Despite the pressure, Gretzky settled the bouncing puck and made a pass all in one motion.

The pass was the most perfect saucer imaginable. It went through the pressuring player, then skipped once and evaded the stick of the Soviet forward in the passing lane, before finally settling flat on the ice just as it reached Ray Bourque. Gretzky got the puck again five seconds later and set up Lemieux for a goal.

Gretzky had five assists in Game Two alone, yet the only part of the series that’s remembered is the end of Game Three.

The second play took place in 1994. The Kings were on the power play against the Canucks. Gretzky took a slapshot from just inside the circle, to the left of the goal. It hit Luc Robitaille—who was stationed in front, facing goalie Kirk McLean—in the upper back and flew 20-25 feet in the air.

Gretzky and McLean were the only players on the ice who appeared to follow the flight of the puck, which was dropping near the right hash-marks.

Gretzky took two steps and swung his stick like a baseball bat, hard, at waist height. The puck rocketed over McLean’s shoulder and into the net. McLean had apparently been waiting for the puck to hit the ice, and was caught off-guard by the batted shot.

The third play took place during a Rangers-Devils playoff series in 1997, and is the one and only time I’ve ever seen the neutral zone trap broken by a single player. Gretzky picked up the puck on the left side of his own defensive zone and skated across the blueline about 10 feet off the boards, where he was met by two Devils forwards to his side and a defenseman straight ahead.

Half-way between the blueline and redline, Gretzky turned sharply to his left and curled towards the boards. Facing the boards, mid-stride, looking straight at the puck, he flipped it across to the other side of the ice at the Devils’ blueline, perfectly onto the stick of Alexei Kovalev, who was skating at full speed. Kovalev scored on the ensuing breakaway, as the Devils’ defense couldn’t recover in time.

As far as I know, of these three plays, the Canada Cup play isn’t on the internet anywhere, the baseball bat goal can be found in one clip on YouTube (at 1:40), and the play against the Devils is nowhere to be seen.

I might be over-reacting, but it would be terrible for people to visualize Wayne Gretzky as a dated player, his image constructed via the goals he scored in the early 1980s. If you look at the best-known highlight reels on YouTube, I’m afraid they do promote this image.

Top 10 Most Lopsided Trades in NHL History

Bernie Horowitz — Tue, 26 Aug 2008 08:16:02 -0400

Honorable Mentions

1. Mar. 18, 1983: The Kings traded Larry Murphy to the Capitals for Brian Engblom and Ken Houston

The Capitals stole Larry Murphy at 22 for a ridiculous price. Houston played only 33 more games in the NHL after the trade. Engblom was similarly unimpressive, though he played 3.5 more seasons.

2. Mar. 4, 1991: The Whalers traded Ron Francis, Ulf Samuelsson, and Grant Jennings to the Penguins for John Cullen, Jeff Parker, and Zarley Zalapski

This trade, though one-sided, doesn’t make the list because at the time, Cullen was a dominant player. At the time of the trade, he was 27 and had 94 points in just 65 games. Nobody could have guessed he would fall apart two years later.

The List

10. Oct. 4, 1991: Edmonton trades Mark Messier and Jeff Beukeboom to the Rangers for Bernie Nicholls, Steven Rice, and Louie Debrusk

Even if Edmonton was rebuilding after its dynasty, it’s hard to rationalize this trade. Messier was one of the best players in the NHL, and Edmonton was compensated with 30-year old Bernie Nicholls (a good player, but useless for a rebuilding team) and two prospects that never panned out (Steven Rice and Louie Debrusk).

There was an interview on WFAN (the New York City sports radio station) with former Rangers GM Neil Smith which touched on this trade. Smith explained that at the time, those interested in Messier were worried about the wear and tear on his body.

For the past 13 years, Messier had missed very few games and played deep into the playoffs in almost every season. In addition, he had appeared in several grueling Canada Cups. According to Smith, NHL GM’s going after Messier all believed this so fully that it drove down Messier’s value.

9. March 20, 1996: Vancouver Canucks traded Alek Stojanov to the Pittsburgh Penguins for Markus Naslund

This trade makes my list because of the staggering disparity between the two players. Many of the trades on this list involve one good player switching teams in exchange for packages of young players who did not pan out.

This deal is different. During the 1995-96 season, Stojanov had recorded no goals and one assist in 58 games. And no, he wasn’t a defenseman, he was supposed to be a power-forward. It’s hard to rationalize placing any value at all on a winger with that sort of statline. Stojanov finished his career with two goals and five assists in 108 games.

Also, this is not a case of two teams giving up on under-performing top prospects. Naslund was having a breakout season, and already had 52 points in 66 games at the time of the deal!

8. 1976: The Rangers traded Rick Middleton to the Bruins for Ken Hodge

This trade foreshadows the Rangers of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s: they traded Rick Middleton—a budding star—after his sophomore season for a washed-up scorer at the end of his career (Hodge).

Middleton went on to score 898 points in 881 games over 12 successful seasons with the Bruins. Hodge spent one full season with the Rangers, scoring 62 points. The next season, he faltered and was sent down after 18 games, never to return to the NHL.

7. June 6, 1986: The Canucks traded Cam Neely and a first-round pick to Boston for Gary Pederson.

This one still hurts Canucks fans. You could try to argue against blaming the Canucks’ management for the trade because Neely had scored only 39 and 34 points in his two seasons with the team, but that was between the ages of 19 and 21. Pederson—a star who had previously had seasons of 92, 107 and 116 points—only had two more successful seasons after the trade.

6. June 23, 2006: Florida traded Roberto Luongo, Lukas Krajicek, and a sixth round pick to Vancouver for Todd Bertuzzi, Bryan Allen, and Alex Auld

Kevin Lowe criticized Brian Burke for his tenure as Vancouver GM, saying that the team would have been in the cellar a long time ago had Dave Nonis not conned the Panthers out of Roberto Luongo. I think he’s right, and this is one of the most lopsided deals since I’ve followed hockey.

There’s no excuse for giving up Luongo for Bertuzzi. It’s true that Bertuzzi had scored 95 points three seasons before the deal, but his scoring had clearly declined somewhat by 2006. Worse yet, his value was further diminished because he was being booed in every arena including Vancouver due the Steve Moore incident.

Luongo was already established as one of the best goalies in the league, and was clearly in his prime. It’s true that Florida was trying to trade him because he had one year left on his contract and wasn’t going to re-sign, but surely they could have aimed higher...

5. Jan. 2, 1992: The Calgary Flames traded Doug Gilmour, Jamie Macoun, Kent Manderville, Ric Nattres, and Rick Wamsley to the Maple Leafs for Craig Berube, Alexander Godynyuk, Gary Leeman, Michel Petit, and Jeff Reese.

At the time of the trade, Doug Gilmour was one of the best players in the NHL, and was in his prime with plenty of time to spare. Calgary traded him, along with two of its most reliable shutdown defensmen (Nattress and Macoun), and a good backup goalie (Wamsley), for an enforcer (Berube), an eighth defenseman (Godynyuk), a declining secondliner (Leeman), a suitcase (Petit, the all-time record holder for most times traded last time I checked), and a third string goalie (Reese).

There’s simply no way to rationalize this trade from the Flames’ perspective.

4. Dec. 6, 1995: The Canadiens traded Patrick Roy and Mike Keane to the Colorado Avalanche for Andrei Kovalenko, Martin Rucinsky, and Jocelyn Thibault

No mystery here. Roy was one of the greatest goalies ever. Without him, I’m not sure Colorado would have won its two Stanley Cups. Kovalenko and Rucinsky were both career second or third line players. Thibault had several good seasons, but has only had three winning seasons since.

Roy demanded a trade after coach Mario Tremblay decided to unkindly leave him in the net after a bad firstperiod. After 20 minutes, Roy had allowed five goals on 17 shots, but Tremblay sent him back out, and he gave up four more goals before finally being yanked, enduring jeers from the fans.

Roy has since said that if Tremblay had not sent him back out, he would not have demanded a trade (see the Wikipedia entry for "Patrick Roy"). Tremblay had taken over from Jacques Demers after the latter was fired fove games into the season.

The Canadiens were not going to fire Tremblay because he had been with the organization even longer than Roy. However, the least they could have done was made a better trade.

3. March 7, 1988: The Flames traded Brett Hull and Steve Bozek to the Blues for Rob Ramage and Rick Wamsley

This one doesn’t require much explanation. The Flames traded Brett Hull towards the end of his rookie season along with a second line winger (Bozek) for a declining defenseman (Ramage) and a goalie St. Louis didn’t need anymore (Wamsley).

Ramage managed only four more full seasons and scored 136 points in 369 games. However, even if he had played as well as in his best season for many more years, the trade would not have been even in the grand scheme.

2. June 23 1975: Detroit traded Marcel Dionne and Bart Crashley to the Kings for Terry Harper, Dan Maloney, and a second round draft pick

This one is pretty simple. Marcel Dionne was 24, and had just scored 121 points. Dan Maloney had some potential, but even with that taken into account, his value should have come nowhere near that of Dionne.

The Red Wings traded one of the highest scorers in history at the age of 24 for a journeyman defenseman and a second-line winger. Dionne proceeded to make them pay by recording 592 goals and 813 assists for 1405 points in 1039 games over the next 14 seasons.

1. May 15, 1967: The Chicago Blackhawks traded Phil Esposito, Ken Hodge, and Fred Stanfield to the Bruins for Pit Martin, Gilles Marotte, and Jack Norris.

Often, when I read a list like this one, the Esposito trade is forgotten. I think it’s hard to argue that this is not by far the most lopsided trade ever made.

Boston acquired Hall-of-Famer Phil Esposito at 25 years old, and he went on to score over 100 points in six of his eight seasons with the Bruins, during which time he shattered the single-season scoring record. Hodge and Stanfield were highly-skilled forwards who both consistently averaged more than a point-per-game with the Bruins.

Hodge did it four out of nine seasons and Stanfield three out of six. All three played major roles in the Stanley Cup victories of 1970 and 1972.

Pit Martin was a solid, scoring winger, about as good as Stanfield. Marotte was a defenseman with some potential, but he never was more than a second-pairing player. Norris was a useless goalie.

Imagine if a team traded Evgeni Malkin (i.e. Esposito), Marian Hossa (Hodge) and Mike Ribeiro (Stanfield) for Vaclav Prospal (Martin), Ian White (Marotte) and Scott Clemmensen (Norris)…

New Jersey Devils At Fault for the Decline of the Pre-Lockout NHL

Bernie Horowitz — Sun, 20 Jul 2008 06:19:10 -0400

Like many people during the lockout, I searched for answers. How did we end up with 2-1 games and neither team eclipsing 22 shots? What happened to the high-scoring play of the 1980’s? It was the fault of the Devils of 1994 and 1995, led by Jacques Lemaire and Lou Lamoriello. I will not approach this dogmatically and rant about how the “Devils suck!”

This is not an outlandish claim. To begin with, Barry Melrose blames the Devils for the decline of offense in the NHL, and has said so on ESPN (the highlight was played several times when it was announced he was returning to coaching).

To answer those who equate the Devils’ original trap with others: traps are rarely the same, and each has its own quirks. The most important distinction is between “trapping” and “countering.” The words themselves explain the crucial distinction. “Trap” implies only a defensive act, whereas “countering’ implies an attack following the defense.

The first team to use countering with great success was the Toronto Maple Leafs of the mid 1990’s. They used a high-pressure style not unlike Detroit today. However, they did not “trap.” They were aggressive defensively, but when the famous line of Gilmour, Borchevsky and Andreychuk was on the ice (or the second line with Wendel Clark), defenses shook in their skates.

The same can be said for the Red Wings today, when they use Datsyuk and Zetterberg against the other team’s top line. This is the distinction used by Gary Bettman, though he does not fully explain. When Bettman says, “we want our best players to be our best players,” he means that late in a close game, the best players should be the ones entrusted with the outcome. This seems self-evident, but it was certainly not the case in the late nineties and early 2000’s.

Conversely, trapping is a purely defensive act. Besides, how can a team counter a neutral-zone breakdwon with a rush if the players doing high-pressure checking are usually unskilled? Therein lies the damage caused by Jacques Lemaire, Lou Lamoriello and the New Jersey Devils.

Ask yourself this: what are the 1994-95 Stanley Cup Champion Devils remembered for? I’d say that people most remember the goaltending of Martin Brodeur and the “Crash Line” (fitting for a trapping team). Disagree? Check the Wikipedia entry for “Mike Peluso.”

An upset is one thing, but it is hard to rationalize how a team with so little talent could sweep a team like Detroit. The Devils’ best offensive players were Scott Niedermayer (before he was fully developed), Stephane Richer, Neal Broten (who was aging fast) and Claude Lemieux (who scored only 19 points in 45 games during the season). On the other hand, they had a deep corps of defensive specialists led by Scott Stevens and Randy McKay. In net, they had Brodeur.

The Red Wings finished that season with a record of 33-11-4 and were coached by Scotty Bowman. They sported Paul Coffey, Sergei Federov, Steve Yzerman, Dino Ciccarelli, Keith Primeau, Vyacheslav Kozlov, Nicklas Lidstrom, Viacheslav Fetisov, and Vladimir Konstantinov, of whom six were hall-of-fame players at the peak of their careers. The goaltending tandem of Chris Osgood and Mike Vernon was one of the best in the league.

My explanation for the result is as follows: one team understood something about the game itself the other did not: that teaching untalented players to perform a simple task repeatedly could beat a team that did not employ a strategy tailored to respond in kind.

It should therefore not be surprising that people best remember the “Crash Line”: Mike Peluso, Bobby Holik and Randy McKay. Peluso recorded only 90 points in 9 NHL seasons. McKay had more offensive success than Peluso, but was far from a finesse player.

The same can be said for Holik. However one wants to disagree about their careers, the playoff stat lines are damning, to say the least. McKay led the group with a goal and two assists in twenty games. Holik came next with no goals and three assists in twenty games. Peluso had one goal and no assists.

There had been a drastic and disturbing mutation of the culture of the NHL. And, it was lauded as “good defensive hockey.” Nobody understood its magnitude at the time.

The major adjustment actually came in 1994. The Devils were without a doubt the first team to use a defense-first, second and third style despite having a talented team.

Technically, the 1994 Devils were better than the 1995 Devils. They had much more scoring power, but, in tie-game situations, coach Lemaire would send out Crash Line-caliber players rather than try to score. If he sent out Stephane Richer in a 4-on-4 situation late in a game, he would be paired with a defensive forward. Watch the Rangers-Devils series from 1994, and try to contradict me. You won’t have an easy time.

When the Devils discovered that they could employ this strategy and cut down on their pricey scoring forwards, keeping only three or four, they scored a mighty blow against the league, which had to deal with teams emulating the 1995 Devils for a decade. When teams noticed the Devils winning without much offensive finesse – and that it could only be fought with a similar strategy -- they copied what they saw. It was “countering” without the counter-attack. It saved money and yielded victory.

As you might have seen in a game this past season between the Canucks and Blue Jackets, skilled players often seemed secondary contributors, only truly making an impact if put on the power-play. In the years leading up to the lockout, teams even more devoid of offensive skill than anything we imagine today would experience success by coupling a good goaltender with a well-executed neutral zone trap and win, no matter how little talent they had.

The 1995-96 Panthers made it to the finals, and their best player was Scott Mellanby (hardly a sniper), with 70 points. Behind him, Florida’s best forwards were Rob Niedermayer, Ray Sheppard, Robert Svehla, Johan Garpenlov and Stu Barnes. What business had such a team in the Stanley Cup Finals?

Three years later, little had changed as the Buffalo Sabres lost in game 6 of the Stanley Cup Finals. Their best scorer was Miroslav Satan (he missed nine playoff games, but it didn’t affect the Sabres’ ability to trap). Their second best scorers were pathetic: Michael Peca (56 points) followed by Michal Grosek (50 points) and Curtis Brown (47 points).

When the Devils met the Mighty Ducks in the 02-03 finals, a “final showdown” of sorts occurred. Consider a simple analogy: two kung fu masters face one another. (I understand that the general idea of kung fu is to use one’s opponent’s aggression against them.) In such a hypothetical situation, both fighters would simply wait for the other to make a move, and neither would do so. Perhaps that’s why I can’t remember the series at all.

In 03-04, the problem was getting worse as the Calgary Flames made the finals featuring what can only be described as Jarome Iginla, Miika Kiprusoff and a bunch of grinders. The second-leading scorer behind Iginla was Craig Conroy, with 47 points. He was followed by Shean Donovan, with 42 points.

Because of the emergence of teams that could win without much talent, brutish scoring tactics appeared. Again, the Devils provide us with a sterling example: In 1997-98, the Rangers were playing the Devils, who were on the power play and had their 2^nd unit on the ice.

Because the Devils did not have as many skilled forwards as needed two full PP units, they had to act “creatively.” They stationed Polish coal miner (and you think I’m joking) turned NHL enforcer Krzysztof Oliwa in front of the net to cause a distraction.

After a few seconds, he was called for a blatant slashing penalty and the power play came to an end. Oliwa finished his NHL career with 45 points in over 400 games.

Fast-forward six seasons to game 5 of the 03-04 finals for an example of cause and effect. The aforementioned grinding Flames faced the Lightning. Calgary was having trouble scoring on Nikolai Khabibulin, so Ville Niemenen abandoned pretense and charged him for no apparent reason (the puck was nowhere near the goal, or to being shot). He was only suspended for one game.

People who try to defend the Devils’ tactics usually use one of two arguments. One: “The Devils were trend setters, they were just playing good defensive hockey” etc. This gets us nowhere because it implies that the future of the NHL lies in a sort of Dark Age of defensive hockey, impending financial doom and declining fan interest.

The other argument hinges on finance: “The Devils had no choice, they were being outspent, and had to find a way to compete.” First of all, they began the whole strategy when they had a talented team, and many of their successful teams of the 1990’s had enough scoring to compete on a normal basis.

Also, if the long-term goal of trapping was winning (without much spending) and financial success for the Devils, it was counter-productive because it drove the NHL to a point where hockey was so unpopular that only six teams could turn a profit (as explained in the Levitt Report).

You can credit the Devils for their success, but that avoids the crux of the matter: what they did was selfish.

State of the New York Rangers: A Positive Outlook on Glen Sather's Overhaul

Bernie Horowitz — Tue, 15 Jul 2008 11:21:21 -0400

As the frenzy of free agency has abated, we can sit back and examine the results with more perspective.

The gist of my stance on the Rangers’ offseason is simple: I trust Glen Sather completely, and so should you. “Why?” People ask, and quickly point to the dark years of the early 2000s.

Let’s start at the beginning. Glen Sather took over from Neil Smith, who, while he deserves credit for winning the Stanley Cup in 1994, dismantled the team not only in the short term, but for the future as well. The price of the win-now team of 1994 was almost unprecedented.

If you think that Colby Armstrong, Erik Christensen and Angelo Esposito was a high price for two months of Marian Hossa, how about the group led by Tony Amonte, Doug Weight and Mike Gartner?

Soon after the party was over, Glenn Anderson, Stephane Matteau, and Brian Noonan were gone, and Esa Tikkanen was in his last throws. In 1997, GM Smith again reloaded for a win-now team. The next season, with Mark Messier gone, Adam Graves was no longer the same, and Leetch, Gretzky, and Richter could not win by themselves.

Literally NOTHING was left in the Rangers’ system. When a prospect made a mark, he found himself gone with surprising speed (i.e., Marc Savard).

Enter Glen Sather, the architect of maybe the most powerful dynasty of all-time. Rangers fans forget that Glen Sather built a team so powerful that he was able to relinquish Wayne Gretzky in his prime and still win the Stanley Cup.

Sather's talent evaluating ability in the early 80s may be unparalleled in the history of the NHL. In a span of several years, Sather picked up stars such as Grant Fuhr and Paul Coffey in the early first round of the draft, but it is his later-round selections that are amazing.

Mark Messier (third round), Glenn Anderson (fourth round), Andy Moog (seventh round), Jari Kurri (fourth round), Esa Tikkanen (fourth round) are all examples of Sather’s talent gauging ability.

Admittedly, Sather’s magic touch was nowhere to be seen as the Oilers finally faded. However (as a headline bragged while Lou Lamoriello struggled with his mistakes just following the lockout), “Slats is back.”

Glen Sather has built the Rangers back up. There is no longer a huge hole in the minor leagues, as was the case under Neil Smith. The minor league system teems with prospects such as by Bobby Sanguinetti and Alexei Cherepanov.

It is time that Rangers fans appreciated Sather for what he has done the last couple of years.

I don’t feel that he has the respect he deserves for several reasons: First, that he is friends with Jim Dolan (no further explanation required). Second, that the Rangers did not win for the first four years Sather was general manager. Third, because we have not yet fully seen the extent of the young talent pool Sather has compiled.

Sather has made many changes, but they are the last in a top-to-bottom overhaul of the organization. Whatever the case, the Rangers have an excellent coach and the prerequisite for a Stanley Cup, a top-notch goaltender. Sather has made changes which I support. I will now review them.

Defense

We should not complain about the Wade Redden signing. Redden is not Brian Leetch, but he is a top pairing defenseman. The important point is that he’s something NOT to worry about. He will not give the puck away like Tom Poti or take dumb penalties like Marek Malik, both of whom were unfortunately plugged into primary roles in the past.

Redden is versatile and clearly a smart player if you look at his +/- ratings. With the cap rising by the year, his “high” price is much less worrisome than some ambulance chasers make it out to be.

The Kalinin signing could turn out to be a brilliant move. It is low risk (in that it’s a one year contract) and could pay dividends. Kalinin is still young and by no means should be judged by his performance last season.

Michal Roszival may well do even better on the power play, as he will no longer shake in his skates at the sight of Jaromir Jagr to his right and act like a “deer in the headlights.”

Dan Girardi and Marc Staal can only get better. Paul Mara is a solid player who is certainly nothing to sneer at, especially as a sixth defenseman.

By using four defensemen who have substantial offensive ability, the Rangers have made a pivotal organizational transition which has gone completely overlooked. They will now use a normal power play format with two defensemen on the point at all times, with Redden, Roszival, Kalinin, and Mara.

The power play will no longer be a muddle of Martin Straka and Roszival both constantly deferring to a shadowed Jagr. There will no longer be desperate stimulus strategies such as having Marek Malik shifting between the front of the net and the point.

It is easy to under estimate the stabilizing effect of having four defensemen who can play the point on the PP. The Rangers will head into the season prepared, with two set PP units.

Forwards

Rangers fans are worried about goal-scoring. While the defensive corps is certainly better established, the situation at forward is nowhere near as problematic as some claim.

Let’s recap: last season, Jaromir Jagr, Shanahan, and Straka declined. Avery missed many games and when he was in the lineup, he had trouble with the puck because of wrist problems.

True, it’s much more reassuring to hear Sam Rosen say, “Jagr with Dubinsky and Straka” than “Dubinsky with Zherdev and Naslund,” but perhaps this juxtaposition will put in perspective the power of name recognition. Zherdev and Naslund combined had roughly the same output as Jagr and Straka (pro-rated). The difference is that Zherdev and Naslund should be expected to do better this season rather than decline (which I will get to later).

I think that we have a good sense of what to expect of Drury and Gomez, but what of the unknown commodities?

The Rangers’ offense this year will rely on growth. The truth is, nobody knows what Petr Prucha, Ryan Callahan, and Nigel Dawes can accomplish on one of the top lines. All three will get chances to step into a major role.

Personally, I think that Prucha’s magic is gone, that Callahan will remain the same (a hard-working winger with some scoring ability), and that Dawes will continue to develop into a sniper.

If even one of the aforementioned players flourishes, the Rangers will be in great shape, with two full lines that can score. Besides, there’s no question that Brandon Dubinsky will continue to emerge as a threat.

What should we make of Naslund and Zherdev? With these acquisitions, Sather is betting against Ken Hitchcock and Alain Vigneault, and the odds are in his favor. Both Naslund and Zherdev are escaped prisoners of ultra-defensive trapping coaches. Both players are going to hit the ice as if they’ve just escaped prison.

We know that Naslund is aging, but it is perfectly realistic to expect him to score 30 goals, since he’s actually allowed to shoot the puck this year. Zherdev, only 23, is the wild card, having come from a similarly restrictive situation, and in addition having great potential. (One need only go on YouTube for reassurance.)

Also, lest we forget, Zherdev was acquired for Fedor Tyutin and a bulky bag of pucks that cost over $2 million (Christian Backman). The opportunity cost of the trade is very low. Tyutin is a defined commodity and is not going to explode offensively. The only thing to say about Backman is that Sather deserves credit for managing to trade him to clear cap space.

Let’s face it, the Jagr/Shanahan generation could only last for so long. For the first time in over a decade, a Rangers fan can look at the roster and minor league system and exhale because there is youth and talent throughout. If the team falters in the short term, it is built well enough to rebound the following season.

This team has nowhere to go but up. Thank you, Slats.