Pricey Prospects: The Pittsburgh Pirates' Predilection

(Photo by Jim McIsaac/Getty Images)

A couple days ago, the Pirates traded the elite established player, Nate McLouth, for one advanced prospect, Charlie Morton, and two raw prospects: Gorkys Hernandez and Jeff Locke.

If these prospects are truly "elite," they would just be worth about McLouth when put together. The fear is that they aren't, at least not all of them, meaning that the Pirates dealt themselves out of a good hand again.

The Pirates are not the only team that has had trouble in this regard. When the Minnesota Twins were about to lose elite Johan Santana to free agency, they offered him to the Boston Red Sox for two elite advanced prospects, Jon Lester and Jacoby Ellsbury.

Boston was willing to offer only one of those advanced prospects, plus a raw prospect. The Yankees made a better offer, of an above-average advanced prospect Phil Hughes, and an above average established player, Melky Cabrera. But for some strange reason, the Twins preferred a package of four undistinguished prospects, in the Pirates' style.

On the other hand, DePodesta actually made out all right with his Shawn Green trade. By saving on Green's $15 million salary, he was able to sign the comparable J.D. Drew for slightly less, paying the difference to Navarro and the other prospects.

If you look at it this way, you can see that DePodesta  swapped Green for Drew and got the admittedly inferior Navarro for "free."  

Monetary savings may be a reason why prospects are now valued. If two low-paid elite prospects can actually do the job of an established elite player, the salary difference could be enormous.

But look at what has been happening in free agency, the past year.

Formerly elite, established players like Jason Giambi and Bobby Abreu can be had for mid-millions, not tens of millions. And the New York Mets effectively picked up Gary Sheffield for $400,000, a rookie salary.

There is no "sure thing," but paying several million dollars for an established player seems like a better bet than gambling on two or three advanced prospects, a move that is often "penny wise, dollar foolish."

There's a Japanese board game, Go, that has two styles, high and low. "High" becomes all the rage for several years while everyone forgets how to play low. Then "low" becomes the ticket to ride, until high recaptures the imagination.

Right now, the "low" road, of prospects, is the preferred road, especially after the success of the Tampa Bay Rays in 2008. But given falling salaries, it may soon be time for teams to rediscover the virtues of "high." And once again, the Pirates look like they will be the last, not first, on this train.

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